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Abstract
Cognitive processes have traditionally been studied objectively within controlled
environments, and how they unfold for different individuals in the flow of everyday life
remains unexplored. This is partially due to the difficulty of studying cognition in real
world settings. Capturing subjective perceptions of cognition may be of use. Selfreported cognitive failures, being minor slips and errors during routine activities, are a
construct of interest. Cognitive failures are associated with schizotypy, a constellation
of personality traits thought to represent psychosis-proneness. It has been posited that
subjective impairment represents a cognitive marker of psychosis risk. However, there
is a “gap” between objectively normal performance and subjectively impaired cognition
in schizotypy which is not understood. Additionally, cognitive failures are poorly
defined, and there is debate concerning the validity of subjective complaints as a
measure of cognition.
The aims of this thesis were to develop a clearer conceptualisation of cognitive failures,
and to consider the nature of the relationship between failures and schizotypy. Two
systematic reviews were initially undertaken to inform further empirical research.
Review 1 involved the examination of cognitive failures in healthy populations, and
highlighted that a range of trait and state factors co-occur to shape the likelihood
cognitive failures will occur. Ongoing concerns regarding the validity of self-reported
cognition were also evident. It was proposed that cognitive failures capture capacity in
the real world; aspects of cognition separate to objectively-determinable ability. In
Review 2, cognitive failures were examined in psychologically disordered and
substance user populations, both of whom were found to experience heightened failures.
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Directed by these findings, Study 1 addressed the impact of self-awareness on selfreported cognitive failures. Self and observer ratings of neuroticism and cognitive
failures were compared for 409 healthy target participants and were moderately
correlated. Neither high nor low neuroticism or self-awareness corresponded with a
reduced correlation between self and observer reports of cognitive failures. This
supported that groups who report heightened failures genuinely experience more errors
in day-to-day life.
Studies 2 and 3 focused on the schizotypy-cognitive failures relationship. Study 2 aimed
to examine self-reports of 863 healthy participants and found increased failures in high
schizotypes relative to low schizotypes. In addition, it was found that negative affect
mediates this relationship, suggesting that emotion contributes to the experience of
failures in schizotypy.
Study 3 involved the assessment of both subjective and objective cognition in 127
healthy participants. Cognitive failures and schizotypy were moderately correlated.
Deficits were evident for emotional but not neutral content on a working memory task.
Fearful stimuli combined with high task difficulty elicited the most errors. However,
self-reported cognitive failures did not correlate with objective cognition even when
incorporating emotional processes. It seems that high schizotypes demonstrate normal
cognition until overwhelmed with high levels of cognitive load and emotion.
Together the results underscore the significance of self-reported cognitive failures as
reflecting aspects of cognition distinct from objective ability. Cognitive failures warrant
further attention from both researchers and clinicians as potentially reflecting
dysfunction of emotion regulation and increased risk for psychological disorders
including psychosis.
iii
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1. Introduction

1.1. Cognition – its significance and determinants.
Cognition is crucial for our successful interaction with others and the world around
us, and enables us to cope with the constant demands of our busy lives. Cognitive
ability refers to the optimal level at which an individual is able to perform across
various domains, including information processing speed, memory, and verbal and
spatial ability (Plomin, 1999), in order to successfully navigate tasks and solve
problems. A term more widely known by the general population, and also explored
extensively within cognitive research, is intelligence. This differs slightly from ability in
that it is broader, encompassing not only performance capability within each domain of
cognition, but also one’s underlying aptitude for “catching on” to what needs to be
understood, or done, in any given situation (Gottfredson, 1997). Although not
completely interchangeable, the research on factors shaping both ability and intelligence
are considered here. Ability is often thought of as innate, and is known to be primarily
shaped by biological factors including structural features of the brain, such as overall
grey matter volume (Andreasen et al., 1993; McDaniel, 2005), and neural efficiency
(Neubauer & Fink, 2009). Brain structure and function are in turn shaped by genetics,
with intelligence conceptualised as a polygenic trait that has a heritability index
somewhere between 0.4 and 0.8 (Nisbett et al., 2012). To a lesser extent, personality
traits may also contribute, with some traits, such as conscientiousness, consistently
associated with heightened cognitive ability (Bratko, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Saks,
2006; Zeidner, 1995). However, by definition, traits that fall under the umbrella of
personality reflect any cognitions, emotions, and behaviours that are enduring across
time and context; ability and intelligence have thus been argued to themselves be
1

personality traits, albeit ones that are particularly cognitive in nature (Barratt, 1995;
DeYoung, 2011). While exploration of the key determinants of cognition continue, an
individual’s level of ability is understood to remain relatively stable over time
(Rönnlund, Sundström, & Nilsson, 2015), with alterations generally only occurring as a
result of significant physiological events such as brain injury or disease.
Optimal ability as assessed in the clinic or lab tends to be the focus of most
existing cognitive research, and as such little progress has been made towards
understanding how ability translates into performance in everyday life. Everyone
experiences slips in attention from time to time, and generally these might lead to
relatively benign consequences such as a missed appointment or an embarrassing slip of
the tongue. However, lapses in cognition can also have a major impact, from workplace
injuries (Simpson, Wadsworth, Moss, & Smith, 2005), to train crashes (Reason, 1984)
and major aviation accidents (Weigmann & Shappell, 1997), to medical errors resulting
in disability or death (Tokuda, Kishida, Konishi, & Koizumi, 2011). Although these are
extreme examples, even minor errors in thinking can prove an irritant that quickly
become disruptive to functioning and wellbeing for those who experience them
frequently. There is therefore a need to diversify cognitive research to also explore real
world cognitive functioning, and the factors that cause some individuals to be more
prone to difficulties than others.

1.2. Problems with everyday cognition in psychopathology
While the experience of slips in normal cognitive processes during daily
activities is commonplace, certain populations experiencing psychological distress tend
to complain of heightened problems with their day-to-day cognitive functioning. The
negative impact of distress on real world cognition has been well researched within
2

populations with physical illness or injury, such as those with epilepsy (Canizares et al.,
2000) and cancer (Hutchinson, Hosking, Kichenadasse, Mattiske, & Wilson, 2012). In
addition, proneness to distress is associated with increased risk for serious cognitive
disorders such as dementia (Wilson et al., 2003, 2006). The relationship between issues
with everyday cognition and serious psychological disorders has also been explored.
Schizophrenia was initially labelled “dementia praecox,” referring to the insidious
deterioration in cognition that was evident in the majority of patients prior to the advent
of antipsychotic drugs (Adityanjee, Aderibigbe, Theodoridis, & Vieweg, 1999).
Presently, abnormalities with cognition are seen as fundamental aspects of the core
psychopathology of schizophrenia, and a variety of data have elucidated a clear profile
of deficits in domains including working memory, executive function, and attention
(e.g., Maggioni, Bellani, Altamura, & Brambilla, 2016; Reichenberg, 2010;
Reichenberg et al., 2009). However, it is also known that this disorder is linked to
problems with cognitive function during daily activities (Aubin, Stip, Gélinas,
Rainville, & Chapparo, 2009), separate to its core symptoms of hallucinations,
delusions, and disorganised thinking. There is of course significant potential confound
from antipsychotic medications, however deficits in cognitive functioning are evident in
the prodromal phase (Schultze-Lutter et al., 2012), and even prior to this, as early as the
first grade (Bilder et al., 2006). Hence, issues with normal cognitive processes in
schizophrenia tend to be conceptualised as reflecting the core neuropsychological
deficits characteristic of the disease.
However, the cognitive aspects of other psychological disorders have been given
less consideration by researchers. Minor problems such as forgetfulness and distraction
have been widely acknowledged as part of the symptomatology of depression and
anxiety (Carlson & Kashani, 1988; Ninan & Berger, 2001). Despite the presumed
3

contribution of cognitive difficulties to the social and occupational impairments evident
in clinical populations, as well as the large body of knowledge on laboratory-assessed
neuropsychology, there remains a large gap in the literature around everyday cognition
in mental illness. The evidence for the link between everyday cognitive difficulties such
as distractibility or clumsiness and psychopathology therefore remains largely
anecdotal, despite the fact that distraction and similar difficulties are “symptoms” of
mental illness recognised by clinicians, lay people, and the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In
contrast to perceptions of cognitive deficits as central to schizophrenia, it has generally
been thought that such difficulties are secondary symptoms in depression and anxiety,
emerging from the specific cognitive and emotional patterns associated with these
disorders. For example, in depression, preoccupation with ruminative thoughts about the
past diverts cognitive resources away from the tasks at hand (Watkins & Brown, 2002),
resulting in distraction; worrying about possible future events has the same result in
anxiety (Wells, 1995).
While the basis for these issues is yet to be explicitly researched, it is interesting
that there have been a number of recent interventions developed aimed at targeting
minor cognitive complaints associated with mental health issues. For example, a
multitude of “brain training” programs, often delivered via simple phone or computer
apps, purport to improve sufferers’ ability to resist the distraction caused by negative
thoughts (Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2015). Within psychotherapy, mindfulness-based
approaches similarly aim to improve ability to control the focus of attention (Jain et al.,
2007). While both treatment strategies are now in wide use, from a research perspective,
the link between real world cognitive slips and psychological distress or disorders
remains assumed rather than clearly elucidated. As such, the nature of this relationship
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and the factors that may exacerbate cognitive problems in psychological disorder
remain largely unknown.

1.3. Significance of research into everyday cognition
An improved understanding of the relationship between real world cognition and
psychopathology is important for a number of reasons. Self-perceptions of cognitive
difficulties in the flow of everyday life are of value for the insight they provide into the
lived experience of people with psychological disorders. The translation of ability into
capacity in ecological contexts is essential for successful functioning in all domains of
life including self-care, occupational, and social. Given the functional impairment
experienced to varying degrees by people with a range of psychological disorders, and
the fact that this is a key determinant of help-seeking (Addington, Van Mastrigt,
Hutchinson, & Addington, 2002; Roness, Mykletun, & Dahl, 2005), it is important that
problems with everyday cognitive performance noted by the patient themselves are
explored as potentially having a tangibly negative impact on quality of life.
Another primary reason for research in this area is the possibility that problems
with day to day cognitive functioning may contribute to the onset and maintenance of
both psychological distress, referring to a low to moderate level of emotional discomfort
that may be persistent or a reaction to life stressors (Horwitz, 2007), and also more
severe mental illness. A cognitive model of psychopathology would posit that
problematic information processing styles contribute to distress, which then amplifies
problems with normal cognitive functioning, triggering further distress, and so on (e.g.,
Beck & Haigh, 2014; Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005). In this way, the impact of
problematic cognition on multiple aspects of daily functioning may lead to a reduced
perceived quality of life. Thus, a vicious cycle exists whereby issues with cognition and
5

distress feed back into each other, and minor issues with thinking can negatively affect
psychological functioning and ultimately significantly reduce well-being. A cocontributing relationship between distress and problems with cognition is already
documented within dementia: healthy older adults who experience greater anxiety and
are concerned about their cognitive functioning are more likely to exhibit impairment
(Mecacci & Righi, 2006), and individuals who experience recurrent episodes of
depression throughout their lifetime are at higher risk of developing dementia (Dotson,
Beydoun, & Zonderman, 2010; Gabryelewicz et al., 2007). It is possible that in serious
psychological disorders such as schizophrenia, even minor cognitive complaints could
induce sufficient distress to further break down cognitive functioning, ultimately
increasing risk of illness onset for at-risk and prodromal individuals (Palmier-Claus,
Dunn, Taylor, Morrison, & Lewis, 2013). Hence, improved understanding of how
distress and cognition interact will enable better conceptualisation of the role of day-today cognitive difficulties in risk for mental illness. This may lead to a refinement of
cognitive intervention, given that the majority of existing approaches target the
biological bases of neuropsychological deficits, rather than focusing on amelioration of
difficulties in real world functioning.
Following on from this, problems with cognition may negatively impact
treatment outcomes, particularly with regards to psychotherapy. Severe cognitive
impairment in patients with issues such as traumatic brain injury and dementia are
routinely considered and accounted for in approaches to therapy such as modified
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) programs (e.g., Fann et al., 2015; Kraus et al.,
2008). In such treatments, abstract psychological concepts are made concrete and
talking kept to the minimum in order to facilitate information absorption by the patient,
despite their serious deficits. However, the less dramatic but nevertheless niggling slips
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and failures experienced by individuals with psychological disorders are rarely taken
into consideration. Complex psychotherapies, including those that focus more on
therapist-client transference elements such as psychodynamic therapies, are evidencebased treatments used for a variety of disorders including depression (Leichsenring,
2001). It is possible that the ability of patients to engage with and benefit from such
therapies may be interrupted by even minor cognitive problems. Hence, alongside
improvements in understanding patients’ lived experiences of cognition as a risk factor,
this research may also lead to improvement in the efficacy of certain psychotherapies by
acknowledging problematic cognition in disorders in which it was previously
unexplored.

1.4. Self-reported cognitive failures as a means of exploring everyday cognition
To study real world cognition as opposed to cognitive ability may require a shift
in focus towards subjective experiences of functioning, constituting a move away from
traditional, objective approaches to examining cognition. Despite psychological
researchers’ desire to control for “context,” the laboratory is also problematic as it
presents yet another specific context with its own (quite strange) demands and
confounds (Reis, 2012). As such, there is a need to consider external validity as being of
equal importance to internal validity (Reis, 2012). With regards to the study of
cognition specifically, Reason (1984) argued that minor slips and lapses, whether
catastrophic or simply embarrassing, warrant understanding purely on the basis of their
being a part of everyday life. Indeed, he felt that venturing beyond the lab to consider
the ordinary concerns of cognition within day-to-day living was likely to provide
researchers with findings both theoretically and practically meaningful (Reason, 1984).
Such arguments suggest that subjective experiences of cognition in everyday life should
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be recognised as important in their own right. At the very least, there is a need to make
explicit the implicit knowledge held about problems with cognition in psychological
disorders. Although not necessarily neatly measurable, individuals’ perceptions of their
own capacity to function successfully during the routine or unexpected demands of their
daily lives can provide valuable information about how real world state and trait factors,
including distress, influence real world cognition. Hence, this thesis will be utilised to
explore subjective experiences of real world cognition, rather than focusing solely on
eliciting samples of performance within the lab.
Cognitive failures are a construct of interest in the study of subjectivelyperceived real world cognition. These are slips in thinking, and capture errors in
memory, attention, perception, and action that often occur during daily life. Cognitive
failures can be self-reported using a structured tool such as the Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), which assesses
proneness to committing a number of common errors in routine tasks. Such errors are
viewed as the behavioural outcomes of cognitive slips. Whilst cognitive failures have
been studied in several papers over the past three decades, the literature has been
somewhat scattered, with no clear conceptualisation or definition as yet shared between
researchers. Self-reported cognitive failures warrant further exploration as a means of
examining everyday cognition and its correlates. This also has the potential to improve
understanding of how psychopathology relates to cognitive functioning outside of
clinical and research settings, in the real world.

1.5. General thesis aims
This thesis will involve the exploration of the experience of cognitive failures in
everyday life and make sense of how it differs from objectively assessed cognition, as
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well as exploring how these relate to psychological distress and disorder. These aims
will be met through two broad objectives:
1) A systematic literature review of cognitive failures in healthy and clinical
populations will help to confirm the construct’s relevance and utility as a
measure of everyday cognition. This will also enable development of a clear
conceptualisation of cognitive failures as they apply to both healthy and clinical
populations.
2) On the basis of the literature review, a series of empirical studies will be
developed to explore the relationship between cognitive failures and
psychopathology. Specific aims arising from the literature reviews will be
described later in this thesis.
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2. A systematic review of cognitive failures in daily life: Healthy populations.

This chapter is based on a paper published in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews.

Carrigan, N. & Barkus, E. (2016). A systematic review of cognitive failures in daily
life: Healthy populations. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 63, 29 – 42.
10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.01.010
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2.1. Introduction
Apparently healthy people experience the frustration (and sometimes
embarrassment) of “brain farts” or cognitive failures on a daily basis. Common
incidents include walking to a room only to forget what you were looking for, locking
your keys in the car, or repeatedly pushing an apparently jammed door before noticing
the large “Pull” sign emblazoned on its front. Whilst irritating and generally quite
minor, some individuals tend to experience these slips more often than others. For these
people, cognitive failures can represent a serious concern and barrier to successfully
carrying out routine responsibilities. Currently, the factors that increase proneness to
cognitive failures are not well understood, and comparisons with objective cognitive
domains have done little to assist researchers in determining how such errors might be
prevented.
The ageing population is bringing to the fore our limited understanding of
cognitive failures. Even healthy ageing appears to be associated with decline in specific
types of cognitive functions, such as those involving the demand for recall (Hohman,
Beason-Held, Lamar, & Resnick, 2011; Rast, Zimprich, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2009).
However, increased awareness of dementia means middle-aged and older people are
experiencing more anxiety about normal cognitive decline, a phenomenon known as
“dementia worry” (Kessler, Bowen, Baer, Froelich, & Wahl, 2012). They are
increasingly turning to commercial brain training programs to improve function. The
marketplace for these cognitive training tools is projected to be worth US$5,721.2
million by 2018 (Markets and Markets, 2014). Whilst training in a specific task may
improve performance on that task, it is unclear whether improvement generalises to real
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life cognitive functioning (Kelly, Loughrey, Lawlor, & Robertson, 2014; Valenzuela &
Sachdev, 2009). Available tools target specific aspects of cognitive ability, but do not
address everyday problems. Understanding the nature and triggers of cognitive failures,
as well as their relationship to formal cognitive assessment, would help improve
identification of individuals at risk of normal age-related cognitive decline, dementia,
and some psychological disorders, at different points in the lifespan, prior to substantial
reductions in cognition and functioning being realised.
The term “cognitive failures” was coined by Broadbent et al. (1982) to refer to
minor slips that cause the normally smooth flow of intended action (physical or mental)
to be disrupted. Cognitive failures reflect a global liability towards frequent lapses in
cognitive control. Several measures have been developed to assess the degree of
liability one possesses to express cognitive failures; those identified in this review are
listed in Table 2.1. The most widely used of these is the Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982), which is perhaps also the broadest
measure in terms of domains of error assessed. We have decided to include all of these
measures in the current review (as opposed to just the CFQ) as whilst they may focus on
particular types of errors, they each tap into the subjective experience of cognitive
failures.
There has been a rich history of psychological researchers attempting to examine
cognition as it occurs in daily life even prior to Broadbent et al.’s seminal paper. From
the 1960s onwards, daydreaming was a particular phenomenon of interest by
researchers such as Jerome L. Singer, Eric Klinger, and Leonard Giambra (e.g.,
Giambra, 1977; Klinger & Cox, 1987; Singer & Antrobus, 1963; Singer, 1975).
Although daydreaming may represent a subtype of cognitive failures, the focus of these
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researchers was undoubtedly on the type and intensity of the content of daydreams. In
addition, these researchers focused on the potentially constructive nature of daydreams
(e.g., in fostering creativity/problem-solving) rather than the associated negative
outcomes reflected in the cognitive failures construct. McVay and Kane (2010) argue
that mind-wandering reflects executive failure rather than function; this is the approach
inherent in the cognitive failures construct as it stands today and is the focus of the
current review.
A number of concerns have been raised with regards to the validity of subjective
measures of cognitive functioning. Some authors suggest self-reports of cognition must
match up with performance on objective (laboratory-based) tasks in order to be
considered valid (e.g., Herrmann, 1982). Therefore, the current lack of a neat correlation
between the CFQ and objective outcomes is a concern for many cognitive researchers.
This is linked to other more general concerns about self-reports of cognition, such as the
high demand placed on respondents’ memory by requiring recall of specific experiences
over a relatively long time period (Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Van Os, 2003).
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Table 2.1
Self-report Measures of Cognitive Failures in Articles Selected for Review
Measure

Domains of error
assessed
Cognitive Failures - Perception
Questionnaire
- Memory
(CFQ; Broadbent - Misdirected action
et al., 1982)
Self and informant
versions available.

Structure of measure

Sample item

25 items describing
common slips of
thought and
behaviour. Frequency
rated along 5-point
scale from Very Often
to Never.

Do you fail to listen
to people’s names
when you are
meeting them?

Cognitive
Slippage Scale
(CSS; Miers &
Raulin, 1987)

- Confused thinking 35 items designed to
- Speech deficits
measure cognitive
slips and distortion.
Requires a True/False
response.

I often find myself
saying something
that comes out
completely
backwards.

Dysexecutive
Syndrome
Questionnaire
(DEX; Burgess,
Alderman,
Wilson, Evans, &
Emslie, 1996)

- Inhibition
- Intentionality
- Executive
memory

20 items describing
behaviours arising
from problems with
executive control.
Frequency rated along
5-point scale from
Very Often to Never.

I get events mixed
up, or get confused
about the correct
order of events.

Prospective and
Retrospective
Memory
Questionnaire
(PRMQ; G.
Smith, Della Sala,
Logie, & Maylor,
2000)

- Memory

16 items describing
particular types of
memory errors.
Frequency rated along
5-point scale from
Very Often to Never.

Do you decide to
do something in a
few minutes’ time
and then forget to
do it?

Reservations about subjective experiences of cognition also reflect the
traditional approach of cognitive psychology, which focuses solely on objectively
assessed “trait” intellect (see Horn, 1972). This is known to be predicted by several
relatively stable factors; most notably genetics (Davies et al., 2011). Changes in
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performance occur only in response to biological processes such as ageing, injury, and
disease, and produce specific, well-documented cognitive profiles (e.g., GonzálezBlanch et al., 2007; Hildebrandt, Fink, Kastrup, Haupts, & Eling, 2013). Thus, the
stability and predictability of trait cognitive ability makes it appealing to clinicians and
researchers alike. However, most people feel instinctively that their cognitive
functioning varies with their mood, environment, and particularly over time - some days
they simply do not function as efficiently as usual, whilst on others they are far more
focused. The objective cognitive tasks considered the gold standard in both research
and clinical settings, whilst useful, capture cognition in an idealistic environment, and at
only one point in time. On the other hand, reports of cognitive failures could add to our
understanding of how cognitive processes play out in real life, improving ecological
validity of research into human cognition.
Review objectives
Despite the potential for a better understanding of cognition in real-life contexts,
subjectively-reported cognitive slips and failures comprise a small research area. The
aim of this review is to identify and draw together the various different factors involved
in day-to-day patterns of failures in healthy individuals. Three core questions will be:
1) How do we define the construct of cognitive failures?
2) What is the relationship between subjectively-reported cognitive failures and
performance on objective tasks?
3) What biological, psychological, and environmental factors influence levels of
cognitive failures?
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As yet, no review of the cognitive failures literature exists. The current systematic
review is therefore necessary to facilitate the development of a unified model of factors
that influence liability towards cognitive failures in otherwise healthy individuals. This
is timely given that this area of study has evolved significantly over the past three
decades.

2.2. Method
We designed and reported this systematic review based on the principles of the
PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses)
statement (Liberati et al., 2009). PRISMA was developed from standards provided by
the QUOROM (Quality Of Reporting Of Meta-analyses) statement, and is based on the
definitions of systematic reviews and meta-analyses set forth by the Cochrane
Collaboration.

2.2.1. Search strategy
Studies were identified by searching electronic databases and scanning reference
lists. PsycINFO (1967-June 2015), Web of Science’s Social Sciences Citation Index
(1956-June 2015), Scopus (1960- June 2015) and the Cochrane database were searched
using the following index items via Boolean search criteria: “cognitive slip* OR
cognitive failure* OR subjective cogniti* AND everyday;” “cognitive slip* OR
cognitive failure* OR subjective cogniti* AND daily.” These search terms were derived
from examination of seminal cognitive failure articles. No limits were applied for year
of publication or language, but only English-translated papers were accessed.
Reference lists of key articles were hand-searched. All types of papers were included in
the search. The last search was run on 10th June, 2015.
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2.2.2. Eligibility criteria
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were outlined prior to the search. Studies were
included if they were:
•

Published in a refereed journal;

•

Identified cognitive failures or subjectively-reported cognitive impairment as
one of their primary measures or outcomes; and

•

Utilised a quantitative, subjective measure of everyday frequency of cognitive
functioning.

Studies were excluded if they:
•

Sampled from a non-healthy/clinical population (e.g., dementia, disease,
psychological disorders);

•

Were attempts to validate measures with specific populations (e.g., cultural,
language groups) or created for specific populations (e.g., hospitalised elderly
people);

•

Measured subjectively-reported cognitive performance with too few items (i.e.,
< 5 items if quantitative);

•

Came from non-psychological or health-related research fields (e.g.,
ergonomics); or

•

Studied an intervention (e.g., cognitive remediation, CBT for sleep problems).

Case studies, letters to the editor, and conference abstracts were also excluded. The
researchers screened titles and abstracts of the articles gathered during the search
against the exclusion criteria. Selected articles were then read by the first author and
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confirmed by the second author, and were excluded if they focused on any excluded
topic or did not use acceptable subjective measures of cognitive failure (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Flow diagram of study selection for systematic review of published research
on cognitive failures in healthy populations.

2.3. Results
We included 52 articles in the review. The studies varied widely in their research
design and grouping of participants. Most of the studies used correlational designs (n =
45), and the remainder consisted of experimental (n = 4), longitudinal (n = 2), and
population designs (n = 1).
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2.3.1. Study characteristics
2.3.1.1. Location
A large portion of the studies were led by researchers based in the United States
(n = 20). This was followed by the United Kingdom (n = 11), the Netherlands (n = 4),
Canada (n = 4), Germany (n = 3), Ireland (n = 2), Italy (n = 2), the Czech Republic (n =
1), Denmark (n = 1), Iceland (n = 1), Israel (n = 1), Japan (n = 1), and Switzerland (n =
1).

2.3.1.2. Study populations
All the articles in this review drew samples from non-clinical populations,
including:
•

Student populations, both university and high school.

•

Organisation personnel, including hospitals and the military.

•

Community groups.

2.3.1.3. Measures of cognitive failures and study design
Included articles varied in design and utilised a diverse range of tools to assess
cognitive failures. Whilst the CFQ was the most common tool, four different structured
self-report measures of cognitive failures were identified in this review. A brief
overview of each of these is provided in Table 2.1. In addition to these, several authors
chose to construct their own brief self-report measures of cognitive failures; these were
also included in fitting with the broad criteria of a quantitative approach to assessment
of cognitive failures.
Whilst the majority of articles utilised retrospective self-report methods, a
number of more recent researchers have been developing experience sampling
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methodologies to capture cognitive failures in the flow of everyday life. Six studies
required participants to report failures either as they were experienced, or at regular
intervals throughout the day via a diary system of data collection (Jónsdóttir,
Adólfsdóttir, Cortez, Gunnarsdóttir, & Gústafsdóttir, 2007; Kane et al., 2007; Lange &
Süß, 2014; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009a; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012;
Unsworth, 2015).
The most common study designs involved comparison and self-reported
cognitive failures with either: 1) other psychological features; or 2) performance on
objective measures of cognitive functioning. Whilst similar in taking a primarily
correlational approach, the relatively open criteria of this review meant that the focus in
articles’ analysis of findings differed, limiting amalgamation and comparison of
outcomes at times. This is considered in the limitations section of this review.
The studies are arranged in tables according to the area they explored or
compared. Some articles contained overlaps of topics; these were grouped per their
primary focus.

2.3.2. What are the key features of the construct of cognitive failures?
2.3.2.1. Dimensions of cognitive failures
Several studies examined the construct of cognitive failures (n = 13; Table 2.2).
Cognitive failures were broadly defined as one’s tendency to experience errors and slips
in functioning (Boomsma, 1998; Broadbent et al., 1982; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny,
2002). The original Broadbent et al. (1982) study treated cognitive failures as reflecting
a single trait usefully dichotomised into “high” and “low” groups. However, some
authors highlighted that alongside this general component, the measure contains more
specific factors (Unsworth et al., 2012). To this end, four studies examined the
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underlying structure of the CFQ via factor analysis. The models produced ranged
inclusion of two (Matthews, Coyle, & Craig, 1990b), three (Broadbent et al., 1982),
four (Wallace, 2004; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002), and five factors (Pollina, Greene,
Tunick, & Puckett, 1992). All articles highlighted memory and action slips as core
dimensions measured by the CFQ, whilst perception, distractibility, and interpersonal
intelligence were less consistently identified.
Wilhelm, Witthöft, and Schipolowski (2010; see Table 2.4) point out that none of
the various models have been independently replicated. These researchers’ re-tested
previous models described by the earlier articles listed in this review using a large
sample of 3,122, and found that none met acceptable standards of fit. Their own
analysis removed 20 of the 32 items included in the German version of the CFQ, and
revealed three factors: Clumsiness, Retrieval, and Intention Forgotten. They strongly
argued against the use of the CFQ as a unidimensional measure, and these findings are
strong given the size of their sample relative to the generally small samples used in
previous failures research. Meanwhile, several researchers have previously argued just
as strongly for the validity of studying the total CFQ score as per Broadbent et al.’s
original suggestion, given that a large general factor is evident and the measure contains
relatively few items (Larson, Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Matthews, Coyle,
& Craig, 1990a; Wallace, 2004). In contrast to Wilhelm et al.’s (2010) data-driven
approach, these authors have proposed that researchers may choose the CFQ total or
dimensional scores based on where study interests lie (Wallace, 2004).
CFQ scores were found to be distributed normally throughout the healthy
population, although women tend to report more failures than men (Boomsma, 1998;
Kanai, Dong, Bahrami, & Rees, 2011). A large-scale genetic study of Dutch families
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suggested that 50% of variability in scores is due to familial heritability (Boomsma,
1998). The authors of the study found no evidence for effects of shared environment; it
was suggested that non-genetic variance in CFQ scores is shaped by external factors
specific to the individual rather than the family unit.
Exploring further the biological component of cognitive failures, two MRI studies
reported that increased parietal grey matter was predictive of greater distractibility in
everyday life (Kanai et al., 2011; Sandberg et al., 2014). One of these groups also found
that reduced GABA in the occipital lobe was associated with increased risk of cognitive
failures (Sandberg et al., 2014). Both findings were thought to be indicative of the role
of organic deficits in everyday processing efficiency. High neural density may be a sign
of inadequate synaptic pruning during development (Kanai et al., 2011); low GABA
levels may limit the ability to selectively suppress sensory information (Sandberg et al.,
2014). Together, GABA levels and parietal grey matter volume explained about 50% of
interindividual variation in failures (Sandberg et al., 2014). This supports a possible
neural basis for the heritability of cognitive failures.

2.3.2.2. Real world performance
The broad purpose of gauging subjective measures of cognition is to gain insight
into “real life” cognitive functioning, beyond that contrived in the lab or the doctor’s
office. Accordingly, cognitive failures have been found to correlate with spousal ratings
of performance, indicating that at least some failures are observable behaviours
(Broadbent et al., 1982). Further, positive correlations between the incidence of injuries
(Larson et al., 1997) and at-fault traffic accidents and self-reported cognitive failures
(Larson & Merritt, 1991) illustrate the unique ability of self-report to predict important,
and indeed, potentially life-or-death, performance outcomes in real life.
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Conversely, findings regarding the association between cognitive failures and
intelligence are mixed. They correlate moderately with academic outcomes as assessed
by the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) in the United States (Unsworth et al., 2012); an
aptitude test tapping cognitive ability rather than knowledge (Frey & Detterman, 2004).
However, they do not correlate with other standard tests of intelligence (Broadbent et
al., 1982; Larson & Merritt, 1991). Larson & Merritt (1991) proposed that cognitive
failures are a qualitative feature of attention management style, and as such do not tap
into the intentional, effortful processes that are engaged in intelligence testing.
Interestingly, Larson et al. (1997) also found that left-handed individuals report
more frequent cognitive failures than right-handers. Although left-handers are also
known to be involved in more accidents than left handers, CFQ did not mediate the
relationship between mishaps and handedness. Of interest is whether other traits
associated with left-handedness contribute to mishaps and failures, or whether this
purely reflects problems with equipment design.

2.3.2.3. Relationship with stress
In one of few studies involving repeated measurement, Broadbent et al.’s (1982)
findings suggested that predisposition towards cognitive failures increases susceptibility
to minor mental health symptoms following a period of exposure to stress – in this case,
nurses placed on more stressful wards. A number of other researchers also found a
positive correlation between cognitive failures and neuroticism, which was viewed as an
indicator of increased vulnerability to stress (Matthews et al., 1990a; Matthews &
Wells, 1988; Wallace, 2004). In Broadbent et al.’s (1986) later research, they further
posited slips reflect a preferred (albeit problematic) processing strategy more likely to
be employed by high CFQ-scorers in states of high anxiety. That is, when not anxious,
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high CFQ-scorers may be able to perform just as well as their low scoring counterparts.
This perhaps suggests that there are individual differences (i.e., trait-like factors) which
predispose some individuals to experiencing cognitive failures when exposed to stress;
this would in turn exacerbate the negative impacts of stress.
Contrary to this, a week-long experience sampling study found no link between
perceived stress levels and number of slips experienced as reported in vivo (Jónsdóttir et
al., 2007). It is interesting that these findings contrasted with those regarding
retrospectively reported stress; this may suggest a bias towards perceiving stress and
daily errors and hassles in those who report increased failures. However, perceived
stress captures only one component of stress; namely an individual’s perception of their
control over factors in their life, as well as persistent background stress. It is possible
more affective and acute measures of stress will be more closely associated with
cognitive failures in the flow of everyday life. There are two studies which provide
evidence to support this conjecture. First, negative mood states exacerbated cognitive
failures in daily life for those who reported high levels of mind-wandering in the lab
(McVay et al., 2009a). Secondly, cognitive failures of individuals with good control
capacity were more likely to be increased when faced with distracting environmental
factors (e.g., chaos, unpleasant tasks), whereas those with poor objective control
experienced failures regardless of context (Kane et al., 2007b). It may be that the CFQ
is most useful in examining stress-triggered variations in performance, rather than stable
neurological deficits (Mahoney, Dalby, & King, 1998).
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Table 2.2
Articles Examining the Construct of Cognitive Failures
Reference

Matthews & Wells
(1988)1
Matthews, Coyle,
& Craig (1990a) 1

Study sample and
population
910 participants across
groups drawn from
various healthy
populations.
160 students across 2
studies.
475 students across 2
studies.

Larson & Merritt
(1991)1

159 healthy adult male
Navy recruits.

Pollina, Greene,
Tunick, & Pucket
(1992)1
Larson, Alderton,
Neideffer &
Underhill (1997)1

419 healthy students.

Boomsma (1998)1

1651 healthy twin pairs
and parents recruited
from the community.
335 healthy students and
Navy personnel.

Broadbent et al.
(1982)1,2

Wallace, Kass, &
Stanny (2002)1

2379 American Navy
recruits. 95% male.

Findings
CFQ correlations with existing measures suggest three aspects of cognitive
failures being measured: memory, perception, and action. Weak correlations with
social desirability and neuroticism scales; no correlation with intelligence.
Increased CFQ scores were associated with increased trait anxiety/vulnerability to
stress, as well as increased self-consciousness.
Multiple factor analyses suggested different models, strongest being 1 factor and 7
factor (covering cognitive and motor processing; types of context/information)
models. Total CFQ score associated with neuroticism and coping styles including
avoidant patterns of behaviour.
CFQ scores were positively correlated with the number of times young men had
been cited for causing a significant traffic accident. Intelligence was not related to
accidents or CFQ scores.
Principal components analysis identified 5 internally-consistent factors:
Distractibility, Misdirected Actions, Spatial/Kinaesthetic Memory, Interpersonal
Intelligence, and Memory for Names.
Increased CFQ scores associated with increased rates of mishaps including injuries
from falling/jumping. Left-handed individuals reported both more accidents and
more failures than right-handers, but the CFQ did not mediate the relationship
between handedness and mishaps.
Found the heritability of CFQ scores to be about 50%, with females reporting
higher mean CFQ scores in both parent and child generations. There was no
association between CFQ scores and education level or age.
Analysis yielded 4 internally-consistent factors of the CFQ: Memory,
Distractibility, Blunders, and (memory for) Names.
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Reference
Wallace (2004)1

Jónsdóttir,
Adólfsdóttir,
Cortez,
Gunnarsdóttir, &
Gústafsdóttir
(2007)3
Kanai, Dong,
Bahrami, & Rees
(2011)1
Markett, Montag,
Diekmann, &
Reuter (2014)1
Sandberg et al.
(2014)1

Study sample and
population
1095 students across 2
studies.

189 healthy volunteers.

145 healthy volunteers.

Findings
Support’s Wallace et al.’s 2002 findings of a 4 factor model, as well as the utility
of total CFQ score as a general factor. Also identified associations between CFQ
and logically related traits such as decreased conscientiousness and increased
neuroticism.
No correlation between perceived stress and number of slips reported over a week
in a diary. A weak correlation with pre-diary estimate of functioning was present.

Greater density of grey matter in the left superior parietal lobe predicted CFQ
scores; as did performance on an attentional capture task in the lab.

500 healthy adults.

Carriers of C/C genotype of the dopamine receptor D2 were less susceptible to
failures, with the genotype explaining about 1.9% of heritability in CFQ scores.
The link was partially mediated by trait impulsivity.
36 healthy adult males.
Increased GABA in the occipital lobe was correlated with decreased CFQ scores,
and density of grey matter in the left superior parietal lobe also predicted CFQ
scores. Together, variations in occipital GABA and LSPL accounted for 50% of
intra-individual variation in failures.
Notes: 1 = CFQ self-report; 2 = CFQ informant-rated, 3 = self-reports captured using experience sampling in vivo.
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2.3.3. What is the relationship of cognitive failures to performance on objective
cognitive tasks?
Several papers selected for this review investigated the relationship between
cognitive failures and objectively assessed cognitive domains (n = 13; Table 2.3).
Cognitive domains were studied via performance on lab-based tasks, and included
attentional networks, behavioural inhibition, and working memory and executive
control. Whilst performance outcomes in each of these domains were associated with
self-reports of cognitive failures (e.g., Berggren et al., 2011; Ishigami & Klein, 2009;
McVay et al., 2009a; Tipper & Baylis, 1987), findings were inconsistent and no
definitive link between failures and a specific objective assessment is yet evident.

2.3.3.1. Attention
Nine articles focused on the relationship between different aspects of attention
and everyday slips (Berggren, Hutton, & Derakshan, 2011; Broadbent, Broadbent, &
Jones, 1986; Forster & Lavie, 2007; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Meiran, Israeli, Levi, &
Grafi, 1994; Murphy & Dalton, 2014; Tipper & Baylis, 1987; Unsworth, 2015;
Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012), with mixed findings. Several studies generally
found that high distractibility on lab tasks was moderately correlated with more frequent
cognitive failures (Forster & Lavie, 2007; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Murphy & Dalton,
2014; Tipper & Baylis, 1987). Two papers reported that failures did not correlate with
any measure of attention; however, higher CFQ scores were associated with a relative
performance advantage on a more complex search task compared to a simple focused
attention task (Broadbent et al., 1986; Meiran et al., 1994). Individuals with higher
cognitive failures demonstrated longer reaction times than those with lower scores, in
both high load situations with distractors present (Tipper & Baylis, 1987), and under
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conditions of low perceptual load (Forster & Lavie, 2007). They were also more
susceptible to auditory distractors (Murphy & Dalton, 2014).
To be distracted is to allow irrelevant information to interfere with performance
of a current activity (Bergman, O’Brien, Osgood, & Cornblatt, 1995); it therefore seems
likely that attentional abilities would influence frequency of slips in our busy,
distraction-laden way of life. Supporting this, Meiran et al.’s (1994) study saw high
CFQ scorers making better use of spatial cues in an attention task, but that this came
with a “cost” – slower reaction times. This perhaps suggests that those prone to failures
have more issues with inhibition than attention itself.
Of note were two linked experience sampling papers by Unsworth et al. (2012;
2015). These compared objective cognition with number of failures reported during
everyday life over the course of a week. The initial study found that attentional control
performance was correlated with reports of failures (Unsworth et al., 2012). However,
the later extension of the analysis identified a relationship between intraindividual
variations in attentional control (as indicated by shifts in reaction times from trial to
trial) and daily slips (Unsworth, 2015). It is interesting that the association between poor
attentional control and cognitive failures was most consistent for in vivo vs.
retrospective reporting of failures. This perhaps supports the existence of a state-like
component of cognitive failures concurrent to its trait-like elements, and accentuates the
need to consider how best to make use of comparisons between existing objective
assessments and failures.

2.3.3.2. Inhibition
The domain of inhibition encapsulates the ability to suppress actions that
interfere with goal-driven behaviour (Aron, 2007), and links closely to the domain of
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attention as discussed above. This objective domain also varied in its relationship with
cognitive failures. Considering behavioural inhibition first, there were no differences
between high and low cognitive failure groups on performance of a visual Go/NoGo
task (Roche, Garavan, Foxe, & O’Mara, 2005). On a physiological level, however,
those who reported more frequent cognitive failures demonstrated increased latency of
antisaccade in an eye-movement inhibition task, suggestive of both poorer inhibition
and greater distractibility (Berggren et al., 2011). Additionally, when completing a
Go/NoGo task, individuals with higher cognitive failures demonstrated larger and
earlier N2 and P3 components; event-related brain potentials thought to reflect activity
of the cortical inhibition system (Roche et al., 2005). That is, participants with more
cognitive failures have to work harder on a cortical level to inhibit their behavioural
responses under challenging conditions. Taken together, these studies suggest while
there may be no objective differences in behavioural inhibition in those prone to
cognitive failures, they may possess a global cortical inefficiency in the physiological
mechanisms which underpin behavioural and perceptual inhibitory responses.

2.3.3.3. Working memory and executive control
Working memory is defined as the ability to concurrently store and manipulate
information (Baddeley, 2010), whilst executive control organises and maintains actions
and thoughts according to goals (Kiefer, 2012). Working memory and executive control
tasks are often grouped together since control of attention and resource allocation is
essential in supporting working memory (Lara & Wallis, 2014). Like attention and
inhibition, working memory and executive control are thought to be essential to our
ability to process relevant information and stay “on track” to successfully carry out
daily activities. Objective working memory capacity and lapses in executive control
(indicated by task-unrelated thoughts), whilst completing laboratory-based tasks, were
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both found to be associated with cognitive failures in some (Kane et al., 2007; McVay
et al., 2009) but not all studies (McVay & Kane, 2009). One study found that this
association only held true for certain levels of cognitive load; participants with high
working memory ability actually reported more failures when faced with less
challenging tasks (Kane et al., 2007). This might link to the popularly-held lay view that
boredom triggers mind-wandering, thereby increasing the chance of mistakes. However,
it must also be considered that task-unrelated thoughts as assessed during lab-based
tasks differ in nature to the kinds of failures reported in everyday life. Overall,
correlations between cognitive failures and working memory and executive control were
not consistently identified.
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Table 2.3
Objective Cognitive Domains and Their Relationship With Cognitive Failures
Reference

Cognitive domains studied:
Selective attention Alerting attention Working memory/ Inhibition of behaviour
Executive function
1
Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones (1986)
X
X
Tipper & Baylis (1987)1
√
1
Meiran, Israeli, Levi & Grafi (1994)
√
Roche, Garavan, Foxe, & O’Mara (2005)1
X
Kane et al. (2007)2
X3
1
3
Forster & Lavie (2007)
X
1
Ishigami & Klein (2009)
√
√
X
McVay & Kane (2009)1*
X
2
McVay, Kane & Kwapil (2009)
√
Berggren, Hutton, & Derakshan (2011)1
√
√
Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers (2012)2
√
X
1
Murphy & Dalton(2014)
√
Unsworth (2015) 2
√
√
1
2
Note: √ = Significant association, X = no significant association, - = not examined in the study. = CFQ self-report; = self-reports of
everyday failures captured in vivo via experience sampling, 3 = relationship was mediated by cognitive demands of the task at hand (i.e.,
relationship exists only at specific levels of demand), * = CFQ adjusted – memory and attentional lapse items only.
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2.3.4. What non-cognitive factors influence cognitive failures?
2.3.4.1. Personality and functioning
Thirteen papers looked at the relationship between personality, functioning, and
the CFQ (Table 2.4). Higher cognitive failures were found to be related to negative
affect (Payne & Schnapp, 2014), neuroticism (Wilhelm, Witthöft, & Schipolowski,
2010) and trait anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998), whilst hypomania was associated with
lower scores (Rodriguez et al., 2013). Cognitive failures were proposed to be one of
multiple phenomena seen in people with these particular personality traits, and selfawareness was considered to be significant in the interpretation of these findings. An
example hypothesis was that neuroticism may lead to increased reporting of cognitive
failures since inappropriate worries result in inflated reports of problems (the
“complaint hypothesis;” Wilhelm et al., 2010). On this basis, it was proposed that
measures of cognitive failures are contaminated by variability introduced via selfawareness deficits (e.g., Chan et al., 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013; Wilhelm et al., 2010).

2.3.4.1.1. Dissociative experiences
Three papers focused specifically on exploration of how tendency towards
dissociative experiences may relate to cognitive failures. The interest in this particular
personality factor was based on obvious similarities between sub-clinical dissociative
experiences such as derealisation (e.g., daydreaming) and mind-wandering aspects of
cognitive failures. A strong positive correlation between dissociative experiences and
cognitive failures was robustly and consistently found across all studies (Bruce, Ray, &
Carlson, 2007; Merckelbach, Muris, & Rassin, 1999; Wright & Osborne, 2005). Both of
these constructs were viewed as aspects of personality (Wright & Osborne, 2005) that
reflect an underlying vulnerability to lapses in cognitive control (Merckelbach et al.,
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1999) and subsequent difficulties integrating information and processes as usual (Bruce
et al., 2007; Wright & Osborne, 2005). A related finding was that individuals who
experience more involuntary autobiographical memories tend to have higher CFQ
scores (Kamiya, 2014). Whilst the constructs are distinct, these types of involuntary
memories may be linked to the more disruptive intrusive memories experienced in posttraumatic stress disorder. The intrusions in Kamiya’s study were recorded whilst
participants were walking without attending to anything in particular; it may be that
those prone to mind-wandering experience fluctuations in cognitive failures in response
to situations of reduced attentional demand.

2.3.4.1.2. Schizotypy
Five articles examined the association between cognitive failures and
schizotypy. This is a normally distributed personality structure incorporating cognitive
disorganisation, unusual experiences, and social impairment, reflecting hypothetical risk
for psychosis (Van Os & Kapur, 2009). Whilst some “high schizotypes” will develop a
psychotic disorder, the majority will not (Kaymaz et al., 2012); psychometric measures
of schizotypy are thus not considered to be of clinical utility. As such, schizotypy has
been included in this review as a dimension of healthy personality similar to any other.
All authors found a positive correlation between schizotypy and cognitive failures, and
it was suggested that subjectively-reported cognitive complaints may represent an
endophenotype of risk for schizophrenia (Corcoran, Devan, Durrant, & Liddle, 2013;
Laws, Patel, & Tyson, 2008). Further, Pfeifer et al.’s (2009) longitudinal study
identified higher cognitive failures as a predictor of later negative schizotypal symptoms
(e.g., introversion, social anhedonia). Cognitive failures may: a) contribute to the
development and maintenance of schizotypal symptoms; or b) coexist with other
symptoms, with the two underpinned by related neurological mechanisms.
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The debate over the impact of self-awareness on self-reporting was revisited in
exploring cognitive failures as a core biomarker of schizotypy. Both Chan et al. (2011)
and Laws et al. (2008) found robust correlations between schizotypy and cognitive slips
in the absence of objective deficits. One group concluded that self-awareness problems
precede other forms of cognitive impairment in psychosis (Chan et al., 2011); the other
proposed awareness remains intact prior to illness onset, enabling high schizotypes to
monitor subtle problems that go undetected by objective assessments (Laws et al.,
2008).
Cognitive failures and schizotypy both have demonstrated heritability (e.g.,
Boomsma, 1998; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2003). Despite the overlap
between the two, there does not seem to be a shared genetic basis. Schizotypy in one
family member was not predictive of cognitive failures in another, lending further
support to the idea that cognitive failures rely on both inherited traits and individual
environmental factors (Pfeifer et al., 2009).
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Table 2.4
Psychological Factors Influencing Cognitive Failures
Reference

Study sample and
population
Personality and functioning
Mahoney, Dalby, & 138 healthy adults.
King (1998)1,2
Wilhelm, Witthöft, 3,122 healthy
& Schipolowski
participants.
1
(2010)
Rodriguez et al.
128 healthy
1
(2013)
undergraduate
students.
1
Kamiya (2014)
24 healthy
undergraduate
students.
Payne & Schnapp
129 healthy
(2014)1
undergraduate
students.
Dissociative experiences
Merckelbach,
128 healthy
Muris, &Rassin
undergraduate
1
(1999)
students.
Wright & Osborne
80 healthy
1
(2005)
undergraduate
students.
Bruce et al. (2007)1 1040 healthy
undergraduate
students.

Findings

CFQ scores were positively correlated with measures of stress and both trait and state
anxiety. CFQ scores of self and others’ reports correlated.
Interpretation of combined results of five studies indicates that probability of reporting
subjective impairment is increased by high neuroticism.
Individuals at high risk for bipolar appraised themselves as more high-functioning than did
low-risk individuals. There were no objective differences, and no relationship between
CFQ and working memory scores.
The number of autobiographical memories experienced by individuals on a 20 minute walk
was moderately positively correlated with CFQ score.
Negative affective states were moderately correlated with overall CFQ scores, whilst
positive affect was not.

Significant positive correlations exist between dissociative experiences and reports of
cognitive failures. Cognitive failures were not related to fantasy proneness.
Strong positive correlation between dissociative experiences and cognitive failures.
Cognitive failures were not related to performance on working memory tasks involving
secondary interference.
Significant correlations between cognitive failures and measures of dissociative
experiences.
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Reference

Schizotypy
Giesbrecht,
Merckelbach,
Kater, & Sluis
(2007a)1
Laws, Patel, &
Tyson (2008)3
Pfeifer, van Os,
Hanssen,
Delespaul, &
Krabbendam
(2009)1
Chan et al. (2011)3

Study sample and
population

Findings

185 healthy
undergraduate
students.

Two cognitive processes of cognitive failures and fantasy-proneness account for 58% of
the link between dissociation and schizotypy.

65 healthy
participants.

There were no differences between high and low schizotypes on a battery of executive
function tasks. However, high schizotypes did report a greater frequency of everyday
executive problems.
Proneness to cognitive failures was associated with negative/depressive dimensions of
schizotypy. Cognitive failures and schizotypy did not share a genetic basis.

566 genetically
related pairs from the
community.

93 healthy students
and community
members.

There were no differences between high and low schizotypes on a battery of executive
function tasks. However, high schizotypes did report a greater frequency of everyday
executive problems. Low schizotypes’ subjective reports were related to some objective
outcomes.
Found a strong positive correlation between schizotypy and CFQ and DEX scores.

Corcoran, Devan,
269 healthy students.
Durrant & Liddle
(2013)1,3
Notes: 1 = CFQ self-report; 2 = CFQ informant-rated; 3 = DEX;
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2.3.4.2. Biological
A portion of articles sought to study biological factors associated with cognitive
failures in healthy individuals (n = 14; Table 2.5). Most of these explored circadian
rhythm or the healthy ageing process. One article examined cognitive failures in
pregnancy (Cuttler, Graf, Pawluski, & Galea, 2011). The authors found that whilst
laboratory assessments failed to identify any deficits in pregnant versus non-pregnant
women, some of their objective “field” tasks (e.g., remembering to call the researchers
on a specific day) demonstrated impairments, as did women’s own self-reports of
cognitive failures. The influence of depression and physical symptoms such as fatigue
on subjectively-reported but not objective cognition was also noted, further highlighting
the significance of ecologically valid measures in understanding experience.

2.3.4.2.1. Sleep-wake cycle
Three articles explored the influence of sleep and the circadian cycle on
everyday cognition. Severity of insomnia was reported to be associated with daytime
cognitive failures, independent of mood and stress levels (Wilkerson, Boals, & Taylor,
2011). Levels of wakefulness were also considered as an aspect of personality. Wallace
et al. (2003) noted that individuals prone to boredom typically experience daytime
sleepiness and distractibility, thus, high levels of cognitive failures are likely a natural
consequence of their personality. Another study examined individual preferences for
morning versus evening hours: individuals known respectively as “larks” and “owls”
(Mecacci, Righi, & Rocchetti, 2004). Larks reported variable levels of cognitive failures
with a peak in problems in the evening hours, whilst owls experienced their cognitive
failures as stable throughout the day. This provides support for the existence of
individual circadian differences that interact with time of day to influence cognition.
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2.3.4.2.2. Age
Nine articles examined the relationship between cognitive failures and normal
ageing. Whilst the CFQ has been used primarily to study young adults, it demonstrates
no age-related measurement bias (Rast et al., 2009). Age-related cognitive decline is
widely acknowledged as a relatively common phenomenon (Hanninen et al., 1996), but
a longitudinal study found that higher failures predicted a steeper-than-usual trajectory
of decline in verbal memory function in particular (Hohman et al., 2011). Despite this,
there was little difference between the overall number of everyday failures reported by
older and younger people (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994; Lange
& Süß, 2014; Reese & Cherry, 2006), and two studies found that older people actually
reported fewer slips (Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994; Mecacci &
Righi, 2006). However, when Rast et al. (2009) analysed CFQ scores using a threefactor model of the measure, they found that people tend to become more forgetful but
less distractible with age. They noted a sharp decrease in distractibility seems to occur
in those in their sixties, and proposed this may be due to the substantial reduction in
attentional demands that comes with retirement-related lifestyle changes.
On the other hand, Kane et al. (1994) did find objective deficits in attention and
inhibition in older adults, although this did not correlate with self-reports with no
increase in frequency failures. Some authors held that objective performance deficits
and poor ratings by informants prove that older people do make more errors in daily
life, but are incompetent in monitoring and reporting these (Harty, O’Connell, Hester, &
Robertson, 2013; Mecacci & Righi, 2006). In contradiction, an experience sampling
study found a moderate correlation between older people’s CFQ scores and in vivo
reports of slips (Lange & Süß, 2014), which would support their ability to provide
relatively accurate retospective reports. This perhaps again highlights potential
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limitations of the use of objective assessments as a comparison point for perceptions of
day-to-day failures. In addition, there may be factors specific to older people to
consider. For example, the advantage of life experience: older people can and do
actively compensate for their absent-mindedness by adjusting the cues they use – both
internal and external – for memory and attention (Maylor, 1990).
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Table 2.5
Biological Factors Influencing Cognitive Failures.
Reference
Cuttler, Graf,
Pawluski, & Galea
(2011)1,2
Sleep-wake cycles
Wallace,
Vodanovich, &
Restino (2003)1
Mecacci, Righi, &
Rocchetti (2004)1

Study sample and
population
61 pregnant women.

Findings

126 healthy U.S. military
personnel and 137
undergraduate students.
390 healthy
undergraduate students.

Higher daytime sleepiness and proneness to boredom was predictive of everyday
failures, and military personnel reported more sleepiness and failures than students.

Wilkerson, Boals,
& Taylor (2011)1
Age
Maylor (1990)1

941 healthy
undergraduate students.

Kane, Hasher,
Stoltzfus, Zacks, &
Connelly (1994)1
Kramer,
Humphrey, Larish,
Logan, & Strayer
(1994)1

20 adults aged between
64-77 years recruited
from the community.
30 elderly adults.

320 female adults
between the ages of 5295.

Found subjective impairment but no evidence of objective deficits in pregnant women.
Depressed mood and physical symptoms were associated with greater subjective
problems.

Frequency of reported cognitive slips was increased with neuroticism, anxiety, and
extreme morningness (vs. eveningness in circadian typology). Morning types were
more susceptible to errors in the evening, whereas evening types were more uniform in
their failures throughout the day.
Found a positive relationship between severity of insomnia and cognitive failures, even
after controlling for confounds of depression, stress and anxiety.
Regardless of intelligence, individuals with higher CFQ scores were more likely to
forget to call researchers in a memory task (i.e., had worse prospective memory).
There was no relationship between retrospective and prospective memory
performance.
Younger adults reported marginally higher CFQ scores than older adults. CFQ scores
did not correlate with an absence of inhibitory suppression effect in older adults.
No differences between older and younger adults in self-reported failures, but older
adults demonstrated slight objective impairment in some aspects of inhibition. CFQ
correlated with several outcomes of objective inhibitory tasks.
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Reference
Mecacci & Righi
(2006)1

Reese & Cherry
(2006)1,3
Rast, Zimprich,
Van Boxtel, &
Jolles (2009)1
Hohman, BeasonHeld, Lamar, &
Resnick (2011)1
Harty, O’Connell,
Hester, &
Robertson (2013) 1

Study sample and
population
1826 healthy adults aged
16 -85 years.

96 healthy adults
recruited from the
community.
Cross-sectional data from
1303 healthy adults.

Findings
Older people reported fewer cognitive failures than younger people, and their
metacognition (attitudes/worry about cognition, cognitive confidence, etc.) did not
seem reduced. However, across age groups, metacognitive worries were associated
with increased failures.
Overall CFQ did not differ between older or younger adults, or between those with
high or low verbal ability. CFQ scores were not related to objective performance.
The CFQ appears free of age-related measurement bias. The factor of forgetfulness
increases with age, whilst distractibility suddenly decreases in the mid-60s.

98 adults with mean age
75 followed over mean
11.5 years.
90 healthy adults aged 18
– 90.

Higher levels of cognitive failures were associated with steeper rates of decline in
objective verbal memory performance and increased activity in insular, lingual and
cerebellar areas during memory processing.
Older people tended to underestimate the frequency of their cognitive failures relative
to informant reports. Older people also demonstrated poorer online awareness of their
errors in an objective attentional task. There was no relationship between CFQ and
objective cognitive performance.
Lange & Süß
91 healthy adults aged 60 The frequency of failures as collected via experience sampling correlated moderately
(2014)1
– 76 years.
with the CFQ. Neuroticism was more closely correlated with ES failures than the CFQ.
There was no correlation between age and CFQ score.
1
2
3
Notes: = CFQ self-report; = PRMQ; = other quantitative measure of cognitive failures constructed by authors.
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2.4. Discussion
In this systematic review, we identified and summarised existing studies of
cognitive failures in healthy populations. The topics explored using the CFQ and other
subjective measures varied widely. This paper focused on reviewing cognitive failures
in healthy population samples, with the aim of identifying key features of cognitive
failures and their relationship to objective cognition. We also aimed to develop a model
of factors that influence liability towards cognitive failures in otherwise healthy
individuals.

2.4.1. Limitations
There are several possible limitations of this review. First, appraisal of studies
was difficult due to poor definition clarity for cognitive failures across articles. In
addition, the fact that this area of research is still somewhat exploratory (with the bulk
of articles describing correlational studies) meant that systematic critique of study
quality as per the PRISMA statement was not feasible. The majority of studies used the
CFQ however measures differed across studies. For instance, one study used qualitative
analysis (Jónsdóttir et al., 2007) but focused on a quantitative outcome being the
frequency of errors reported, and so was included here. Despite these limitations to our
ability to present a truly systematic review, we feel that the articles included have
allowed us to begin to develop a more comprehensive model of the cognitive failures, as
per the overarching aim of this review.
Time and access limitations meant that it is possible that not all relevant articles
published pre-1990 were accessed; thus, information stemming from earlier trends in
the approach to cognitive failures may be limited. Perhaps more pertinent to this issue is
the construct of interest itself, which may have also contributed to problems in
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identifying relevant papers. Cognitive failure is a research area that has been constantly
evolving for decades, and which has been viewed in different ways (and given different
names) by various researchers. Whilst care was taken in selecting broad search terms,
the addition of other search terms (e.g., attentional lapses, distractibility, accidentproneness, mishap-proneness) may have ensured all articles, particularly older ones
using different and more specific terms for cognitive failures, could be successfully
identified.
Finally, a systematic assessment of bias is absent from this review. This is
primarily due to two reasons. The first is that this review is qualitative in nature, and
does not represent a meta-analysis or attempt to answer a simple question around effect
size for an intervention, and thus a statistical test of bias is not warranted. Secondly, the
variety of study designs included in these reviews contrasts starkly with a more typical
review which analyses primarily randomised-control trials. This precluded the use of a
structured risk of bias tool. Nevertheless, the primary goal of synthesising existing
findings around factors associated with cognitive failures is achieved. Targeted reviews
designed to answer questions about the strength of the relationships revealed within the
current review are required to provide a more rigorous analysis of the quality of the
research.

2.4.2. Features of the construct of cognitive failures
Problems with memory and action slips are identified as core dimensions measured
by cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; Pollina et al., 1992; Wallace et al., 2002).
However, this tight definition may exclude some aspects of everyday failures such as
more general cognitive functioning, distractibility, and mind-wandering. On the basis of
the studies gathered here, we suggest a broader understanding: cognitive failures reflect
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errors in real world planned thought and action, proneness to which is determined by
internal and external exacerbating factors.
Although the definition of cognitive failures has been made clearer through this
review, the dimensionality of the CFQ itself remains one of the key debates within the
literature. Wilhelm et al.’s (2010) most recent analysis provided strong support for the
CFQ including three dimensions. This later study is strong in terms of its large sample
size and rigorous analytic strategy, but further research is required to confirm its
assertions. Several authors who have analysed underlying factors of the CFQ argue for
the use of a single score as reflecting a general factor of failures (Broadbent et al., 1982;
Larson et al., 1997). This includes Wallace (2004), whose earlier four-factor model has
been used by several researchers but who nevertheless acknowledges the utility of
studying one general factor of failures only. This remains the approach of the majority
of cognitive failures researchers. Thus, the unidimensional CFQ remains valuable for
the insight it provides into the general experience of cognitive problems in daily life
functioning. In addition, its decades-long use in correlational studies is just now
beginning to be drawn into a cohesive literature that reveals the traits, biology, and realworld tasks that relate to increased frequency of failures overall. At this stage, both
schools of thought warrant further consideration.
The mode of inheritance of cognitive failures has not yet been explored, however
heritability could be conferred: 1) directly; 2) indirectly through a general inefficiency
of information processing; or 3) indirectly through familial risk for personality
variables, which in themselves increase the likelihood of failures occurring. Related to
this is the finding that women are more at-risk for slips than men (Boomsma, 1998;
Kanai et al., 2011). Again, this may stem from a number of sources including a direct
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biological basis, or indirectly via personality traits that occur at more elevated levels
and/or more frequently in women and are also associated with cognitive failures. For
example, women score more highly on neuroticism than men (Costa, Terracciano, &
McCrae, 2001; Wilhelm et al., 2010), which may render them more alert to their own
errors. More generally, women may simply have greater metacognitive awareness than
men. Regardless of the mechanism, the heritability and gender differences of cognitive
failures points towards a set of behaviours which are stable and trait-like.
The final core feature of cognitive failures is one that tends to be implied only;
they encompass errors that occur in a particular context: “real life.” This assumption
needs to be made explicit given that most cognitive research looks specifically at
cognition that is not occurring in ecological contexts. The necessarily subjective
approach of cognitive failures highlights that the personal, real-time experience of
cognition in an everyday context is both measurable and meaningful, despite being a
clear departure from traditional cognition research.

2.4.3. Cognitive failures versus objective performance
The correlations between self-reported cognitive failures and performance on
domain-specific neuropsychological tasks are small at best (e.g., Ishigami & Klein,
2009; Wallace et al., 2002). While the search for such a relationship has been the focus
of much recent research into cognitive failures, it is interesting to note that multiple
studies have compared selective attention with everyday failures, whilst few have
explored other ability domains. Certainly, an attentional deficit would seem to be the
most obvious neuropsychological concern, as mind-wandering could serve as the
catalyst for many of the most common types of failures. However, further research into
other subtypes of attention, working memory, and inhibition is perhaps warranted, given
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the potential significance of each of these in managing multiple and complex demands
in daily life. Ignoring these gaps, if we take the criterion for validity of self-reported
cognition to be correspondence with objective neuropsychological performance, the
CFQ clearly falls short. However, as stated previously, we may not be looking at
corresponding constructs in objective neuropsychological performance and
subjectively-reported cognitive failures.
Roughly half of the articles reviewed here attribute the gap between objective
and subjectively-reported cognition to impairments in the ability to self-monitor (e.g.,
Chan et al., 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013; Wilhelm et al., 2010). For example,
neuroticism (Wilhelm et al., 2010), stress, and anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) are all
related to cognitive failures, but may also induce biased styles of responding to
questions regarding personal performance. Whilst this explanation is popular in the
literature, the theoretical basis is not yet well established. Different authors view
cognitive failure scores that are not predicted by neuropsychological outcomes as
indicators of exaggerated (Wilhelm et al., 2010) or alternatively under-developed (Chan
et al., 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013) self-awareness or insight. The inconsistency in
these interpretations may stem from authors adjusting them according to the direction of
their expected results compared to those obtained. Recent research utilising experience
sampling found that neurotic individuals reported increased failures in vivo, presumably
in the absence of biases expected in retrospective self-reports (Lange & Süß, 2014). The
debate around the role of self-awareness in cognitive failures is ongoing.
Despite the lack of correlation with neuropsychological outcomes, cognitive
failures relate closely to a range of real life outcomes. These include likelihood of being
the at-fault driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991), university entrance scores
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(Unsworth et al., 2012), and behavioural observations from spouses (Broadbent et al.,
1982). These findings further support the idea that objective and subjective assessments
of cognition could represent two different but equally valuable concepts for
measurement. The best way to conceptualise this difference is not yet clear. However, a
quick glance at the nature of how we go about traditional neuropsychological testing - at
one time point; in one isolated, idealistic test setting - would suggest that its
correspondence to real world functioning would be poor. Within real world cognition
multiple factors interlink, combine, and interact, in ways yet to be investigated, to shape
our capacity according to levels of stress, the people around us, or even whether it is
9am or 5.30pm. Again, this gap in our knowledge likely stems from the long-standing
focus on ability in human cognition, which has been to the detriment of our
understanding of how ability is implemented in the more chaotic setting of daily life.

2.4.4. Factors contributing to cognitive failures
Given that the experience of cognitive failures seems to be distinct from
neuropsychological ability, research in this area has gradually turned towards exploring
the influence of other aspects of the individual and their daily context. Whilst the
definition that arises from the existing literature highlights a possible primary basis in
biology (i.e., genetics and sex), a range of secondary factors are also evident. We have
grouped these into stable factors and variable factors (see Figure 2.2).

2.4.4.1. Stable factors
A number of factors that are considered trait-like are associated with increased
frequency of cognitive failures (see the inner circles of the model, Figure 2.2). The
strong link with dissociative experiences (Bruce et al., 2007; Merckelbach et al., 1999;
Wright & Osborne, 2005) is not surprising; lapses in control that trigger mild
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dissociation are similar to those resulting in unexpected errors in routine tasks.
Schizotypy is also related to more frequent cognitive failures (Giesbrecht et al., 2007;
Laws et al., 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2009); this may be through similar mechanisms as there
is a documented relationship between schizotypy and dissociation (Barkus, Stirling, &
Cavill, 2010). Schizotypy represents the subclinical end of a spectrum of psychosisproneness, and failures may represent a subclinical level of the cognitive deficits often
seen in schizophrenia. The possible mechanism by which neuroticism (Wilhelm et al.,
2010) and trait anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) increase the likelihood of cognitive
failures in daily life has been discussed earlier, and is less clear. Whilst failures in both
schizotypy and dissociation are viewed as reflecting core deficits in cognitive control,
neuroticism and anxiety tend to be perceived by researchers as linked to problems of
self-awareness.
Alternatively, it is possible that failures represent patterns of cognition that are
characteristic of certain personality types. Another possibility is that cognitive failures
may contribute to (or even play a causal role in) personality. Taking schizotypy as an
example, consistently high rates of cognitive failures could reduce success of social
functioning, which is another feature of this personality structure (Miller &
Lenzenweger, 2012). We could also interpret personality traits such as anxiety,
neuroticism, and schizotypy as more broadly reflecting difficulties in emotional
regulation, which determines ultimate sensitivity of cognitive capacity to external
stressors. Using another example from schizotypy, an additional load such as stress is
needed to trigger problems in objective performance in high schizotypes (Smith &
Lenzenweger, 2010), and this would likely be reflected in everyday failures. This
remains speculation however, due to the limited research on the relationship between
cognitive failures and personality. Nevertheless, the link with several personality traits
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is evidently strong, and provides further evidence that there is stability in tendency
towards failures.

2.4.4.2. Variable factors
Equally as influential in cognitive failures are state-based, variable factors (see
the outer circles of the model, Figure 2.2). Those identified in the current review vary
widely, and experience would suggest it is likely that many more have yet to be studied.
Most people would agree that their ability to concentrate appears to be reduced
in times of high stress, or when they feel fatigued or have low mood. Accordingly, dayto-day cognitive failures seem to increase reliably in response to poor sleep quality and
low mood (Payne & Schnapp, 2014; Wilkerson et al., 2011), as well as high anxiety
(Mahoney et al., 1998; Mecacci et al., 2004). Unsurprisingly, the environment and
current activity influence failures as well. Challenging tasks or chaotic surrounds can
trigger slips (Kane et al., 2007) but so can finding oneself feeling bored (Wallace et al.,
2003). Although no studies exist as yet, we could also suspect contextual features such
as social setting (and individual expectations associated with this) and task saliency
would also impact the flow of cognition.
Hormonal state and age are biological factors which, whilst more stable than
emotional or environmental states, also constantly change over time. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that hormonal changes can significantly impact on normal cognition.
This has been particularly evident in women, with the whole gamut of phases including
pre-menstrual states, menstruation, pregnancy and “baby brain,” and menopause
interfering with normal cognition in women (e.g., Cuttler et al., 2011; Henry & Rendell,
2007; Keogh, Cavill, Moore, & Eccleston, 2014; Sherwin, 2013). This could be another
reason women tend to report more failures: they are regularly exposed to physiological
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processes that may interrupt functioning either directly, or indirectly through symptoms
such as fatigue and lowered mood. However, research examining subjectively-reported
failures across the menstrual cycle is yet to be conducted.
Surprisingly, given popular views of ageing, the current review did not provide
strong evidence for an age-related increase in cognitive failures. Older people tended
not to complain of more problems than younger people (Kramer et al., 1994; Reese &
Cherry, 2006) although some researchers did identify problems with specific areas such
as memory, but not attention (Rast et al., 2009). Linking back to the self-awareness
debate, it is possible that, as some researchers have suggested, older people are
inaccurate in their reporting (Harty et al., 2013). However, it is also possible that older
adults hold an advantage in terms of awareness of problems and experience in using
compensatory strategies, resulting in the relative parity of young and old CFQ scores
(Maylor, 1990). Some researchers have suggested that the lack of an increase in failures
with age may be more closely associated with environmental factors (Rast et al., 2009);
that is, the less demanding lifestyle of retirement limits opportunity for mistakes. This
conclusion is debateable, as by definition, failures are unexpected errors in the normal
flow of daily life, and their occurrence is not dependent on particular types of lifestyle
or activities. Overall, the current findings suggest that heightened cognitive failures are
not necessarily part of healthy ageing, and further research should seek to determine
their utility as an early indicator of dementia that can be easily captured with a brief
questionnaire.
The final factor identified in this review is time of day. Not only does lack of
sleep impact functioning during the day (Wilkerson et al., 2011), but personal
preference for the morning or evening hours also shapes the pattern of failures that will
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occur over the course of the 24-hour circadian cycle (Mecacci et al., 2004). We have
placed time in the outer circle of our model of cognitive failures as it is the one factor
that will always be exerting influence, no matter what else is in play in any given
individual. Time may seem a superfluous inclusion, however, traditional assessment of
cognition generally ignores it and the current findings suggest it is vital to explaining
the fluctuations in functioning that we all experience throughout every day. The study
of the stress-related hormone cortisol is an example of research that has acknowledged
the significance of time of day. There is recognition of a diurnal pattern of cortisol
secretion, which is biologically pre-programmed but also responsive to behavioural and
environmental stressors (Dmitrieva, Almeida, Dmitrieva, Loken, & Pieper, 2013). As
such, the preferred methodology includes sampling cortisol levels at multiple time
points over multiple days. Given the link between stress and cognitive failures, this
approach to measurement is likely also of value to cognitive research.
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Figure 2.2. Factors associated with increased risk of cognitive failures.

2.4.4.3. Co-occurrence and interaction of contributing factors
Notably absent from our proposed model is underlying cognitive ability. Even
very broad measures such as intelligent quotient are unable to predict which individuals
will experience more or less cognitive failures (Larson & Merritt, 1991). Whilst this is
potentially due to the different goals of objective and self-report approaches to cognitive
research, the model we suggest here could provide for another explanation: ability may
interact with context in which cognition is occurring. This fits with the findings of Kane
et al. (2007) that those with low ability experience failures quite consistently, whilst
those higher in ability tend to experience slippage only when faced with distracting
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environments. Despite the ongoing search for a link to neuropsychological performance,
we consider that at this stage there is insufficient evidence for us to include cognitive
ability in the model. However, the possible interaction of other stable factors with shifts
in state is highlighted.
As yet, very few studies have examined whether co-occurrence of factors may
have an additive or otherwise impact on the likelihood of experiencing failures. The
model proposed here highlights that whilst the various aspects of biology, personality,
mood, and environment affecting cognitive failures are distinct, within an individual
any combination of these could exert influence at the same time. Visually, the model
depicted in Figure 2.2 as applied to one person would feature the outer circles
constantly shifting around the stable inner ones throughout each moment of the day.
The alignment of factors at any given point in time would determine how effectively
that person will perform. This interplay is an unavoidable part of human life, but one
which is routinely overlooked.
Consideration of the effects of co-occurring factors may also help solve the
debate on the problem of self-awareness and bias in reporting. For example, those
personalities that have been linked to greater cognitive failures without necessarily
exhibiting deficits of ability, such as schizotypal, anxious, or neurotic types, are known
to be more reactive to both interpersonal and environmental stress (Collip et al., 2013;
Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999). It may be that such individuals experience problems
whilst dealing with the time-pressures and hassles of daily responsibilities, but not when
asked to perform in the relative calm of the laboratory. In a similar example already
noted, people with a preference for morning hours (i.e., larks in circadian typology) are
more likely to experience failures in the evening hours (Mecacci et al., 2004). As such,
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rather than having poor self-awareness, it may be that the occurrence of failures reflects
a diathesis-stress-like process.

2.4.5. Conclusions and directions for cognitive failures research
Cognitive researchers have never been quite comfortable with the idea of
measuring cognition using anything other than a relatively narrow range of objective
assessment paradigms. The subjective way in which measures such as the CFQ gauge
problems in everyday functioning is perceived as especially questionable. However, the
findings of this review highlight that whilst self-reported failures do not appear to
directly reflect any specific domain of ability, they are reliably influenced by a range of
other factors. Some of these contributing factors are trait-like and have the potential to
shape a person’s functioning from birth, whilst many are dependent on momentary
shifts in surroundings and time of day. Therefore, concerns about the validity of treating
cognitive failures as a measure of cognitive ability are founded. Instead, we propose that
the construct of cognitive failures actually provides a measure of cognitive capacity.
Capacity is understood here as one’s level of cognitive performance in a particular
situation. It is perceived to be fluid; shifting over time and with context. This is distinct
from cognitive ability, which is the relatively stable level at which a person may
optimally function, given ideal circumstances. Ability is biologically determined (by
genetics, age, and disease status), whilst capacity is additionally shaped on a momentary
basis and reflects the fluctuations that are observed in performance during real life.
Much of the research into cognitive failures thus far has been disparate in terms
of both the construct’s conceptualisation and the contributing factors of interest. In
addition, no studies thus far have considered the interaction between factors. Our model
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of cognitive failures as a gauge of cognitive capacity, whilst preliminary, could provide
a unitary basis for future research. We suggest the following key goals for further study:
1) Elucidate the effects of co-occurrence of key trait and state factors in cognitive
failures, such as trait anxiety and stress.
2) Explore the relationship between cognitive failures and psychological disorders.
3) In the long term, determine whether a brief self-report tool such as the CFQ, which
could be easily administered by a primary-care clinician, holds potential as an early
diagnostic indicator for diseases such as dementia and schizophrenia.
4) Also in the long term, determine whether everyday cognitive failures may serve as
a target for early intervention in diseases such as dementia and schizophrenia.
Whilst the “what” for future research is relatively clear, the “how” is less so. The
existing research makes clear that the full range of fluctuating factors relevant to day-today cognitive experiences simply cannot be measured in the lab. The recent emergence
of experience sampling methods offers a means of evaluating many of these factors in
more ecologically valid ways. The often contrasting results presented in this review
regarding retrospective versus in vivo reports of failures highlights a need to pursue
this. If for no other reason, this form of ambulatory assessment is necessary to capture
the time of day effects that invariably influence us all. This method requires a great deal
of refinement in its application to cognitive failures, however it may be the next step in
the emerging shift in cognitive research from the laboratory to real life.
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3. A systematic review of the relationship between psychological disorders or
substance use and self-reported cognitive failures.

This chapter is based on a paper that has been published in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.

Carrigan, N. & Barkus, E. (2016). A systematic review of the relationship between
psychological disorders or substance use and self-reported cognitive failures. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 21(6), 539 – 564, 10.1080/13546805.2016.1250620.
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3.1. Introduction
As people go about their daily lives, most experience the irritating phenomenon of
cognitive failures – also known as cognitive slips or “brain farts.” Common failures include
finding yourself re-reading the same page of a book multiple times, or putting salt instead
of sugar on your cereal. As these examples illustrate, cognitive failures occur during routine
tasks that one would usually have no difficulty in successfully completing (Clark, Parakh,
Smilek, & Roy, 2011). As such, they represent a lapse in cognition in “real world” settings,
rather than an ability deficit (Broadbent et al., 1982).
Cognitive failures are experienced by everyone from time to time, and are normally
distributed throughout the general population (Boomsma, 1998; Kanai et al., 2011). Some
people are more prone to making errors than others; of interest are the factors that
determine this vulnerability. Objective cognition largely captures (relatively) stable ability,
whilst cognitive failures are thought to reflect capacity, where performance might shift
depending on context (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Cognitive failures are shaped by traitbased vulnerability factors related to personality (e.g., Bruce et al., 2007; Pfeifer et al.,
2009), but also appear to be shaped by fluctuating state factors including mood and stress
(Ishigami & Klein, 2009), wakefulness (Wallace et al., 2003), and even time of day
(Mecacci et al., 2004).
In addition to these contributing factors, people suffering from psychological
disorders are also thought to be more vulnerable to cognitive failures (Broadbent et al.,
1982; Merckelbach, Muris, Nijman, & de Jong, 1996). However, there has been an
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emphasis on traditional objective measures of cognition in both healthy and clinical
populations, meaning knowledge around everyday cognitive functioning in psychological
disorders is limited. This in turn places limitations on conceptualisation and treatment of
patients’ cognitive difficulties. For example, in schizophrenia, up to 27% of patients exhibit
normal neuropsychological functioning on objective assessments (Palmer et al., 1997),
despite severe impairment in daily life. If clinicians refer primarily to test performance,
they are unlikely to comprehend the breadth of disruption to the real-world functioning of
their patients, and will thus be limited in their ability to provide effective treatment. There
is therefore a need to improve our understanding of subjective experiences of cognition in
patients’ daily lives. This review will serve to form a preliminary picture of the association
between cognitive failures and different psychological disorders.

3.1.1. Measurement of cognitive failures
There are a number of approaches utilised in measuring cognitive failures. Several
experimental tasks have been designed to capture aspects of cognition essential to everyday
life. For example, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly,
Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) assesses susceptibility to everyday attention failures,
whilst tip-of-the-tongue studies examine proneness to word retrieval failures (Maylor,
1990). Recently more naturalistic measures have been applied, such as testing prospective
memory by instructing participants to call at a prescribed time in the future (Cuttler et al.,
2011). Alongside such tasks, there has also been increasing interest in self-reported
perceptions of everyday slips and failures; this will be the focus of the current article.
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Several self-report tools have been developed, with the most widely used being the
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982). The CFQ requires
individuals to indicate how frequently they have experienced a list of minor perceptual,
memory, and action failures in everyday life; higher scores reflect a general vulnerability to
slips. Interestingly, correlations with the CFQ have been used to confirm the ecological
validity of objective measures of everyday cognition, including the SART (Smilek,
Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010).
However, the use of self-reported cognitive failures leads to questions of validity.
Given that neuropsychological assessments are considered the “gold-standard” method of
capturing cognition, the poor correspondence between performance on neuropsychological
assessments and self-reported slips is of concern to some authors (Donohoe et al., 2009;
Wilhelm et al., 2010). It may be, however, that the two types of assessment are capturing
different, but equally relevant and valid, aspects of cognition.
The reliability of self-reported cognitive failures is also questioned. Particularly
pertinent is the association between cognitive failures and neuroticism (Broadbent et al.,
1982; Matthews & Wells, 1988). Two views of this relationship are expressed: neurotic
people 1) are genuinely more prone to everyday cognitive failures (Neupert, Mroczek, &
Spiro, 2008; Suls & Martin, 2005), or 2) tend to exaggerate reports of failures due to their
negative self-appraisal style (Wilhelm et al., 2010). It is necessary to determine more
imaginative methods for validating the assessment of cognitive failures to ensure that the
concerns of critics can be addressed.
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Certainly, the use of informants in cognitive failures could help to address concerns
over both the validity and reliability of cognitive failures. Given the behavioural nature of
many of the complaints captured under the banner of cognitive failures, it is possible that
those living with one another could be aware of the extent to which they are experienced.
Across the healthy population, self-reported cognitive failures show moderate correlations
with informant ratings (Broadbent et al., 1982; Mahoney et al., 1998), as well as with real
world outcomes such as the likelihood of being at-fault in a car accident (Larson & Merritt,
1991). This suggests that self-reported cognitive failures are indeed of value as an
indication of proneness to problems with real world cognition. Further studies are needed
corresponding both subjective and informant ratings of cognitive failures to assist in
addressing some of the measurement concerns; other creative methods such as real-time
assessment may also be of use.

3.1.2. Cognitive failures in psychological disorders and substance use
Feeling overwhelmed with the demands of life tends to go hand-in-hand with
difficulty thinking clearly. Cognitive failures are known to be associated with stress
(Mahoney et al., 1998) and negative affect (Payne & Schnapp, 2014), and patients with a
range of psychological disorders including depression, bipolar, generalised anxiety, and
schizophrenia complain of similar difficulties (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The link between these disorders and objective cognitive outcomes has been well covered
(e.g., David, Zammit, Lewis, Dalman, & Allebeck, 2008), however investigation of
patients’ experiences of everyday slips has been limited. There are two key possibilities for
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the nature of a relationship between psychopathology and cognitive failures: 1) problems
with cognitive functioning in everyday life causally contribute to aspects of illness such as
negative affect (e.g., Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008a), or 2) vulnerable individuals’
already compromised systems struggle to cope with daily stressors, resulting in cognitive
failures (e.g., Matthews, Coyle, & Craig, 1990). It is beyond the scope of this paper to
elucidate how cognitive failures and psychological disorders influence each other; however,
a review of the currently disparate literature will provide information about which
particular disorders are most affected.
This review will also consider the effects of substance use on cognitive failures. This
is of interest for a number of reasons. First, there is already a large body of research that has
demonstrated the impact substance use has on everyday cognition. For example, ability to
successfully carry out cognition necessary for safe driving is adversely impacted by use of
substances including alcohol (Marczinski, Harrison, & Fillmore, 2008) and cannabis
(Downey et al., 2013). Whilst these findings are based on objective measures of cognition
(i.e., driving simulators), they suggest that real world cognition – as in cognitive failures may also be affected by substance use.
Second, there is an overlap between psychological disorders and substance use. A
high proportion of individuals with a psychiatric diagnosis will either have co-morbid
substance use disorders, or use substances including nicotine, alcohol, and illicit drugs
(Weaver et al., 2003). In those studies that do measure cognitive failures in clinicallydefined populations there tends to be a lack of consideration for the potential role of
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substance use, most likely due to the complexity of clinical presentations. Therefore, it is
important to consider any findings for the effects of substance use on cognitive failures;
even those studies considering substance use in otherwise psychologically healthy
individuals would provide useful information.

3.1.3. Objectives of the current review
There have been several studies examining cognitive failures in individuals with
psychological disorders and in substance use; however, their findings are yet to be drawn
together. This review will seek to determine whether or not there is a relationship between
cognitive failures and different psychological disorders or substance use, and how this
relates to objective cognitive outcomes. Specifically, three core questions will be explored:
1) What is the relationship between cognitive failures and psychological disorders?
2) What is the relationship between cognitive failures and substance use?
3) How do subjective cognitive failures relate to performance on objective tasks in
people with psychological disorders or in substance users?

3.2. Method
We designed and reported this systematic review based on the PRISMA (Preferred
Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses) statement, an internationally
recognised 27-item method ensuring the highest standard in systematic reviewing (Liberati
et al., 2009). PRISMA was developed as an update to previous standards provided by the
QUOROM (Quality Of Reporting Of Meta-analyses) statement, and is based on the
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definitions of systematic reviews and meta-analyses set forth by the Cochrane
Collaboration.

3.2.1. Search strategy
Studies were identified by searching electronic databases and scanning reference lists.
PsycINFO (1967-March 2016), Web of Science’s Social Sciences Citation Index (1956March 2016), Scopus (1960- March 2016) and the Cochrane database were searched using
the following index items via Boolean search criteria: “cognitive failure* OR cognitive
slip* OR subjective cogniti* AND everyday;” “cognitive slip* OR cognitive failure* OR
subjective cogniti* AND daily.” These search terms were derived from examination of
seminal cognitive failure articles (e.g., Broadbent et al., 1982; Wallace et al., 2002). Several
other search terms were considered but ultimately excluded.
Whilst “mind-wandering” is sometimes used interchangeably with cognitive failures,
it actually refers to a subtype of failure. Although this would perhaps support its use as a
search term, preliminary searches found that the majority of recent papers focus on aspects
of mindfulness or the content of daydreams, rather than errors that may arise in daily
functioning. “Accident-proneness” is another term that has previously been associated with
cognitive failures (e.g., Reason, 1979), however this is now largely confined to human
factors research where it refers to a concept encapsulating issues beyond human errors in
cognition. The chosen search terms therefore reflect the current review’s focus on cognitive
failures, defined as cognitive capacity in everyday life which is fluid and may fluctuate
according to shifts in factors such as illness and environment (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a).
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No limits were applied for year of publication or language, and translated foreign
papers were accessed. Reference lists of key articles were hand-searched. All types of
studies apart from case studies and theoretical papers were included in the search. The last
search was run on 15th March, 2016.

3.2.2. Eligibility criteria
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were postulated prior to the search. Studies were
included if they were:
•

Published in a refereed journal;

•

Identified cognitive failures or subjective cognitive complaints as one of their
primary measures or outcomes;

•

Sampled from populations with any psychological disorder listed in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, including substance use disorders; OR

•

Sampled from healthy populations but examined substance use including that of
alcohol and other drugs both illicit and non-illicit, but excluding caffeine; and

•

Utilised the CFQ as a subjective measure of everyday cognitive performance.

Studies were excluded if they:
•

Sampled from a non-psychologically disordered population, including those with
neurological disorders such as dementia or traumatic brain injury, or those with
other cognitive disorders such as dyslexia;
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•

Were attempts to validate the CFQ with specific populations (e.g., cultural,
language groups) or created for specific populations (e.g., elderly people);

•

Came from non-psychological or health-related research fields (e.g., ergonomics);
or

•

Studied outcomes of a new intervention.

This search strategy focused on the CFQ, excluding objective, laboratory-based
measures such as the SART. This enabled an exploration of everyday cognitive
functioning, with self-reported failures capturing real world errors that cannot be replicated
in the lab. It should also be noted that there are a number of other self-report tools available
including the Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES; Cheyne, Carriere, &
Smilek, 2006), Short Inventory of Minor Lapses (SIML; Reason, 1993), and the
Prospective and Retrospective Memory Failures Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith et al., 2000).
However, preliminary searches failed to identify a substantial number of articles that
utilised these measures with clinical populations. In addition, the CFQ is one of the
broadest measures, covering slips in memory, attention, and perception. Therefore, a sole
focus on the CFQ was chosen to ensure consistency and clarity.
This review was left open to clinical populations with any kind of psychological
disorder as listed in the DSM 5, excluding those defined by neurological issues or severe
cognitive impairment, such as dementia, learning disorders, and ADHD. Given the field of
cognitive failures is still relatively small, this relatively open search approach was taken as
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a means of providing a preliminary overview of the literature, as per the aims of this
review.
Case studies, letters to the editor, and conference abstracts were excluded. The
researchers screened titles and abstracts of the articles gathered during the search against
the exclusion criteria. Selected articles were then read and excluded if they did not meet
criteria.

Figure 3.1. Flow diagram of study selection for systematic review of published research on
cognitive failures in populations with psychological disorders.
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3.3. Results
We included 21 articles in the review. The studies varied widely in their research
design and grouping of participants. Almost all of the studies used correlational designs
(n =19), with some longitudinal studies (n = 2; Manning, Teo, Guo, Wong, & Li, 2016; van
den Bosch, Rombouts, & van Asma, 1993).

3.3.1. Study characteristics
3.3.1.1. Location
The largest portion of articles came from the United Kingdom (n =8), these were
largely studies looking at substance use. The United States contributed the next largest
portion (n = 4), followed by the Netherlands (n = 3), and Australia (n = 1), Bosnia-andHerzegovina (n = 1) Canada (n = 1), the Czech Republic (n = 1), Ireland (n = 1), and
Singapore (n = 1).

3.3.1.2. Study populations
We identified studies focusing on a range of different psychological disorders.
Sampled populations included those with:
•

Affective disorders, including major depressive and bipolar disorders.

•

Anxiety disorders.

•

Post-traumatic stress disorder.

•

Schizophrenia.
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We identified papers sampling from users of the following substances:
•

Nicotine.

•

Alcohol.

•

Cannabis, ecstasy, and polydrug use (i.e., use of two or more substances by the
same individual, either at the same or different times).

We examined the studies and arranged them into sub-tables according to the disorder
or substance they examined. Some articles contained overlapping topics; these were placed
into sub-tables based on their primary focus.
Whilst it was not the purpose of this paper to additionally conduct a meta-analysis, we
calculated effect sizes for each study that provided sufficient statistical detail. The majority
of studies identified for this review provided CFQ means and standard deviations, which
enabled calculation of standardised mean differences (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). As such, d
and 95% confidence intervals were calculated for those studies that presented data on
between-groups differences in CFQ scores, and are presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. A
small number of studies instead reported correlations between CFQ scores and those of
diagnostic measures; in these cases, r correlation coefficients were transformed into d for
ease of comparison (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). The size of these
effects as per Cohen’s (1988) suggested classifications are also indicated in the tables.
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3.3.2. Relationship between psychological disorders and cognitive failures
3.3.2.1. Affective disorders
As per Table 3.1, four papers examined depression and consistently demonstrated a
profile of elevated cognitive failures (Farrin, Hull, Unwin, & Wykes, 2003; MacQueen,
Galway, Hay, Young, & Joffe, 2002; Preiss, Kramska, Dockalova, Holubova, & Kucerova,
2010; Sullivan & Payne, 2007). Effect sizes for the differences between depressed and
control individuals were generally large. In bipolar populations there were only two studies
identified, neither of which found any evidence of a relationship between the disorder and
heightened cognitive failures.
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Table 3.1
Associations Between Affective Disorders and Cognitive Failures
Reference

Study population

Findings

MacQueen,
Galway, Hay,
Young, &
Joffe (2002)

40 patients with past or current
major depressive disorder
(SCID for DSM-IV).
Mean age 36.2 years; 30
males.

Farrin, Hull,
Unwin, &
Wykes (2003)

43 UK military servicemen
with mild depression (BDI >
10).
Mean age 35.79 years.
37 outpatients with bipolar I or
II in depressed, hypomanic,
mixed, and euthymic phases of
illness (SCID for DSM-IV).
Mean age 46.2 years; 20
males.
26 individuals with seasonal
depression, 8 with major
depressive disorder (Seasonal
Pattern Assessment
Questionnaire > 11; BDI-II
>17).

Patients reported more cognitive failures, and
this predicted poorer memory performance
independent of mood. There was no difference
in failures reported by symptomatic versus
improved patients (i.e., antidepressant nonresponders versus responders).
Depressed men performed worse on an attention
task and also reported higher CFQ scores than
non-depressed men.

Burdick,
Endick, &
Goldberg
(2005)

Sullivan &
Payne (2007)

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]
Clinical vs. control: p <
.001; 1.77 [1.25, 2.28]****

Clinical vs. control: p <
.0001; 1.57 [1.13,
2.02]****

75% of patients displayed mild
neuropsychological impairment, but selfreported cognitive failures did not correlate
significantly with measures of mood or
objective outcomes.

CFQ – depression
relationshipa: p =.06;
0.67**
CFQ – mania relationshipa:
p = .09; - 0.59**

Both patient groups reported greater experiences
of cognitive failures than healthy individuals.
There was no difference between the two
depression subtypes.

MDD vs. control:
p < .001; 1.68 [0.89,
2.47]****
MDD vs. SAD:
p > .05; 0.56 [-0.24,
1.37]**
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Reference

Study population

Findings

Age 18-22 years; 4 males.

Preiss,
Kramska,
Dockalova,
Holubova,
&Kucerova
(2010)
Schouws,
Comijs, Stek,
& Beekman
(2012)

32 outpatients with depression,
currently in euthymic stage
(MINI).
Mean age 46.8 years; 12
males.

Found no differences in attentional networks in
euthymic patients compared with controls.
Attentional performance did not correlate with
CFQ scores. Group comparisons for CFQ scores
were not reported.

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]
SAD vs. control:
p < .001; 1.12 [0.63,
1.61]***
Did not report on group
differences or relationship
between CFQ and
diagnostic measures.

101 elderly patients with
Patients reported no greater failures than
Clinical vs. control: p =
bipolar, currently in euthymic
controls despite exhibiting impairment in
0.36; 0.14 [-0.02, 0.04]
stage (SCID for DSM-IV).
several objective domains. Patients with worse
Mean age 69.3 years; 50
objective performance reported fewer cognitive
males.
failures than those with better performance.
Notes: p values for some studies were not reported and thus are not included in the table. a = r coefficients transformed into
Cohen’s d; CIs not calculated. Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate
(Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8); **** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3).
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These studies mirror recent attempts to uncover a neuropsychological profile of
depression. These have so far identified central deficits in the objectively-measured
domains of attention, executive functioning, and to a lesser extent episodic memory (e.g.,
McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009; Rock, Roiser, Riedel, & Blackwell, 2014).
The presence of objective deficits in patients in remission supports cognitive
impairment as a core feature of depression, impacting psychosocial functioning
independent of mood fluctuations. Accordingly, patients whose mood responds positively
to antidepressant treatment continue to report heightened cognitive failures in everyday life
(MacQueen et al., 2002). Farrin et al. (2003) described a vicious cycle between depression
and cognitive failures, whereby normal errors trigger strong, negative reactions (thoughts,
feelings) that drain cognitive resources, further increasing the chance of errors. Similar
levels of failures were noted in those with seasonal affective disorder (Sullivan & Payne,
2007), suggesting that the failures may not be specifically associated with any one subtype
of depression.
However, two studies of individuals with bipolar disorder found that patients in
various phases of illness (depressed, hypomanic, mixed, and euthymic) tended to report
fewer failures relative to both healthy controls (Schouws, Comijs, Stek, & Beekman, 2012)
and their own objectively-assessed neuropsychological deficits (Burdick, Endick, &
Goldberg, 2005). This pattern of “under-reporting” is difficult to interpret, as illness
chronicity is linked to significant confounds such as mood stabilising medications and the
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adjustment or lowering of perceptions/expectations of functioning over time. In addition,
hypomanic symptoms may reduce awareness of errors made in an everyday context.

3.3.2.2. Non-affective disorders
We identified only seven articles that focused on psychological disorders other than
mood disorders (Table 3.2). These included two examining anxiety disorders, three on
trauma-related disorders, and two on schizophrenia. The findings of these papers were less
consistent than those regarding depression. There appear to be weak links between
increased cognitive failures and anxiety (Grisham, Norberg, Williams, Certoma, & Kadib,
2010; Merckelbach et al., 1996), and one of these papers found a comparatively stronger
association with depression (Merckelbach et al., 1996). The findings regarding
schizophrenia were mixed, with one group identifying no increase in failures for psychosis
compared to controls (Donohoe et al., 2009), whilst the other found a large difference,
comparable to the heightened reports of those with major depression (van den Bosch et al.,
1993). The most robust findings related to trauma, with CFQ scores being greatly increased
in those with PTSD symptoms (Boals, 2008; Boals & Banks, 2012; Koso, SaračHadzihalilovic, & Hansen, 2012). More detailed information about these findings is
provided following Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2
Associations Between Non-Affective Disorders and Cognitive Failures
Reference

Study population

Anxiety disorders
Merckelbach,
3 studies including 30 females
Muris,
with spider phobias and 224
Nijman, & de
outpatients with anxiety (panic
Jong (1996)
disorder, GAD, social phobia,
OCD, atypical anxiety) or
depression (SCID for DSMIII-R).
Mean age 31 years; 30 females
only – mean age 35 years; 105
males.
Grisham,
23 patients with compulsive
Norberg,
hoarding patterns and 17 nonWilliams,
hoarding patients with current
Certoma, &
anxiety (GAD, social phobia,
Kadib (2010)
OCD, panic disorder, specific
phobia, PTSD) or mood
disorders (ADIS for DSM-IV).
Mean age 49 years; sex of
clinical groups not reported.

Findings

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]

CFQ scores were correlated with general
psychopathological symptom severity.
Clinically anxious individuals and those with
OCD reported fewer failures than healthy
controls, whilst clinically depressed individuals
reported more than controls. Individuals with a
phobia did not differ to controls in their CFQ
scores.

Spider phobic vs. control:
-0.01 [-0.51, -0.49]
Anxiety vs. control:
-0.39 [-0.64, -0.14] *
Depressed vs. control:
0.91 [0.43, 1.41]***
OCD vs. control: -0.3 [0.68, 0.08]*

Patients reported more cognitive failures than
healthy controls, but there were no differences
between hoarding and non-hoarding patients.

Hoarding vs. clinical
controls:
p > .05; 0.2 [-0.45, 0.86]*
Hoarding vs. non-clinical
control:
p < .01; 1.06 [0.39,
1.73]***
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Reference

Study population

Post-traumatic stress disorder
Boals (2008)
13 Holocaust survivors (no
diagnostic measures; assumed
to evidence PTSD symptoms
as per previous findings with
this population).
Mean age 72 years; 13 males
only.
Boals & Banks 909 undergraduate students
(2012)
who had experienced a
traumatic event (PCL-S > 43
and DSM-IV-TR criteria).
Mean age not reported; 319
males.
Koso, Sarač45 adult male ex-servicemen
Hadzihalilovic, (DSM-IV criteria).
& Hansen
Mean age 44 years; 45 males
(2012)
only.
Schizophrenia
van den
24 patients with schizophrenia
Bosch,
and 13 patients with
Rombouts, &
depression (DSM-III-R
van Asma
criteria).
(1993)
Mean age schizophrenia 28.7
years; mean age depression
39.9 years; sex of clinical
groups not reported.

Findings

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]

Intrusive thoughts (i.e., Holocaust-related PTSD CFQ - PTSD symptom
symptoms) predicted the frequency of everyday relationshipa: p < .05;
failures.
1.46****

PTSD symptoms were related to cognitive
failures, and an interaction with perceived stress
had an additive effect on cognitive failures.

CFQ-PTSD symptom
relationshipa: p < .001;
0.63**

Severity of PTSD symptoms was related to both
objective cognitive impairment and increased
CFQ scores.

Clinical vs. control:
p < .001; 3.83 [3.09, 4.86]
****

All psychiatric patient groups experienced
higher levels of cognitive failures than normal
individuals, and these ratings were consistent
over a 3-month period. Symptoms relating to
anxiety and depression were found to be most
closely associated with everyday failures.

Schizophrenia vs. MDD:
-0.25 [-0.93, 0.42]*
Schizophrenia vs. controls:
1.2 [0.56, 1.84]***
MDD vs. controls:
1.72 [0.91, 2.53]****
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Reference

Study population

Donohoe et al.
(2009)

51 stabilised patients with
chronic schizophrenia (SCID
for DSM-IV).
Mean age 39.8 years; 20
males.

Findings

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]
Clinical vs. controls:
0.33 [-0.06, 0.71]*

Patients did not report more cognitive failures
than controls. Cognitive failures and objective
neuropsychological assessment correlated only
for some patients with good clinical insight (i.e.,
good awareness of illness). Overall, clinical
insight and cognitive insight (cognitive failures
correlate with objective outcome) not linked.
Notes: p values for some studies were not reported and thus are not included in the table. a = r coefficients transformed into
Cohen’s d; CIs not calculated. Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate
(Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8); **** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3).
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3.3.2.2.1. Anxiety disorders
Anxiety symptoms in a healthy student population were correlated positively with
CFQ scores (Merckelbach et al., 1996). However, in another sub-study the same authors
found that clinically anxious patients reported failures similar to controls, and less than
depressed patients (Merckelbach et al., 1996). Conversely, clinically anxious participants in
the second identified anxiety article reported significantly more errors than controls,
although there were no differences between hoarding and non-hoarding patients (Grisham
et al., 2010). It was somewhat surprising that there were so few papers on failures and
anxiety disorders, given the significant impact anxiety can have on everyday functioning.
There were also some limitations of the identified papers; primarily, both studies featured a
mixed sample rather than being disorder-specific. Included were individuals with a range of
anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder, social phobia, and OCD, as well as those with comorbid depression. Given the heterogeneity of these disorders, the current review provides
only a limited glimpse of the potential link between anxiety and everyday cognition.

3.3.2.2.2. Post-traumatic stress disorder
Individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are another group
experiencing a high frequency of cognitive failures (Boals & Banks, 2012; Boals, 2008),
with symptom severity related to both daily slips and neuropsychological deficits (Koso et
al., 2012). Intrusive memories surrounding trauma and “flashbacks” are thought to drain
cognitive resources, increasing the likelihood of slips (Boals, 2008). Importantly,

77

situational stress appears to interact with PTSD symptoms for an additive effect that can
trigger even more failures (Boals & Banks, 2012).
Whilst the findings in these three articles were consistent, it is notable that they
involved quite different forms of PTSD. Boals and Banks’ study (2012) utilised a student
population reporting the experience of at least one traumatic lifetime event which led to
clinical symptoms of PTSD. Such events included a serious accident, or an unexpected
death. The other studies, meanwhile, included survivors of Holocaust concentration camps
(Boals, 2008) and servicemen who were torture survivors from the Bosnian war (Koso et
al., 2012). These prolonged experiences of pain and harm would precipitate complex
trauma, quite distinct to the one-off incidents faced by students. Whilst the “brain-drain”
caused by intrusive memories provides one explanation of cognitive failures, complex
trauma involves sequelae additional to PTSD, such as elevated arousal systems,
somatisation, dissociation, and high risk for repeated harm (Herman, 1992); all of which
may also impact cognition. Other factors of potential significance that have yet to be
considered are time since traumatic event (e.g., 20 years between Bosnian war and article
publication vs. 60 years between Holocaust and article publication), and presence of
psychotic symptoms.

3.3.2.2.3. Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia was another disorder for which no distinct profile of cognitive failures
is yet evident, with findings of both increased (van den Bosch et al., 1993) and normal
levels (Donohoe et al., 2009) of everyday problems. These studies included two quite
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different groups: recently hospitalised patients versus “stable” chronic patients. A possible
explanation for the discrepancy in findings, therefore, is difference in phase of illness.
Chronic sufferers may develop compensatory strategies through their experiences, and thus
evidence fewer cognitive failures than younger individuals recovering from their first
psychotic episode. However, given the paucity of information on inclusion criteria and
sample characteristics in the current literature, further phase-specific research is necessary
before such conclusions can be drawn. Another issue is that schizophrenia, control, and
other patient groups differ in age in van den Bosch (1993) et al.’s study, with the increased
age of depressed patients perhaps likely to increase failures relative to the younger
schizophrenia group. However, as per the findings of our previous review, contrary to
popular belief older people do not report increased cognitive failures relative to younger
people (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a), making this unlikely.
Van den Bosch et al. (1993) found that a tendency to be overwhelmed by cognitive
demands – “cognitive overload” – is a subset of cognitive failures that is associated
specifically with psychotic symptoms. They suggest the complexity of sensory information
in everyday life overloads compromised sensory processing in psychosis. However, the
broader finding of this study was that heightened failures are present regardless of whether
depression or schizophrenia was the diagnosis (van den Bosch et al., 1993). This, combined
with the findings reported in section 3.3.2.1, support a view of anxiety and depression (i.e.,
negative symptoms) as most significant to cognitive failures in schizophrenia. Further
research examining the mechanisms underpinning the relationship between cognitive
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failures and schizophrenia may highlight a significance of interactions between symptoms
and day-to-day factors, such as stress and time of day.

3.3.3. Relationship between substance use and cognitive failures
Eight articles explored the impact of substance use on cognitive failures: two on
nicotine, one on alcohol, and five on cannabis, ecstasy, or polydrug use (Table 3.3). Of
these, only the alcohol paper studied a clinical population: patients with alcohol
dependence disorder. Daily smoking seemed to be associated with increased failures
(Parrott & Kaye, 1999; Wan, Friedman, Boutros, & Crawford, 2008), as did alcohol
dependence (Manning et al., 2016). The literature on cannabis and ecstasy did not provide
clear evidence; only cannabis seemed to have a small detrimental effect on everyday
cognition (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008). It is important to note that the bulk of these studies
assessed substance use patterns via self-report only, with limited information collected. It is
therefore unclear how dosage, method of use, and frequency of use may differentially shape
patterns of cognitive failures.
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Table 3.3
Associations Between Substance Use and Cognitive Failures
Reference

Nicotine
Parrott & Kaye
(1999)

Wan, Friedman,
Boutros, &
Crawford (2008)

Alcohol
Manning, Teo,
Guo, Wong, & Li
(2016)

Study population

Findings

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]

25 each of smokers
(mean age 24.3 years; 15
male), abstaining
smokers (mean age 23.5
years; 11 male), and nonsmokers (mean age 26.5;
7 male).
440 non-smokers (170
males), 107 daily
smokers (43 males), and
47 non-daily smokers (18
males).
Overall mean age 19.01
years.

Abstaining smokers reported greater stress,
lower arousal, less pleasure, and more cognitive
failures than both non-smokers and nonabstaining smokers. There were no differences
between these latter groups.

Smokers vs. non-smokers:
0.40 [-0.16, 0.96] *
Abstaining vs. smokers:
0.89 [0.31, 1.47] ***
Abstaining vs. nonsmokers:
1.29 [0.68, 1.90] ***
Daily vs. non-daily:
-0.02 [-0.42, 0.37]
Daily vs. non-smokers:
0.31 [0.08., 0.54] *
Non-daily vs. nonsmokers:
0.33 [-0.02, 0.68] *

30 post-detox alcoholdependent patients
(DSM-IV-TR criteria).
Mean age 49.5 years; 30
males only.

Alcohol dependence diagnosis post-inpatient
detoxification was associated with increased
CFQ scores relative to controls.

Daily smokers reported greater frequencies of
cognitive slips, and non-daily smokers reported
more slips in memory than non-smokers.

Not calculable from
provided data.
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Reference

Study population

Cannabis, ecstasy and polydrug use
Rodgers (2000)
15 ecstasy users (mean
age 31.4 years; 7 males),
15 cannabis users (mean
age 30.25 years; 7
males).

Heffernan, Jarvis,
Rodgers, Scholey,
& Ling (2001)

Montgomery &
Fisk (2007)

Fisk &
Montgomery
(2008)

3 studies comprising 91
regular ecstasy users.
Mean age 26.6 years; 52
males.

Findings

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]

Verbal memory deficits were identified in both
ecstasy and cannabis users, whilst only ecstasy
users exhibited impaired delayed memory.
Subjective impairment did not significantly
differ between groups.

Ecstasy vs. cannabis:
p > .05; 0.54 [-0.19, 1.27]
**
Ecstasy vs. control:
p > .05; 0.01 [-0.71, 0.72]
Cannabis vs. control:
p > .05; -0.53 [-1.25, 0.20]
**
Same data as above study.

Ecstasy users reported more errors in
prospective memory in everyday life than
controls; this matched with objective
performance. This was not generalizable to all
aspects of everyday cognition, with no
differences in ratings on the CFQ.
43 ecstasy/polydrug
Ecstasy/polydrug users exhibited greater
users.
subjective (also supported by informant) and
Mean age 21.56 years; 24 objective deficits than non-users; however,
males.
cannabis was found to be the drug most closely
linked to users’ everyday problems.
46 cannabis-only users.
Relative impairment in real-world memory
Mean age 21 years; sex
functioning was identified in cannabis users,
not reported.
although this was not found in objective
measures of executive processes. Significant
others also observed more failures in users than
non-users.

Ecstasy/polydrug vs.
controls:
0.51 [0.12, 0.91] **

Cannabis vs. control:
p = .02; 0.59 [0.08, 1.13]
**
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Reference

Study population

Hadjiefthyvoulou,
Fisk, Montgomery,
& Bridges (2011)

42 ecstasy/polydrug
users.
Mean age 21.67 years; 14
males.

Findings

Group differences: pvalue; Cohen’s d [95%
CI]
Ecstasy/polydrug vs.
control:
p > .05; 0.25 [-0.22, 0.72] *

Regular illicit drug use was associated with
deficits in objective and subjective prospective
memory, but not cognitive failures more
generally. Cognitive failures correlated with
recency of ecstasy use.
Notes: p values for some studies were not reported and thus are not included in the table. Classification of effect sizes: trivial
(Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate (Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8); **** very large (Cohen's d >
1.3).
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Interestingly, none of these articles examined acute intoxication, focusing instead on
functioning during withdrawal and periods of abstinence/sobriety, and incorporating a
mixture of occasional and chronic users. It must be noted that few of these studies
controlled for time since last use, with most asking for a specific period of abstinence (e.g.,
7 days since last ecstasy use) and relying on self-report only, rather than any objective
measures of compliance. Given the possibility of intraindividual variations in drug
clearance rates (as in ecstasy; e.g., De La Torre et al., 2000), the findings presented in this
review should be viewed as providing only an early indication of the patterns of real life
cognition associated with substance use.

3.3.3.1. Nicotine
There has been much research conducted into the effects of nicotine on cognition,
with immediate beneficial effects after use evident even in non-users (Heishman,
Kleykamp, & Singleton, 2010). However, this review identified only two papers that
looked at the subjective experience of cognitive functioning in smokers. Daily smokers
report more failures than those who smoke occasionally (Wan et al., 2008), and
specifically, smokers experience more slips during periods of abstinence (Parrott & Kaye,
1999). Abstaining smokers also reported more stress, lower mood, and reduced arousal, and
experienced everyday life as having more hassles; this highlights the significance of
nicotine for sustaining normal functioning in users (Parrott & Kaye, 1999). This paper also
highlights the complexity concerning the nature of the relationship between cognitive
failures and substance use. Potentially there are other mediating or exclusively contributing
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factors such as mood and anxiety which could fully or partially account for cognitive
failures’ association with substance use. These need to be taken alongside any alterations in
brain functioning which may be a direct result of the substance use; although it is presumed
in non-clinical samples that this would lead to elevated cognitive failures being transitory
and temporally related to substance use. In assessing the existing research, it is important to
note that both studies utilised groups with large variations in the number of cigarettes
smoked daily (e.g., range from 5-60 daily for abstaining smokers; Parrot & Kaye, 1999).
Given the well-documented effects of nicotine withdrawal, such large differences in dosage
would be expected to impact upon cognition to different degrees.
Nevertheless, an important issue raised in these two articles is the potential role of
nicotine as a kind of self-regulator, vital for sustaining normal functioning and without
which, cognition may be impaired. Related to this, Wan et al. (2008) noted potential
patterns of use of nicotine for self-medication in schizotypal individuals, a group known to
have increased emotional reactivity (Collip et al., 2013). Alongside aiding cognition,
therefore, nicotine may also play an essential role in assisting emotion regulation in a
subgroup of users, with use having an indirect impact on cognitive failures.

3.3.3.2. Alcohol
The only article focusing on alcohol use was also the only one to study a population
with a substance use disorder (Manning et al., 2016). Individuals with alcohol dependence
complain of increased cognitive failures even after a period of detoxification. At three
months follow up, abstainers reported significant reductions in cognitive failures, whilst
85

those who relapsed did not. This would suggest that, at least for alcohol dependence,
cognitive failures are related to the intoxication and withdrawal associated with the
substance use itself, rather than being related to any longer lasting changes in brain
structure or functioning. Implicit within this is that cognitive failures result from alcohol
dependence and are not a potential risk marker for it.
The lack of articles studying alcohol was surprising, given the extensive literature on
the effects of alcohol intoxication on cognition including executive function, inhibitory
control, memory, and motor control (Peterson, Rothfleisch, Zelazo, & Pihl, 1990; T. A.
Schweizer et al., 2006). There have also been more recent attempts to explore the impact of
alcohol on cognition in more naturalistic settings (e.g., bars; Lyvers & Tobias-Webb,
2010), however the lack of studies of subjective perceptions of cognition is stark when
compared to research around other substances.

3.3.3.3. Cannabis, ecstasy and polydrug use
Five papers examined cannabis or ecstasy use; these proved difficult to isolate in
users (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007), and many researchers chose to include polydrug users.
Unsurprisingly, given the contrasting psychopharmacological effects of depressants and
stimulants, findings were mixed. A small sample of both ecstasy and cannabis users
recruited by Rodgers (2000) did not report any subjective impairment, but cannabis was
associated with heightened failures in another (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008). Cannabis users’
complaints about problems with daily functioning were affirmed by their significant others,
despite an absence of demonstrable neuropsychological deficits (Fisk & Montgomery,
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2008), adding weight to the notion that neuropsychological assessments are not necessarily
capturing all the information related to real world cognitive functioning.
Chronic ecstasy users reported problems with memory specifically but did not
endorse cognitive failures in general (Heffernan, Jarvis, Rodgers, Scholey, & Ling, 2001).
One study utilising highly chronic ecstasy users (average 346.5 tablets in lifetime prior to
study) did find high levels of cognitive failures, but also acknowledged that most heavy
ecstasy users are polydrug users (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007). Specifically, many people
use cannabis to manage the low mood and irritability associated with the “come down”
from ecstasy (Klugman & Gruzelier, 2003); typically, this pattern of use would be most
common in chronic consumers. Indeed, further analyses in the study of chronic ecstasy
users suggested cannabis as the key predictor of failures (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007).
These findings reflect the literature around objective measures of cognitive functioning,
where there are also conflicting findings as to whether ecstasy or cannabis is actually the
main source of impairment (e.g., Croft, Mackay, Mills, & Gruzelier, 2001; Klugman &
Gruzelier, 2003). In addition, there is the possibility that the combined effects of ecstasy
and cannabis produce a cascade of neurobiological events which are particularly toxic.
Further work is needed to tease apart the interacting effects of substances, indeed, the
effects of legal substances such as alcohol and nicotine are often forgotten about in studies
concerning illicit substances.
The role of self-awareness in reporting cognitive failures was raised quite frequently
in the substance use literature. It was proposed that metacognitive deficits resulting from
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chronic use of illicit substances may prevent accurate reflection on everyday performance
(Rodgers, 2000). However, informant-self correlations support that cannabis users are
capable of reporting on difficulties; the lack of association with objective cognitive
outcomes suggests that the subtlety of users’ real life cognitive problems are not detectable
in the isolation and calm of lab testing (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008).

3.3.4. Subjective cognitive failures versus performance on objective tasks in
individuals with psychological disorders
Several papers compared cognitive failures and objectively assessed cognitive
performance in a range of psychological disorders and patterns of substance use (n = 14). A
range of objective domains were tested for correlation with everyday cognition; with
attention, executive function and memory being predominant. In line with our previous
review on the link between subjective and objective cognition in healthy populations
(Carrigan & Barkus, 2016), there were no consistent associations evident between cognitive
failures and any objective domains of cognition. These findings are displayed in Table 3.4,
which displays the domains examined and whether a relationship with cognitive failures
was found.
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Table 3.4
Comparison of Objective Cognitive Assessment and Subjective Cognitive Failures in Psychological Disorders and Substance Use
Reference

Psychological disorders
MacQueen, Galway, Hay, Young, &
Joffe (2002)
Farrin, Hull, Unwin, & Wykes(2003)
Preiss, Kramska, Dockalova, Holubova,
& Kucerova (2010)
Burdick, Endick, & Goldberg(2005)
Schouws, Comijs, Stek, &
Beekman (2012)
Grisham, Norberg, Williams, Certoma,
& Kadib(2010)
Koso, Sarač-Hadzihalilovic, &
Hansen(2012)
Donohoe et al. (2009)
Substance use
Manning, Teo, Guo, Wong, & Li (2016)
Fisk & Montgomery (2008)
Parrott & Kaye (1999)
Heffernan, Jarvis, Rodgers, Scholey, &
Ling (2001)
Montgomery & Fisk(2007)
Hadjiefthyvoulou, Fisk, Montgomery, &
Bridges(2011)

Disorder

Overall
cognition

Attention

Executive
function

Depression

Memory

Working
memory

Verbal
function

X

Depression
Depression

√
X

Bipolar
Bipolar (elderly)

X
X

Compulsive hoarding
patterns
PTSD

X

Schizophrenia

X

Alcohol
Cannabis use
Ecstasy use
Ecstasy use

X

Ecstasy-polydrug use
Ecstasy-polydrug use

X

X
√

X
X

X

√

√

X
√
√*
√
X
X

√*

X

√

√

X
X
√

X
X
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Notes: √ Denotes domain compared with CFQ scores and association identified. X Denotes domain compared with CFQ scores
but no association identified. Columns left blank donate domains of cognition not studied by the cited article. *Parity only met
for patients with intact clinical insight
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3.3.4.1. Psychological disorders
There was a consistent disparity between neuropsychological outcomes and selfreports of daily functioning of people with a diagnosed psychological disorder, as in
healthy populations (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016). Farrin et al. (2003) found a relationship
between CFQ scores and errors and longer reaction times in depression, however other
studies of affective disorders failed to uncover any relationship (Burdick et al., 2005; Preiss
et al., 2010; Schouws et al., 2012). Cognitive biases present in individuals with mood
disorders could be argued to skew reporting in a negative direction, however the experience
of poor concentration is a well-accepted symptom of depression (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013; Watts & Sharrock, 1985). This disparity may actually be due to
problems with the ecological validity of current objective measures.
An article studying war veterans with PTSD was the only study to identify objective
test parity with cognitive failures across all domains tested, including executive function,
memory and verbal function (Koso et al., 2012). This perhaps supports the proposed
mechanism behind increased failures in PTSD, whereby intrusive memories increase slips
via depletion of cognitive resources (Boals, 2008). These findings also highlight the
significance of the link between PTSD symptoms (such as flashbacks) that are precipitated
by “triggers” in daily life, and the level of disruption to cognitive, occupational, and social
function experienced by sufferers. Further consideration of the role of situational factors in
cognitive failures in psychopathology more generally may serve to increase our
understanding of this phenomenon.
91

Some final findings of note were produced by Donohoe et al. (2009) in their study
on schizophrenia. The authors suggested that one element of insight into illness is cognitive
insight or awareness of cognitive functioning. They suggested that the CFQ essentially
provides a measure of cognitive insight, and so its utility lies only in identifying
discrepancies between neuropsychological performance and self-reported perceptions of the
same. Predicted premorbid intelligence quotient (as per the Wechsler Test of Adult
Reading) and episodic memory were both correlated with CFQ scores only for a few
patients with intact clinical (i.e., illness) insight. That is, clinical insight was necessary, but
not sufficient, for cognitive insight.

3.3.4.2. Substance use
There was an even greater “gap” between objective and subjective cognition in
substance use. As mentioned earlier, this was proposed to be due to metacognitive deficits
in drug users (Rodgers, 2000), whether due to substance use or personality factors that
predispose to substance use. Whilst correlations between subjective and objective cognition
were not explored, ecstasy-polydrug users had both higher CFQ ratings and poorer working
memory performance than non-users (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007), and alcohol dependent
patients had increased CFQ scores as well as memory, working memory, and executive
function issues (Manning et al., 2016). More significant cognitive problems may be
expected in the clinical population of the latter study, but the former focused on highly
chronic ecstasy users, albeit without a diagnosed disorder. Perhaps individuals only
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experience a noticeable severity of problems and/or unable to compensate for them once a
certain threshold of substance abuse is surpassed.

3.4. Discussion
A range of studies on cognitive failures in different psychological disorders were
identified and examined within this review. Failures in substance users were also explored,
given that substance use is known to influence objective cognitive performance, as well as
being closely related to psychological disorders.

3.4.1. What is the relationship between cognitive failures and psychological disorders?
There appears to be links between a number of psychological disorders and
heightened reports of cognitive failures. Patients with depression and PTSD were
consistently more prone to everyday failures than controls, with medium to large effect
sizes. Researchers looking at both of these disorders posited that particular aspects of their
psychopathology drain cognitive resources to result in failures: in depression, catastrophic
reactions to perceived errors (Farrin et al., 2003); in PTSD, intrusive thoughts and
flashbacks (Boals, 2008). Individuals with bipolar disorder were the only group to report
fewer cognitive failures than controls, which raised the issue of insight; this will be
discussed in detail later. Schizophrenia is also associated with increased cognitive failures,
although this is similar to the level seen in depressed patients (van den Bosch et al., 1993),
and it is not clear whether these reflect depressive symptoms rather than being distinct to
psychosis.
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It is important to note that the existing research is largely correlational in nature.
Therefore, it is still unclear whether cognitive failures are consequent of other
psychological symptoms or part of the core symptoms present in these disorders.
Consideration also needs to be given as to whether cognitive failures are part of the
inherited vulnerability for psychological disorders. However, given the lack of disorder
specificity, as well as cognitive failures’ correlation with neuroticism in both healthy and
disordered populations (van den Bosch et al., 1993; Wilhelm, Witthöft, & Schipolowski,
2010), it is possible that cognitive failures could relate to psychological distress or
problems of emotion regulation more generally.

3.4.2. What is the relationship between cognitive failures and substance use?
The picture of cognitive failures in substance use is even less clear. Nicotine seems to
be associated with cognitive failures in a dose-response fashion according to level of use,
with daily smokers experiencing more failures than non-daily smokers (Wan et al., 2008).
However, the significant factor appears to be withdrawal rather than intoxication, with
abstaining smokers suffering more daily hassles and failures than non-abstainers (Parrott &
Kaye, 1999). Nicotine is often used as an emotion regulation tool (Schleicher, Harris,
Catley, & Nazir, 2010) with deprivation reducing thresholds for coping with stress. In
abstaining smokers, increased failures may therefore occur alongside or as a kind of
cognitive consequence of stress.
Surprisingly, there was only one article identified that considered alcohol use; this
focused on a clinically dependent population and found CFQ scores remained heightened
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immediately post-detox, but were reduced after three months in those who continued to
abstain (Manning et al., 2016). Patients who relapsed did not experience the same reduction
in cognitive failures, suggesting that time since alcohol dependence is perhaps more
important than brain changes associated with abuse for everyday cognitive functioning. To
highlight the limited research on self-reported everyday cognition and alcohol, we excluded
only one alcohol article on the basis that it utilised a different measure of subjectivelyperceived cognition (Ling et al., 2003). This paper found that level of alcohol consumption
in a non-clinical sample correlated with level of everyday memory problems, with heavy
drinkers reporting more issues than moderate drinkers, and moderate drinkers more than
abstainers. These papers suggest, similarly to nicotine, that potentially it may be the
withdrawal state which is potent to predisposing to cognitive failures.
Long term heavy cannabis use appears to be linked to increased vulnerability to
failures to a greater extent than ecstasy (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008; Montgomery & Fisk,
2007). Findings were overall limited, inconsistent, and complicated by polydrug use.
Existing papers, whilst limited, suggest substance use has the potential to increase
cognitive failures. As such, substance use needs further consideration as an issue affecting
measurement in further research into everyday cognition in clinical and non-clinical
populations.
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3.4.3. How do subjective cognitive failures relate to performance on objective tasks in
people with psychological disorders or in substance users?
There was no evidence of a direct link between objective neuropsychological
outcomes and self-reported cognitive failures in either psychological disorders or substance
use. Comparison between these two approaches to measuring cognition represents a key
topic of interest, and contributes to the ongoing debate regarding self-awareness, reliability,
and validity of subjective reports of cognition. Some authors suggest reported failures in the
absence of neuropsychological deficits indicate impaired self-awareness related to illness
(as in schizophrenia; e.g., Donohoe et al., 2009). This mirrors the debate around
neuroticism, where increased self-reported failures are viewed as reflecting tendency for
negative self-evaluation. Poor self-awareness is not necessarily indicated by a lack of
relationship between objective and subjective cognitive measures. Rather, everyday
cognitive failures may tap into aspects of cognition quite different to those accessed in the
lab. If affective dysregulation is indeed a significant contributor to vulnerability for
cognitive failures, then real world stressors both external and internal are likely to trigger
errors for psychologically vulnerable individuals. This would occur regardless of one’s
level of objective neuropsychological ability, hence the low correlation between lab-based
and real world performance. The current findings highlight the need to develop more
ecologically valid measures of cognition, particularly ones that can capture real world
emotional factors more readily.
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3.4.4. Limitations
An earlier goal of this review was to elucidate distinct profiles of real life cognitive
functioning for specific psychological disorders. However, the literature search revealed
that this would not be possible. The number of studies for each disorder was limited; some
disorders were the focus in as few as one or two articles, and others were not studied at all.
The lack of studies was surprising, given the wide acceptance as “common knowledge” (as
well as being acknowledged in the DSM 5) that mild cognitive issues often go hand-inhand with psychological disorders. Similarly, we were able to identify only a handful of
articles exploring the link between CFQ scores and substance use. Most notably missing
were papers regarding alcohol use, given its global popularity and legality.
Ideally, a PRISMA review would also include an analysis of the quality of articles; or
in the case of a meta-analysis a formal test of bias. However, this was not possible. This
area of research is relatively small, and the necessarily broad scope of the search meant that
articles were primarily correlational, using a variety of populations and methods; this
makes comparisons using one set of criteria difficult. In addition, there remain
inconsistencies in how cognitive failures are conceptualised. As such, it is important to
qualify conclusions of the current review as tentative and preliminary. Targeted reviews
designed to answer questions about the strength of the relationships revealed within the
current review are required to provide a more rigorous analysis of the quality of the
research.
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There are a few broad limitations identified which form recommendations for future
research. In particular, phase of illness for clinical populations was not always considered.
Both cognitive functioning and perceptions of functioning may shift over time. For
example, individuals in prodromal stages of illness are likely to report increased cognitive
problems (e.g., as in psychosis; Schultze-Lutter, Klosterkötter, & Ruhrmann, 2014), which
may reflect acute awareness of decline in their functioning. The sense of there being
“something wrong” may, in itself, ensure subjective monitoring is heightened. Chronic
sufferers, by contrast, may have a different profile of failures; perhaps due to improvements
in cognition related to medication, stabilisation of symptoms, development of
compensatory strategies, or the lowering of expectations of their own capacities.
Similarly, the impact of comorbid psychological disorders on cognitive failures is also
yet to be addressed. Given that 45% of individuals hold two or more diagnoses (Kessler,
Chiu, & Demler, 2005), of interest is how the interaction of symptoms might have an
additive effect on failures.
Related to this, substance use disorders are also frequently comorbid with other
psychological issues (Weaver et al., 2003). The complex pharmacodynamics of substances
of abuse, as well as prescribed medications, need to be considered in order to tease out key
factors in cognitive failures. Adding to the difficulty of this task is the neuroprogression
associated with severe mental disorders, in which neurological systems reorganise as illness
progresses (Gama, Kunz, Magalhães, & Kapczinski, 2013). This may increase failures
independent to other known factors such as stress (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a), as well as
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interacting differently with different substances at different stages. Perhaps increased
interest in subjective cognitive complaints by neuroscientists will enable exploration of
these issues in the near future.

3.4.5. Clinical implications
Despite the limitations of this review, the current findings highlight important
implications for clinical practice. First, previous findings in healthy populations that
negative affect and psychological distress increase cognitive failures can now be extended.
Psychological distress seems to impact day-to-day cognitive functioning proportionately,
such that individuals at the extremes of the distress continuum, (i.e., those with clinical
disorders) report significantly higher levels of failures than those with subclinical levels of
distress. Currently, the extent to which subtle cognitive deficits are considered by clinicians
is limited (Burdick et al., 2005). A brief, self-report tool such as the CFQ could be
introduced at the assessment stage in addition to neuropsychological measures in order to
better inform clinicians of the particular struggles faced by patients. Similarly, cognitive
failures could be used to monitor shifts in perceived daily functioning during treatment.
Cognitive behavioural therapies could be designed to address cognitive failures directly;
normalising the experience of mistakes, helping clients to identify and mediate the effects
of triggers for slips and failures such as stress.

3.4.6. Conclusions and future directions
It has previously been suggested that cognitive failures reflect both trait vulnerabilities
and the influence of fluctuating state factors (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016). We can now add
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to this that a range of psychological disorders including depression, anxiety, PTSD, and
schizophrenia are all associated with increased self-reported failures in everyday life. In
addition, use or withdrawal from substances including nicotine, alcohol, and cannabis may
also lead to heightened failures, particularly in those whose pattern of use is chronic. Selfreported cognitive failures do not correlate with objective measures of cognition in either
clinical or substance use populations, suggesting they may measure unique aspects of
cognition.
The next step in this area of research will be to determine whether some common
factor is responsible for heightened cognitive failures across both clinical and non-clinical
individuals. For example, we already know that cognitive failures are associated with
negative affect and neuroticism in healthy populations; one possibility is that emotional
dysregulation increases vulnerability to slips. Another important aspect of further research
into cognitive failures will be attempts to resolve the ongoing debate around the validity of
self-reports, specifically with regards to the role of personality traits that may impact the
accuracy of self-perceptions, such as neuroticism.
Although this review has focused on simple, retrospective self-reports, there are some
new approaches to measurement of subjectively-perceived cognitive failures which will
likely be of value in answering some of these remaining questions. A methodology of
particular interest is ambulatory assessment, also known as experience sampling (e.g.,
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, et al., 2003). This involves capturing self-reports of errors in
vivo; failures are reported as they occur during everyday activities, removing memory bias.
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Another major benefit of the use of experience sampling is the possibility for studying
changes in functioning at multiple time points throughout each day. This would allow for
examination of fluctuations, and the factors which may interact with trait and illness-related
vulnerability to shape these shifts, such as time of day, stressors, and substance use. To
date, only a handful of studies have utilised experience sampling to study cognitive failures
in healthy populations (Kane et al., 2007; Lange & Süß, 2014; McVay et al., 2009; Neupert
et al., 2008). This approach would seem to be the next step towards studying real world
cognitive capacity in an ecologically valid way, but as it is not yet widespread,
retrospective self-reports as captured via measures such as the CFQ remain invaluable in
providing a picture of cognition as it translates into everyday life.
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4. Schizotypy

4.1. Schizophrenia and schizotypy
4.1.1. The psychosis continuum and conceptualisations of schizotypy
Schizophrenia is a severe psychological disorder comprising psychotic, affective,
interpersonal, and cognitive symptoms (van Os & Kapur, 2009). It has a serious impact
on quality of life, with increased mortality rates related to suicide as well as a high
prevalence of comorbid health issues (McGrath, Saha, Chant, & Welham, 2008).
Traditionally, the medical view of schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders has
been dichotomous – one is either sick or healthy (Johns & Van Os, 2001). However, it
is now increasingly being recognised that there exists a continuum of psychosis, along
which individuals sit at varying levels of risk for disorder. This concept links to a
diathesis-stress understanding of schizophrenia aetiology, whereby genetically
vulnerable individuals may not necessarily manifest psychosis unless faced with
particular environmental stressors (Walker, Kestler, Bollini, & Hochman, 2004).
Similar notions of a continuum are now being incorporated into the recognition of the
stage of symptom presentation; here rather than representing a continuum of risk, it
allows the possibility of tracking how far along an individual is in the expression of
illness.
Clinical staging models of schizophrenia aim to utilise symptom profiles related to
distinct stages of illness, recognising that early “warning signs” differ from the fullblown symptoms that are the focus of the DSM and similar taxonomies (McGorry,
Nelson, Goldstone, & Yung, 2010). This is a model which has been borrowed from
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physical disorders such as cancer and arthritis. In McGorry et al.’s (2010) research,
illness stages are defined by severity and persistence of symptoms, as well as
progression in domains such as neurocognitive and social functioning. Beyond the
initial pre-clinical stage of increased risk (e.g., due to genetics) with nil current
symptoms, stages include mild, non-specific symptoms; moderate, non-specific
symptoms (“ultra-high risk”); first episode psychosis; incomplete remission; relapse;
multiple relapses; and severe, unremitting illness (McGorry, et al., 2010). The major
clinical benefit of this model includes the ability to better target treatments, with less
invasive options to be used for earlier stages to prevent full expression of psychotic
illness. Supporting this model, neuroimaging evidence indicates increasing severity of
pathological measures with stage of illness, as well as more effective (and benign)
treatment for earlier versus later stages (Wood, Yung, McGorry, & Pantelis, 2011).
However, the psychosis continuum is a broader concept still. Rather than
notionally focusing on phases of illness it captures individuals at lower levels of
severity and risk. This includes individuals with related but stable personality issues
such as schizotypal personality disorder, and extends down to those who experience
isolated psychotic-like phenomena but otherwise maintain a normal level of mental
health and functioning. As such, clinically-defined psychosis relates only to a very
small portion of the entire phenotypic continuum (Johns & van Os, 2001). Some of the
interest in a continuum of psychosis stems from the realisation that psychotic-like
experiences are far more common than previously thought, with evidence of a normal
distribution throughout the general population (van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys,
Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). For example, auditory
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verbal hallucinations occur in around 10-15% of children and adults in the general
population (de Leede-Smith & Barkus, 2013), and delusional ideation in 25 – 30%
(Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004).
Schizotypy is one construct useful for exploring this continuum. It refers to a
cluster of traits reflecting attenuated forms of positive, negative, and disorganised
psychotic symptoms which are thought to reflect risk for psychosis. Schizotypy has
emerged as a key construct in psychosis research due to its utility for improving
understanding of the developmental trajectories, risk, and treatment of schizophreniaspectrum psychopathology, as well as for exploring variation in subclinical and normal
groups, all within a single framework (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). Genetic
research appears to support schizotypy as an intermediate phenotype for schizophreniaspectrum disorders, with healthy schizotypes and psychosis patients sharing genetic
features (Kendler et al., 1981; Torgersen, Onstad, Skre, Edvardsen, & Kringlen, 1993;
Walter, Fernandez, Snelling, & Barkus, 2016). Some of the single nucleotide
polymorphisms which have been associated with schizophrenia have also been reported
to be in excess in those who express schizotypy (Walter et al., 2016). Expression of
schizotypy increases with genetic proximity to schizophrenia, with relatives of patients
also high on schizotypy (Kendler & Walsh, 1995; Moreno Samaniego et al., 2011;
Vollema, Sitskoorn, Appels, & Kahn, 2002). In addition to this genetic evidence,
schizotypy and schizophrenia share other common aetiological factors including trauma,
urbanicity, and cannabis use (Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, & Lewis, 2006; Marzillier &
Steel, 2007; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2007). As such,
schizotypy may be thought of as a normally distributed phenotype that is representative
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of the continuum of risk for psychosis in the general population (Claridge, 1997), with
low, average, and high schizotypes in the non-clinical range, and schizotypal personality
disorder and schizophrenia at its upper extremes. A number of factors including
cognition, temperament, and physical and psychological environment interact with
schizotypy to impact on mental health outcomes, determining an individual’s movement
along the continuum (Brod, 1997).
Although the concept of a psychosis continuum is now accepted by many
researchers (e.g., Claridge, 1997; DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 2015; Johns & van Os, 2001;
Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015), there remain varying conceptualisations of
schizotypy. Meehl (1962, 1990) proposed that the psychological features making up
schizotypy stem from underlying schizotaxia, a neurointegrative anomaly reflecting
possession of a schizogene. Schizotaxia results in cognitive slippage, leading to the
aberrant psychological and social functioning of schizotypes including subtle thought
disorder and odd behaviour. Meehl’s view of schizotypy is very much a disease-based
model, with around 10% of the population thought to evince it (Lenzenweger, Maher, &
Manschreck, 2005). Whilst all schizotypes display their latent vulnerability to psychosis
through functional abnormalities, not all will decompensate (Lenzenweger, 2006a). This
implies that both exacerbating and protective factors operate against the backdrop of
schizotypy to move people along the continuum of risk.
Other researchers, such as Claridge (1997), describe schizotypy as representing a
form of individual difference, meaning that all individuals in the normal population
possess schizotypal traits to some degree. Meehl and proponents such as Lenzenweger
(2006a, 2006b, 2010) view schizotypy as a set of stable personality traits that reflect
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conferral of psychosis risk, albeit in a small subgroup of high scoring individuals; a
quasi-dimensional model of schizotypy. By contrast, Claridge’s view of schizotypy is
fully dimensional across the entire population, with delineation of health and disorder
occurring at some higher point along the continuum. Both approaches allow that only a
subgroup of those who express schizotypal traits will go on to develop a diagnosable
mental health disorder. Where they differ is whether the distribution of schizotypy is
fully dimensional or if a meaningful clinically relevant cut-off exists which leads to a
discontinuity and ensures the trait is therefore quasi-dimensional in its links with
clinical disorders. Claridge and colleagues’ perspective incorporates personality
features, but is more focused on a dimensional perspective that reflects attenuated
versions of the different types of psychosis-related symptoms. The fully dimensional
approach is most consistent with the concept of a continuum of psychosis, and may
account for the high rates of psychotic-like experiences in the general population (de
Leede-Smith & Barkus, 2013; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). Similar to the quasidimensional approach, potentiation of illness is thought to occur when high schizotypes
are exposed to external aetiological factors. However, proponents of Claridge also
emphasise the potential for schizotypy to be adaptive. It has been shown that high
schizotypes can experience subjective wellbeing (Goulding, 2004) and even benefit
from strengths in areas such as a high level of creativity (Brod, 1997; Nelson &
Rawlings, 2010).
The quasi-dimensional and fully dimensional approaches to schizotypy
therefore overlap conceptually, with both acknowledging that stable personality-based
schizotypy interacts with external aetiological factors to determine risk. Logically more
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traditional aspects of personality such as openness, neuroticism, and conscientiousness
are not subsumed under schizotypy; rather they reflect an increasingly complex
presentation of human personality. As such within this thesis, schizotypy is regarded as
a cluster of traits present to varying degrees within all individuals; and which
encompasses both stable personality features and psychotic-like symptoms that may
fluctuate over time. Combined, these reflect current level of risk and the impact of
external stressors.
Research into schizotypy holds dual interest for researchers. First, the use of
non-clinical schizotypy samples enables exploration of the psychosis-like symptoms
and related psychological features free from potential confounds of medication,
hospitalisation, distress, symptom severity, problematic coping strategies, and lack of
insight that are associated with clinical populations (Barrantes-Vidal, Grant, & Kwapil,
2015; Raine, 1991). Secondly, an understanding of schizotypy has the potential to
enhance knowledge on the aetiology, onset, and treatment of schizophrenia. One of the
advantages of this bottom-up approach to studying psychotic psychopathology is the
identification of possible endophenotypes, such as social behaviours or styles of
cognition, which act as markers of risk (Koychev et al., 2011; Kwapil & BarrantesVidal, 2015). Given the breadth of the schizotypy construct in capturing the entirety of
the psychosis spectrum, it enables consideration of markers that may be present premorbidly, even prior to any discernible prodrome. “Basic symptoms” is a concept of
recently renewed interest within psychosis risk, referring to subtle disturbances to drive,
affect, thinking, speech, and stress tolerance that may not be detectable via objective
testing, but which are perceived by the affected individual prior to the more marked
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decline in functioning that indicates the beginning stages of psychosis (Schultze-Lutter,
2009). The eventuation of end symptoms from these basic ones is thought to occur on
the basis of insufficient coping (Schultze-Lutter, 2009). Schizotypal traits provide a start
point for examining cognitive basic symptoms, and as such, schizotypy research has the
potential to provide direction for early intervention.
It is however important to emphasize that the majority of individuals with high
levels of schizotypal traits will not go on to develop psychosis (Kaymaz et al., 2012).
Sub-clinical schizotypes rarely seek help; many even revel in unusual phenomena such
as out-of-body experiences (McCreery & Claridge, 2002), spiritual or religious
phenomena (Brod, 1997), and an impressive creative ability (Jackson, 1997). This
means that ethically, disclosure of psychosis risk merely on the basis of schizotypy is
not necessarily warranted. A study into participant perceptions of psychosis suggested
that, given the low proportion of individuals who transition, the burden of awareness
likely outweighs any benefits (Linscott & Cross, 2009). As such, the unique experiences
and personalities of sub-clinical schizotypes are highly valued in research, but those
who are not help-seeking are not usually informed of their psychometric status by
researchers.

4.1.2. Issues in measurement of schizotypy
As mentioned, there have been multiple perceptions and approaches to
understanding schizotypy, and as such there are a multitude of approaches to measuring
schizotypy within general populations. Whilst clinical measures such as the Structured
Interview for Schizotypy (SIS; Kendler, Lieberman, & Walsh, 1989) exist, it is argued
that schizotypy can be validly identified on the basis of a range of measures, and as
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such, self-reported schizotypy does not need to be qualified as “psychometric”
schizotypy (Lenzenweger, 2006a). Several self-report questionnaires have been
developed for this purpose. Some of these capture a broad subset of schizotypal traits
such as the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason,
Claridge, & Jackson, 1995) and the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine,
1991). Others meanwhile capture specific symptoms such as the group of measures
known as the Chapman scales (Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976), the Peters et al.
Delusion Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 2004), and the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale
(LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981). Of the broader self-report measures, many take a
dimensional approach mapping roughly onto the clinical dimensions of schizophrenia.
A three-factor model of schizotypy includes positive, negative, and social impairment
dimensions (Lenzenweger, 1991), whilst four-factor models comprise positive,
negative, conceptual disorganisation, and asocial/non-conformity (Vollema & van den
Bosch, 1995); the precise structure of schizotypy as measured via self-report differs
according to the measure in use.
The SPQ (Raine, 1991) has been chosen as the key measure of schizotypy within
healthy populations, primarily because it is one of the broadest measures. It was
developed using the DSM-III-R criteria for schizotypal personality disorder, covering
three dimensions and nine subscales: cognitive-perceptual (ideas of references, odd
beliefs or magical thinking, unusual perceptual experiences, suspiciousness),
interpersonal (excessive social anxiety, no close friends, constricted affect), and
disorganised (odd speech/thought, odd behaviour). Although developed to assist in
identification of schizotypal personality disorder, the SPQ is also of use for exploring
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variations in schizotypal traits within healthy populations. It has a normal distribution
(Johns & Van Os, 2001; Raine, 1991), and taps into a broad range of subclinical and
personality-based features, alongside attenuated symptoms of psychosis. Being based on
personality disorder criteria, it is perhaps more conservative and oriented to clinical risk
than other measures of schizotypy; a benefit of this is that healthy individuals scoring
highly on the SPQ are likely closer to the upper end of the subclinical portion of the
psychosis spectrum. Whilst it does not directly assess some of the broader personality
features of schizotypy proposed by Meehl, such as anhedonia (1962), the SPQ still
manages to capture a number of subtle variations in normal functioning in such a way
that it is of use for studying schizotypal traits in non-help-seeking individuals.
Some researchers have argued strongly for a dimensional approach to measuring
schizotypy (e.g., Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). As both schizophrenia and
schizotypy are heterogenous, treating a measure such as the SPQ as unidimensional
risks the generation of conflicting results via samples that differ in their makeup
(Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). However, given that schizotypal traits are thought to
confer a general risk for schizophrenia-spectrum psychopathology, it is also meaningful
to explore level of overall schizotypy. In particular, initial exploration of constructs
linked to schizotypal traits warrant use of the holistic trait schizotypy in order to provide
the best chance of successfully identifying an association at its most basic level. As
such, it is primarily the total SPQ score which is examined in this thesis, in order to
examine the effects and correlates of trait schizotypy as a whole. Findings relating to the
widely used three-factor model of the SPQ identified by Raine et al. (1994) are reported
as secondary outcomes in some, but not all, studies.
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An additional consideration in the approach to measurement of schizotypy relates
to the treatment of data. In the existing literature, there are two key approaches to
analysis: group and continuous. Given schizotypy is conceptualised as a continuum, it
could be argued that it must be treated as continuous within data analyses. However, it
is additionally useful to conduct group analyses comparing “high” with “low”
subclinical schizotypes. Although this reflects the traditional, dichotomous medical
model approach to disorder, group approaches are important in that they enable
exploration of whether variables behave in the same way for individuals at both the
upper and lower ends of the spectrum. Clinical cut-offs for self-report measures such as
the SPQ are not yet known and as such, groupings must be made based on a potentially
more arbitrary portioning of participants. Continued exploration of schizotypy in both
continuous and group analyses is required for ongoing improvement in the
understanding of schizotypy and its relationship to clinical risk, and this thesis utilises
both approaches for this purpose.

4.1.3. Criticisms of schizotypy
A longitudinal study found that both positive and negative schizotypy predicted
schizophrenia-spectrum psychopathology (positive OR = 1.50; negative OR = 1.87) and
impaired functioning after ten years (Kwapil, Gross, Silvia, & Barrantes-Vidal, 2013).
A recent review of studies of the general population found that between 5 – 40% of high
scorers in the general population go on to develop a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder,
depending on the scale of interest (Debbané et al., 2015). Although these rates suggest
that the schizotypy construct improves sensitivity for predicting psychosis, longitudinal
studies are limited, and some authors have expressed concern about using this construct
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to explore the aetiology of schizophrenia and related disorders, For this reason, “AtRisk Mental States” (ARMS) is a more recent construct of interest within the psychosis
literature. Individuals experiencing ARMS exhibit a change from premorbid functioning
characterised by various mental states such as nonspecific anxiety and depression,
subthreshold psychotic symptoms, or brief transient psychotic symptoms (Yung et al.,
2003). ARMS may or may not progress to psychosis, but if this occurs, the ARMS may
be retrospectively labelled a prodrome (Yung et al., 2003). This has become the focus of
many researchers and clinicians, with programs of early intervention targeting ARMS
populations well-established in a number of countries, including Australia (e.g., Yung et
al., 2007).
However, concern that schizotypy is somehow less valid than ARMS may be
misguided. First, schizotypy is a much broader construct, capturing the entire psychosis
continuum. It was never intended to be diagnostic (Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015) but
rather sought to explore more distal, even pre-morbid risk; ARMS research meanwhile
targets those at more imminent clinical risk of conversion within twelve months
(Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, Berning, Maier, & Klosterkötter, 2010). In addition,
schizotypy may enhance research with ARMS populations, with assessment of
schizotypal traits providing additive value to ARMS in predicting risk (Debbané et al.,
2015). There have also been decreasing transition rates even within ARMS populations.
In initial studies this was 40% (Yung et al., 2003), but a general pattern of reduction in
transition over years of publication across continents and institutions (Hartmann et al.,
2016) has seen a recent meta-analysis identify a figure closer to 22% over twelve
months (Fusar-Poli et al., 2012), and as low as 14% (Simon & Umbricht, 2010). As
112

such, some researchers propose a return to schizotypy as a crucial construct in exploring
psychosis aetiology (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015; Lenzenweger, 2006b).
Arguments include that schizotypy incorporates a broad range of symptoms and
disorders beyond just rare or severe ones, and is therefore more useful than the more
specific constructs that it subsumes (Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015). Hence, subclinical
schizotypes, even those who remain healthy and psychologically compensated
throughout their lives, are of value for researchers looking to understand the
developmental pathways of psychosis-related psychopathology.
It is also worth acknowledging here criticisms of the widespread use of university
students in the existing schizotypy literature. Although there is a need to broaden
research to include other groups in the community, Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal (2015)
point out that the use of students is restrictive but not invalid, as variation along the
schizotypy spectrum is expected in this population as in any other. They also point out
that whilst tertiary students are indeed at a slightly lower risk of developing
schizophrenia than the general population, the current findings utilising this group point
to the promise in expanding on this area with further research. In addition, study of a
generally lower-risk group such as students may have the additional benefit of exposing
potential protective factors (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). As such, a community
population incorporating a large proportion of university students is utilised for the
purposes of this thesis. This is done on the basis that this group reflects a similar level
of variation to other subclinical groups; additionally, as the most studied group it has the
most potential for drawing meaningful conclusions within a relatively new area of
interest.
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4.2. The relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures
4.2.1. Cognition in schizotypy
As mentioned, the central focus of schizotypy research has been in exploring
related markers of risk psychosis, and cognition is one of particular interest. A key
feature of schizophrenia is cognitive impairment, which creates barriers to social,
occupational, and academic functioning for affected individuals (Dickerson, Boronow,
Ringel, & Parente, 1996; Fett et al., 2011; Harvey, 2010). Given that up to 80% of
schizophrenia patients experience problems with cognition (Bora, Yücel, & Pantelis,
2010), similar problems are also expected in schizotypy, albeit to an attenuated degree.
There is some evidence that individuals high in schizotypy also demonstrate mild
deficits in cognitive domains including working memory, executive function, and
sustained attention, although overall intelligence quotient remains intact (Raine, 2006).
But the presence of such deficits in schizotypy are debated; conflicting results exist,
with many studies failing to identify any impairment relative to controls (e.g., Chan et
al., 2011; Laws et al., 2008; Stratta et al., 1997). Nevertheless, as the review in Chapter
2 of this thesis highlighted, people high on schizotypy consistently complain of a
heightened level of cognitive failures in their everyday lives (Corcoran et al., 2013;
Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, Kater, & Sluis, 2007b; Gooding, Tallent, & Hegyi, 2001;
Pfeifer et al., 2009).
The concept of basic symptoms was described earlier in this chapter (section
4.1.1), and relevant here are a subset of issues known as cognitive basic symptoms,
which include subtle problems in attention and memory (Schultze-Lutter, 2009). They
occur in all stages of schizophrenia, but are one of the earliest signs to emerge,
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becoming evident to the afflicted individual prior to a more concrete functional decline
(Schultze-Lutter et al., 2014). Self-reported cognitive failures may capture cognitive
basic symptoms. Indeed, some researchers have already proposed that failures represent
a pre-morbid marker of risk, evident even in the absence of objectively-detectable
impairment (Laws et al., 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2009). We would expect rates of cognitive
failures to increase with psychosis risk, with patients with schizophrenia reporting the
highest and healthy individuals scoring low on schizotypy the fewest. In this way, high
schizotypes can be thought of as an intermediary group, reporting fewer cognitive
failures than patients, but more than average or low schizotypes. Hence, cognitive
failures are of interest as an endophenotype of schizotypy, particularly as one that is
relatively early in its emergence along the continuum of risk.
The mechanisms through which cognitive failures are heightened in healthy high
schizotypes are unclear. It may be that an underlying base deficit in cognitive ability
results in poorer cognitive functioning in daily life. However, the inconsistent findings
regarding the associations between both schizotypy and objective cognitive ability, and
cognitive failures and objective ability as described in Chapter 2, do not provide much
support for this theory. Related to this, it has also been suggested that schizotypes’
reporting of high failures in the absence of reduced objective outcomes indicates that
self-reports reflect self-awareness of cognition specifically, rather than cognitive
outcomes more broadly (Chan et al., 2011; Laws et al., 2008). Perceptions of this
problem vary from the claim that a mismatch between objective and subjective
cognition equates to impaired self-awareness in schizotypy (Chan et al., 2011), to the
suggestion that subclinical schizotypes are actually able to maintain a high level of
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awareness prior to illness onset, noting mild deficits that are not yet externally
observable (Laws et al., 2008). Finally, it is also possible that this link may be due to an
overlap in the two constructs, with measures of schizotypy including some items
regarding thought function that are similar to those in the CFQ. The SPQ contains very
few items that, at face-value, overlap with the CFQ; however, further research is
required to confirm the extent to which problems with everyday cognition are also
measured by the SPQ.
As proposed in Chapter 2, cognitive failures appear to capture something different
to objective cognition, and as such the assertion that they reflect primarily selfawareness in schizotypy must be challenged. This is particularly vital for at-risk
populations, for whom low levels of impairment coupled with the retained ability to
utilise coping strategies may reduce the utility of traditional measures (Schultze-Lutter
et al., 2014). Perhaps a more useful approach to the schizotypy-cognitive failures link is
to relate it back to the model of cognitive failures proposed earlier (Carrigan & Barkus,
2016a), incorporating both stable trait and shifting state and environmental factors.
Schizotypy includes various features that may shape everyday cognition, and the
expression of some of these is dependent on state. Increased negative affectivity and
affective reactivity are features of schizotypy (Horan, Blanchard, Clark, & Green, 2008;
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, et al., 2003) that are shared with other personality traits also
known to relate to cognitive failures, including neuroticism and state anxiety. Affective
or emotional reactivity refers to the tendency to exhibit more intense emotional,
physiological, and behavioural responses to emotional stimuli (Larsen & Diener, 1987).
The term “reactivity” denotes the role of triggering events that occur to evoke such a
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response. It is possible that healthy people high on schizotypy find it more difficult to
maintain cognition at their optimal level of ability (i.e., that which is demonstrated in an
idealised lab/clinic setting) when faced with the emotional stimuli and demands of real
life.
A significant emerging methodology in exploring cognitive failures in everyday
life utilises experience sampling (ES) to answer questions about real world functioning,
and a group of researchers have already used this within both psychosis and schizotypal
groups. One such study utilised schizophrenia patients, their first-degree relatives, and
controls, and found that level of vulnerability modified increases in negative affect in
response to stressors during the flow of everyday life (Myin-Germeys, Van Os,
Schwartz, & Stone, 2001). Whilst researchers are yet to focus specifically on cognitive
failures in everyday life using ES, there is evidence that psychotic-like symptoms
associated with poor concentration and control over thoughts occur more frequently for
those high on positive schizotypy (Barrantes-Vidal, et al., 2013; Kwapil et al., 2012). In
addition, stress at one time point increases the risk of problems with thought control at
the next (Barrantes-Vidal, et al. 2013). These findings provide further support for the
theory that stress reactivity contributes to everyday failures in schizotypy.
It is also possible that aspects of schizotypy other than emotional reactivity contribute to
cognitive failures. For example, multiple elements of the cognitive-perceptual factor of
schizotypy may be pertinent. Transient perceptual disturbances may reduce the
efficiency with which information in the environment is processed; likewise with
experiences of suspiciousness. Interpersonal difficulties could also be to blame, with the
social interactions inevitable in daily life impacting cognitive functioning by inducing
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stress. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore all of these possibilities.
The current focus will be on the role of affect in contributing to the experience of
cognitive failures for people high in schizotypy. The strong link between negative affect
and cognitive failures in the broader population (e.g., McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009b;
Payne & Schnapp, 2014), along with evidence of exaggerated emotional responses to
everyday stressors in schizotypy, support the need to investigate whether emotional
reactivity contributes to the experience of cognitive failures in this interesting group.
Investigative significance of the schizotypy-cognitive failures relationship
While cognitive failures may be thought of as relatively minor and benign,
understanding patterns of failures and the impact of them on psychologically healthy
schizotypes is important for a number of reasons. First, in relation to risk, a cognitive
theory of schizophrenia posits that an innate cognitive deficit is actually the source of
psychotic phenomena, rather than a by-product (Beck & Rector, 2005; Meehl, 1962).
Thus, the subtle cognitive complaints of subclinical schizotypes may represent a
manifestation of the earliest processes which, whilst having multiple possible
trajectories including lifelong psychological health, may also lead to the development of
a psychological disorder including schizophrenia. Depending on one’s preferred
language, cognitive failures may be labelled a cognitive basic symptom (SchultzeLutter, 2009); a biomarker of risk (Diwadkar, Montrose, Dworakowski, Sweeney, &
Keshavan, 2006); or an endophenotype (Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, Jolles,
Delespaul, & Van Os, 2002) of schizophrenia. Following the hypothesis that heightened
emotional reactivity is key to the experience of these symptoms in high schizotypes, it is
also possible that excessive triggering may lead to a cascade of other problems,
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including positive psychotic symptoms. In this way, cognitive failures may have the
potential to eventually facilitate upward movement along the spectrum of psychosis
risk. Additionally, they may continually interact with stress to influence movement from
remissive into relapse phases at various points during a person’s lifespan.
Secondly, as mentioned previously in this thesis, cognitive failures have the
potential to result in serious problems in day-to-day life, including major accidents and
injury (e.g., Simpson et al., 2005; Weigmann & Shappell, 1997). In a population that
apparently experiences such ongoing disruption to daily cognition in addition to a range
of other psychological issues, failures are likely to have far-reaching negative effects on
the occupational and social functioning of schizotypes. People high on schizotypy but
below the clinical threshold may not seek help, leaving little chance for interventions
such as medication or therapy being made available to ameliorate these issues. College
students high on schizotypy report a poor quality of life equivalent to those with severe
mental illness in areas such as daily activities, relationships, and health, despite
objective measures suggesting their lives are relatively better (Cohen, Auster,
MacAulay, & McGovern, 2014). The reasons for this are unclear. It is possible that selfreports are impacted by negativistic biases (Cohen et al., 2014); however it is also
possible that subtle issues with cognition are disruptive enough to contribute to an
overall sense of reduced wellbeing. As such, the experience of cognitive failures within
the everyday lives of those with schizotypal traits warrants further understanding, even
separate to its link to risk.
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5. Specific Aims of Thesis

5.1. Key questions and aims
Several questions arise from the literature review presented in the preceding
chapters. First, the reviews in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that real world cognitive
functioning is quite different to ability as measured objectively, and as such cognitive
failures permit the exploration of cognitive capacity in everyday life. However, the
ongoing debate in the literature as to the validity of self-reported measures of cognition
must be addressed prior to exploring failures further. To what extent does selfawareness of one’s own cognitive and psychological functioning influence or distort
self-reports of cognitive failures?
In terms of better understanding the mechanisms underpinning cognitive
failures, it is apparent that both state and trait factors are known to influence
vulnerability to failures, but how do these interact? Schizotypy is a trait consistently
linked to cognitive failures, and this relationship is of particular interest given that
problems with everyday cognition have been proposed to be a marker for psychosis risk
(Pfeifer et al., 2009). However, what is not yet known are the mechanisms through
which people high on schizotypy tend to be more prone to failures. Both schizotypy and
cognitive failures share a relationship with affect, therefore does emotional reactivity
lead to heightened failures in schizotypes? If so, can we reduce the gap between
objective and subjective cognition in psychosis prone individuals by utilising emotional
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stimuli to elicit reduced performance in schizotypes, similar to the issues they report in
daily life?
This thesis presents an attempt to answer these questions through a sequence of
three empirical papers, with the hypotheses and individual studies described below.

5.2. Hypotheses
Specific hypotheses for each of these studies will be presented within each chapter.
However, there are some broad main hypotheses for the combined findings of this
thesis, which are presented here:
1. Self-reported cognitive failures will not be distorted by self-awareness or
neuroticism.
2. High schizotypes will report increased cognitive failures in daily life.
3. High schizotypes’ increased emotional reactivity will contribute to their
experience of increased cognitive failures in daily life.
Secondary hypotheses related to this are:
a. Negative affect will mediate the relationship between schizotypy and
cognitive failures.
b. High schizotypes will also exhibit a relative deficit in performance on
objectively-assessed neuropsychological working memory tasks
containing emotional (vs. neutral) stimuli.
Figure 5.1 on the following page depicts the relevant variables for each of the papers
included in this thesis.
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Figure 5.1. Key variables of interest for each of the studies within the thesis.
122

To address these hypotheses, the empirical research chapters are as follows:
Chapter 6: Self-reported cognitive failures: Neurotic complaints or valid measure of
real world cognition?
This initial study will facilitate exploration of whether self-reports of cognitive
failures correlate with informant ratings, and whether level of neuroticism or selfawareness alter this relationship. This will provide information as to whether selfreports of cognitive failures reflect biases of self-perception, and therefore the extent to
which self-reported failures can be considered to have utility as a means of measuring
everyday cognition.
Chapter 7: Schizotypy and cognitive failures: Mediating role for affect.
The second study will involve an initial exploration of the association between
schizotypy and cognitive failures in a large sample. Negative affect will also be
measured in order to explore whether it acts as a mediator or moderator in the
schizotypy-cognitive failures relationship.
Chapter 8: Do complaints of everyday cognitive failures in high schizotypy relate to
emotional working memory deficits in the lab?
The third study will maintain the focus on the impact of emotion on cognition in
schizotypy. It will be used to examine the effect of emotional stimuli on objectivelyassessed working memory performance. Of particular interest will be whether high
schizotypes show a relative deficit for emotional vs. neutral content, and which types of
emotional content have the greatest impact on cognition. Whether vulnerability to
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cognitive failures accounts for differences in cognitive functioning in schizotypy will
also be considered.
A general discussion will follow in Chapter 9.
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6. Self-reported cognitive failures: Neurotic complaints or real world problems?

This chapter is based on a paper currently in preparation. It has previously undergone
review at Personality and Individual Differences.

Carrigan, N. & Barkus, E. (manuscript in preparation). Self-reported cognitive failures:
neurotic complaints or real world problems?
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6.1. Introduction
Little is known about cognitive functioning as it occurs outside of the lab, during
the course of everyday life. One way to explore this is through subjective self-reports of
cognitive slips and errors. However, it is unclear whether self-perceptions are useful as
measures of cognition, or whether they are biased by level of self-awareness of their
own functioning. This paper will be used to examine the extent to which subjective selfreports of cognitive errors may be considered reliable as a measure of everyday
cognition.

6.1.1. Self-reported cognitive failures
Cognitive failures refer to common errors in cognition and action that occur during
the course of daily activities, such as forgetting what you were looking for once you
reach a room, or getting into the shower with your glasses still on. Importantly,
cognitive failures occur during routine tasks that one has completed many times before,
and as such reflect reduced capacity in the moment rather than an underlying deficit of
ability. Current conceptualisations of cognitive failures would suggest that failures
reflect trait proneness to slips, as well as the impact of fluctuations in transient factors
such as mood, stress, environment, and time of day (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a).
Proneness to cognitive failures can be captured via self-report measures that assess
tendency towards experiencing a range of common slips, the most commonly used tool
being the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982). CFQ scores
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are normally distributed in the general population, although women tend to report
slightly higher scores than men (Boomsma, 1998). The CFQ is associated with several
real world outcomes such as university entrance exam scores (Unsworth et al., 2012)
and the likelihood of being the at-fault driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991).
Therefore, self-reported failures appear to measure aspects of cognition relevant to real
world functioning.

6.1.2. Cognitive failures and neuroticism
Cognitive failures are normal phenomena that are experienced by everyone from
time to time. However, complaints of slips are increased in a range of psychological
disorders, with individuals who have depressive disorders reporting the most markedly
increased CFQ scores relative to controls (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b). At the subclinical level, negative affect, comprising aversive mood states and subjective distress
(Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), is related to cognitive failures. For example, both
state anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) and sadness (Farrin et al., 2003) correspond with
increased frequency of cognitive failures. Similarly, trait neuroticism, which is
associated with increased psychological distress and internalising psychopathology such
as anxiety and depression (Aldinger et al., 2014; Hengartner, Ajdacic-Gross, Wyss,
Angst, & Rössler, 2016), has been repeatedly linked to increased cognitive failures
(Matthews et al., 1990a; Mecacci et al., 2004). Related literature has examined trait
effortful control, a construct describing dispositional ability to maintain attention and
correct errors which is correlated with cognitive failures (Sutton, Van Rensburg,
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Jentink, Drobes, & Evans, 2016). Researchers in this area have also found a close link
between neuroticism, negative affectivity, and reduced cognitive control, suggesting
that low capacity to regulate emotions results in high susceptibility to lapses in
cognitive effort, or vice versa (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2009). Increased vulnerability
to distress, whether manifested sub-clinically (e.g., high neuroticism scores) or
clinically (e.g., depressive disorder), therefore appears to be important in determining
proneness to cognitive failures in everyday life.
However, the link between neuroticism and self-reported cognitive failures has
raised concerns regarding the impact of self-awareness, being the ability to direct
attention towards the self and accurately observe one’s own level of cognitive
functioning, on the reporting of failures. It has been suggested that those who score
highly on neuroticism tend to exaggerate reports of cognitive problems relative to their
actual performance due to their negative self-appraisal style. That is, neurotic
individuals may perceive their cognitive functioning to be worse than it actually is due
to a negative bias. Therefore, the “complaint hypothesis” of increased failures in those
scoring highly on neuroticism would suggest that self-reported cognition reflects a
disposition to complain about one’s own cognition, rather than a reflection of how an
observer might perceive them to move through their daily life (Wilhelm et al., 2010).
This hypothesis is thought to be supported by correlations between cognitive failures,
neuroticism, and dysfunctional aspects of self-consciousness (Wilhelm et al., 2010).
More broadly, it has been suggested that the lack of clear association between objective,
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lab-based measures and self-reports of cognitive failures means that subjective failures
are not to be considered useful as a measure of everyday cognition (Horn, 1972;
Wilhelm et al., 2010).
Whilst many researchers in the field implicitly hold to the complaint hypothesis of
cognitive failures (see Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a), there are other possible explanations
for the link between cognitive failures and personality traits such as neuroticism. For
example, a stress-vulnerability approach would posit that affective aspects of
neuroticism may lead to the triggering of cognitive failures. Heightened emotional
reactivity in neuroticism, being the tendency to experience heightened emotions in
response to salient stimuli (Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008), causes
exaggerated physiological, psychological, and behavioural responses when evocative
events occur (Ormel et al., 2013; Suls & Martin, 2005). Affective experiences trigger
memory failures in neurotic individuals (Neupert et al., 2008), suggesting that everyday
slips and failures too may occur as a kind of cognitive consequence of heightened
emotional reactivity in neuroticism. Given the link between cognitive failures and
negative affect, and the possible role of emotional reactivity in shaping everyday
cognition in this group, it is important that the hypothesis that self-reported failures
reflect little more than a tendency to complain about cognition is scrutinised more
closely.

129

6.1.3. Role of self-awareness in self-reports of cognitive failures
It is important to determine the extent to which level of self-awareness impacts or
even distorts self-reported cognitive failures. The approach in current research has been
to consider how well self-reported cognitive failures correspond to laboratory-assessed
formal neurocognition. This has yielded no clear associations across studies (Carrigan
& Barkus, 2016a). Laboratory-assessed neurocognition and the errors in thinking
captured through cognitive failures could represent different facets of cognition. The
myriad of emotions, stressors, and situations that shift and co-occur in everyday life
simply cannot be replicated in the lab. It makes sense that real world settings are more
likely to elicit errors than the idealistic conditions of the lab environment; thus, selfreports of real world cognitive failures are likely to reveal problems that are quite
different to those being studied in the lab.
An alternative approach may be to compare self-reports of cognitive failures with
those of someone who is close to the self-rater (e.g., a significant other). Although not
objective in the sense of accepted gold-standard measures of cognitive performance,
people who are in close contact have the opportunity to observe the behavioural
outcomes of someone’s slips during daily life. There are several studies of self-observer
comparisons of cognitive failures in traumatic brain injury (e.g., Robertson et al., 1997),
dyslexia (e.g., Smith-Spark, Fawcett, Nicolson, & Fisk, 2004), and in polydrug users
(e.g., Montgomery & Fisk, 2007). However, self-other comparisons for healthy
populations have been studied in only a handful of papers (Broadbent et al., 1982;
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Mahoney et al., 1998). Whilst the evidence is admittedly limited, the findings of
moderate correlations in these studies suggest that self-reported failures reflect real slips
in thinking that are reasonably observable to others. As such, comparison of observer
and self-reports of cognitive failures is likely to yield information about whether selfreported failure scores reflect real world cognition, or merely a tendency to complain.

6.1.4. Current study
The current study will be used to extend upon the existing research to explore the
extent to which observer ratings and self-reports of cognitive failures correlate. In order
to explore the accuracy of the complaint hypothesis of failures, the impact of
neuroticism on the relationship between observed and self-reported cognitive failures
will also be examined.
Neuroticism is generally measured via self-report using tools such as the Eysenck
Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), and similar to cognitive
failures, self-reports correlate moderately with observer reports (Gomà-i-Freixanet,
1997). However, unlike cognitive failures, self-reported neuroticism has long been
viewed as a reliable measure of behavioural patterns that are reflective of this
underlying trait, and these behaviours are generally considered to be observable. On this
basis, level of correspondence between self- and observer-reports of neuroticism may be
of use as an indicator of self-awareness of personality and psychological features. This
is not an ideal measure of self-awareness, given the likely vast difference in internal
experience and that which is externally expressed. Nevertheless, it enables some
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comparison of self-perception and objective outcomes, and has been employed in
studying a variety of factors and populations, including personality in healthy groups
(Vazire, 2006), and cognition in brain injured patients (Fleming, Strong, & Ashton,
1996). We therefore sought to determine whether disparity between observer and selfratings of neuroticism, as an indicator of general self-awareness of one’s own
behavioural patterns, predicts greater disparity in self and observer-ratings of cognitive
failures.
It was hypothesized that neuroticism will be positively correlated with cognitive
failures. It was also expected that observer and self-ratings of both failures and
neuroticism will be moderately correlated. Two possible findings that would support the
complaint hypothesis, that failures are distorted by poor self-awareness, were thought to
be: 1) that the correlation between self and observer ratings of failures is reduced in
high neuroticism relative to low neuroticism; and 2) that controlling for the effects of
self-awareness also results in a reduction in the correlation between self and observer
ratings of failures. Alternatively, if neither neuroticism nor self-awareness appeared to
influence self-observer correlations, then the complaint hypothesis could not be said to
be supported.
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6.2. Methods
6.2.1. Participants
Participants were 402 psychology undergraduate students whom provided selfreports (targets), and each invited someone who saw them on a daily basis (e.g., partner,
parent, sibling, or housemate) to be their informant. Target participants included 24%
males, and had a mean age of 22.24 years (min = 18, max = 53, SD = 5.81). Informant
participants included 46.3% males, and had a mean age of 29.82 years (min = 17, max =
78, SD = 14.55). Information about ethnicity was not collected for either group. The
makeup of relationship of informants to targets was as follows: partner/spouse 39.55%,
parent 22.89%, close friend 16.17%, sibling 12.44%, housemate 6.22%, other relative
1.74%, and son/daughter 1.00%.
Data was collected from students between 2014 and 2016. Over three cohorts of
students, 508 students overall completed the self-ratings. Of those participants and
informants who provided data, 96% consented for its use in the research. 99 participants
were excluded on the basis of missing, incomplete, or unmatched observer data.
Inclusion criteria were open, with participants excluded only on the basis of having a
psychotic or neurological disorder by self-report questionnaire (as per other personality
research, e.g., Ettinger et al., 2005). This led to the exclusion of an additional seven
pairs, leaving a total of 402 pairs for analysis.
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6.2.2. Instruments
6.2.2.1. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) is a 25-item
self-report inventory used to assess slips in cognition experienced by the targets during
the course of everyday life. The CFQ asks targets to indicate the perceived frequency
with which they have experienced a list of common failures over the past six months;
for example, “Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?” The
response format is a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = never, and 4 = very often). Possible
scores range from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicative of a greater propensity
towards experiencing failures during daily life.
Cronbach's alpha for the CFQ in the initial study was found to be .89 (Broadbent
et al., 1982). The dimensionality of the CFQ has been a source of ongoing debate within
the literature, with authors arguing alternatively for a unidimensional (e.g., Wallace,
2004; Larson et al., 1997) or multidimensional (e.g., Wilhelm et al., 2010) model of the
CFQ. Given the current study’s interest in self-awareness and observability of everyday
failures in general, the decision was made to use the total CFQ score only. This was
labelled as the variable CFQ-self.
The wording of each item on the CFQ was slightly modified in order to seek
responses from informants regarding targets. For instance, the item previously worded
as “Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?” was re-worded to “Do
they find they forget what they went to the shops to buy?” It should be noted that
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Broadbent et al. (1982) have previously detailed a separate informant version, referred
to as the CFQ-For-Others. This comprises eight items thought to be most easily
apparent to those other than the individual who experiences the slips. Whilst it may be
unlikely that even a significant other could observe all of the CFQ items (e.g., “Do you
find yourself suddenly wondering whether you’ve used a word correctly?”), it is
possible that they may be aware of this by virtue of knowing the other person very
intimately. Therefore, it was important for this study to compare self and informant
responses on the full CFQ. The full CFQ score as rated by significant others is labelled
as the variable CFQ-observer.

6.2.2.2. Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
The second questionnaire administered to targets was the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985); the shortened 48 item version was
used in this study. The EPQ has a yes/no format and assesses three facets of targets’
personality: Extraversion (e.g., “Are you rather lively?”), Neuroticism (e.g., “Are your
feelings easily hurt?”), and Psychoticism (e.g., “Do you prefer to go your own way
rather than act by the rules?”), as well as including a Lie scale (e.g., “If you say you will
do something, do you always keep your promise no matter how inconvenient it might
be?”). All measures have good internal consistency and test–retest reliability, with the
exception of psychoticism ( Eysenck & Eysenck, 1994). For the purposes of the current
study, neuroticism (N) was the only scale of interest. In the same way as the CFQ, the
wording of the EPQ was slightly modified in the informant version. Using an example
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item listed above, this was re-worded to “Are their feelings easily hurt?” The two
variables in the analyses are labelled as N-self and N-observer.

6.2.3. Procedure
The study was approved by the institution’s human research ethics committee. As
part of their coursework in a second year personality psychology subject, student
participants were first asked to complete an online survey relating to their own
experience and behaviour. Following this, they were asked to request an informant to
complete a modified version of the same survey. Targets were clearly instructed
verbally and in writing to select an informant who knew them well and saw them every
day or nearly every day, such as a partner, parent, sibling, housemate, or very close
friend. Targets were asked to create and input an individualised code for their data, and
to provide their informant with this in order to facilitate data matching.
In the second stage of data collection, informants were instructed to complete the
questionnaires with regards to their observations of the target’s experiences and
behaviour. Informants were provided information about the questionnaire and study in
written form only (i.e., via the first page of the online survey). It was emphasized to
them their participation was not compulsory, and that their decision to participate or not
would have no impact on their target’s coursework outcomes. Students examined their
own data in the context of the course to gain an understanding of the observability of
personality. Students and informants were also both asked for consent for the use of
their data in the current research separately to the in-class use.
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6.2.4. Statistical analyses
Alongside the measured variables, two additional variables were calculated for the
analyses: CFQ-disparity and N-disparity. CFQ-disparity was calculated by subtracting
CFQ-observer ratings from CFQ-self ratings, such that a negative score would indicate
under-reporting of one’s cognitive failures relative to objective reports, while a positive
score would indicate over-reporting of one’s cognitive failures relative to objective
reports. Similarly, N-disparity reflected subtraction of N-observer from N-self scores,
with a negative score reflecting under-reporting of one’s own neuroticism relative to
objective reports, and a positive score reflecting over-reporting. Absolute values (CFQdisparity-ab; N-disparity-ab) were also calculated to allow examination of the
magnitude of difference in self vs. other reports separate to direction of self-reporting.
As both self and observer reports of the N scale of the EPQ are widely accepted as a
reliable measure of behavioural tendencies reflecting trait neuroticism, the N-disparity
score was utilised as a measure of self-awareness in the current study.
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to examine the internal consistency of the CFQ
for this sample. Linearity of the association between self- and observer-reports was
assessed using a hierarchical multiple regression approach.
T-tests were conducted to look at sex differences for the CFQ, N, and related
measures. Cohen’s d was used to examine effect sizes for sex differences, and effect
sizes were considered in line with Cohen’s (1988) classification: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2),
small (> .2), moderate (> .5), large (> .8), and very large (> 1.3).
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Correlations were calculated to examine relationships between variables, and the
self and observer scores. Separate correlations were calculated for groups at different
levels of neuroticism and self-awareness. A mean split was conducted on neuroticism
scores to enable comparison of CFQ self-observer correspondence for those at either
extreme of the neuroticism continuum; those with higher than average vs. lower than
average levels of neuroticism. Additionally, r-to-Z transformations were conducted to
enable comparison of groups for differences on these via an ANOVA. A regression
analysis was utilised to determine whether magnitude of discrepancy in neuroticism
scores predicted discrepancy in cognitive failures scores. Partial correlations were also
conducted to confirm these findings by controlling for the effects of neuroticism and
self-awareness on the self-observer CFQ relationship, and Z-scores were calculated to
enable comparison of the magnitude of self-other discrepancy for cognitive failures vs.
neuroticism.

6.3. Results
6.3.1. Descriptive statistics and sex differences
The 2014 cohort of participants included 133 students (24.06% males) with mean
age 22.05 (SD = 5.45); the 2015 cohort 136 students (23.53% males) with mean age
22.94 (SD = 6.62); and the 2016 cohort 133 students (24.06% males) with mean age
21.71 (SD = 5.22). There were no significant differences in age or sex between cohorts,
therefore analyses examined participants as a single group.
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Internal reliability for both CFQ-self and CFQ-observer were excellent, where
Cronbach’s alpha was α = .91 for each. T-tests revealed target sex differences on a
number of variables; see Table 6.1. Supporting the past literature, both CFQ-self and Nself were higher for women than men. CFQ-observer and N-observer were similarly
elevated for women, suggesting that heightened failures and neuroticism did not simply
reflect exaggerations in reporting on the part of women. Effect sizes indicated that most
of the sex differences were small, although there was a large difference for N-observer
scores which suggests that informants of female targets notice far more neuroticism
than do those of male targets. CFQ-disparity scores did not differ according to sex,
further supporting that sex did not differentially impact propensity to over- or underreport one’s own cognitive failures. Although absolute disparity scores did not differ,
men did have a slightly greater positive disparity in neuroticism scores, suggesting that
men view themselves as being more neurotic than they display to their close others.
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Table 6.1.
Mean Differences in Ratings Between Male and Female Targets
Variable

Male

Female

95% CI of the
difference

M

SD

M

SD

Lower

Upper

t

p

Effect size
Cohen’s d

CFQ-self

36.19 13.16 43.33 14.82 -10.48

-3.81

-4.21

<.001

- 0.49*

CFQ-observer

29.24 14.89 34.87 13.44 -8.81

-2.44

-3.47

.001

- 0.41*

CFQ-disparity

6.95

2.34

-.77

.44

- 0.09

CFQ-disparity-ab

13.07 10.39 14.64 12.31 -4.09

.95

-1.23

.22

0.14

N-self

4.74

3.44

6.95

3.42

-3.01

-1.43

-5.51

<.001

- 0.65**

N-observer

3.06

2.58

6.19

3.54

-3.78

-2.47

-9.37

<.001

- 0.94***

N-disparity

1.67

3.05

0.77

3.59

0.10

1.71

2.22

.03

0.26*

N-disparity-ab

2.49

2.42

2.76

2.41

-.82

.29

-.94

.35

0.11

15.09 8.46

17.17 -5.37

Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate (Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8);
**** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3).
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The impact of informant sex on ratings of targets and disparity scores were also
examined; see Table 6.2. Neither CFQ-observer nor CFQ-disparity showed any
difference according to whether the informant was male or female. However, there was
a moderate effect for sex on N-observer, with males rating targets as slightly higher in
neuroticism than females. There was also a small effect for sex on N-disparity, with
female informants associated with a larger positive disparity (i.e., self-ratings higher
than observer-ratings), suggesting that females tend to perceive their close others as less
neurotic than their close others view themselves. However, absolute magnitude of
discrepancy in neuroticism scores did not differ by sex.
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Table 6.2
Mean Differences in Ratings Between Male and Female Informants
Variable

Male

Female

95% CI of the
difference

M

SD

M

SD

Lower

Upper

t

p

Effect size
Cohen’s d

CFQ-observer

33.72 13.56 33.35 14.40 -2.39

3.13

.26

.79

0.03

CFQ-disparity

8.06

16.50 -3.38

3.19

-.06

.96

-0.01

CFQ-disparity-ab

14.79 11.53 13.76 12.20 -1.30

3.37

.87

.38

0.09

N-observer

6.18

3.63

4.81

3.44

0.68

2.07

3.89

<.001

0.52**

N-disparity

0.42

3.37

1.47

3.51

-1.73

-0.38

-3.06

.002

-0.31*

N-disparity-ab

2.56

2.22

2.82

2.56

-0.73

0.22

-1.07

.29

0.11

16.96 8.15

Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate (Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8);
**** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3)
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6.3.2. Correlations between variables
Linearity of the association between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer was assessed
using a hierarchical multiple regression approach. While the linear model was
significant (F(1,400) = 47.22, p < .001), adding a quadratic component to the CFQ selfobserver relationship did not result in a change in R2 (F(1,399) = .10, p = .75). This
confirmed the relationship to be linear rather than quadratic.
Associations between cognitive failures and neuroticism, and observer and selfreports were examined, with descriptive statistics for the entire sample displayed in
Table 6.3. Correlation coefficients differed for male and female targets, however as
differences were slight and correlations remained significant at the same level, data is
presented only for the combined group. Separate tables for each sex are included in
Appendix B. As expected, cognitive failures and neuroticism were significantly related,
and there were also significant associations between observer and self-reports of both
variables. CFQ-self was moderately positively correlated with N-self (r = .40, p < .001)
and with CFQ-observer (r = .33, p < .01), and more weakly with N-observer (r = .19, p
< .001). Similarly, CFQ-observer was weakly positively correlated with N-observer (r =
.23, p <.001) and N-self (r = .10, p < .05). The largest correlation evident in this study
was between N-self and N-observer (r = .52, p < .01).
CFQ-disparity and N-disparity were also positively correlated (r = .30, p <.01), as
were the absolute scores (r = .23, p <.01). This relationship was linear (F(1,400) =
39.45, p < .001), with addition of a quadratic component reducing R2 by only .003
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which was not significant (F(1,399) = 0.2, p = .90). It appears that these new variables
behave in the same way as the raw CFQ and N variables.
To enable further comparison of the discrepancies between self- and observerreports, Z-scores were calculated for CFQ- and N-disparity relative to the sample’s
average standard deviation. Although both were positive rather than negative in
direction, CFQ-disparity scores were significantly larger (M = 0.24, SD = 0.50) than Ndisparity scores (M = 0.14, SD = 0.50; t(401) = 3.42, p =.001), This suggests that
cognitive failures are either slightly more difficult to self-report or alternatively for
others to observe than neuroticism; however the size of deviation remains relatively
small.
Table 6.3
Descriptive Statistics for Self, Observer, and Disparity Scores for All Target
Participants
Variable

Mean

S.D.

CFQ-self

41.63

14.73

CFQ-observer

33.55

13.97

CFQ-disparity

8.11

16.69

CFQ-disparity-ab

14.24

11.89

N-self

6.43

3.55

N-observer

5.44

3.59

N-disparity

0.99

3.48

N-disparity-ab

2.70

2.41
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6.3.3. Effects of neuroticism on the relationship between self and observer ratings
of CFQ
The effect of neuroticism (self-rated) on the correlation between CFQ-self and
CFQ-observer was explored via a mean split of participants into high and low
neuroticism groups. Mean N for the high group was 9.45 (SD = 1.96) and for the low
3.35 (SD = 1.96); these differed significantly (t(400) = -33.89, p < .05). Correlations
between CFQ self and observer were r = .34 for the high group and r = .31 for the low;
both were significant at p < .01. A Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation was performed to
enable comparison of these correlation coefficients. There was no statistically
significant difference between groups, (z = 0.11, p = .46), suggesting that the
relationship between observer and self-ratings of cognitive failures is not altered by
being high on neuroticism.
Given that neuroticism is correlated with both self and observer ratings of CFQ,
partial correlations were also run to confirm that controlling for self-rated neuroticism
did not result in a reduction in self-observer correlations. There was a moderate positive
correlation between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer when controlling for neuroticism
which was statistically significant (r = .31, p < .001). This differed little from the zeroorder correlation between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer, supporting that neuroticism had
little influence in controlling for the relationship.
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6.3.4. Effect of self-awareness on relationship between CFQ self and observer
ratings
6.3.4.1. Direction of discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports
An ANOVA was also conducted to examine whether the relationship between self
and observer CFQ ratings was impacted by self-awareness, as measured by N-disparity
which compared self and observer ratings of neuroticism. Participants were split into
three groups: 1) those with a positive disparity score (i.e., self-rated as higher on
neuroticism than observed; n = 210); 2) those with a disparity score of zero (i.e., selfrated as having the same neuroticism as observed, n = 68); and 3) those with a negative
disparity score (i.e., self-rated as having lower neuroticism than observed; n = 124). The
demographic makeup of these groups was as follows: 1) 26.67% male, age M = 22.43,
SD = 6.12; 2) 26.47% male, age M = 20.40, SD = 1.43; 3) 17.74% male, M = 21.94, SD
= 4.98. No differences were evident in participant sex (χ(1) = 3.72, p = .16) or age (F(2,
401) = .80, p = .45) between these groups, suggesting that there are no clear differences
in self-awareness whether male or female, younger or older.
Correlations between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer were altered slightly for each
group but all remained in the moderate range. For the positive disparity group, r = .32;
no disparity group, r = .46; and negative disparity group, r = .33. For all groups, this
relationship remained significant at p < .01. In addition, a Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation
indicated there were no statistically significant differences between the no disparity vs.
positive disparity groups (z = 1.17, p = .12), the no disparity vs. negative disparity
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groups (z = 1.01, p = .16), or the positive vs. negative groups (z = -0.10, p = .46). This
suggests that direction of self-awareness (i.e., heightened or lowered) did not
differentially impact the relationship between observed and self-ratings of cognitive
failures. Partial correlations were also examined to confirm that the relationship
between self and informant ratings of CFQ remained unchanged when controlling for
self-awareness. There was again a moderate positive correlation between CFQ-self and
CFQ-observer when controlling for N-disparity which was statistically significant (r =
.37, p < .001). This differed little from the zero-order correlation between CFQ-self and
CFQ-observer, further supporting that self-awareness had little influence in the
relationship.

6.3.4.2. Magnitude of discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports
As above, a partial correlation of CFQ-self and CFQ-other controlling for Ndisparity-ab produced similar results to the original zero-order correlation (r = .33, p <
.001). Instead of a group analysis, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to
determine whether magnitude of discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports of neuroticism
(i.e., N-disparity-ab) predicted discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports of cognitive
failures. This was significant, F(1, 400) = 22.90, p = < .001. However, R2 was
relatively small (.05). Although self-awareness does shape the magnitude to which selfobservations deviate from objective reports of cognitive failures, its impact is relatively
small.
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6.3.5. Effects of relationship type on relationship between CFQ self and observer
ratings
The final analysis sought to determine whether the type of relationship between
target and informant had any impact on the CFQ self-observer relationship. The base
rate of couple participants (i.e., those whose informants specified themselves as being
either partner or spouse to their target) was biased in comparison to other informants,
with 39.55% compared to the next highest being parents at 22.89% (refer to methods in
section 6.2.1 for detailed breakdown). As such, we conducted a partial correlation
controlling for type of relationship using a dummy coded variable specifying whether
the informant was a partner or non-partner to the target. The partial correlation produced
was moderate (r = .33, p <.001), and was identical to the zero-order correlation between
CFQ-self and CFQ-observer. This suggests that different types of informants did not
differentially influence the relationship between self and observer ratings.

6.4. Discussion
The aim of the current study was to extend previous research regarding the
relationship between cognitive failures and neuroticism. Of interest was whether selfreported cognitive failures are best understood as a measure of real world cognitive
slips, or rather, as a tool distorted by self-awareness and primarily reflecting propensity
to complain about one’s own cognition.
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Supporting previous findings, being high on neuroticism was associated with an
increased level of self-reported cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; Merckelbach
et al., 1996; Wilhelm et al., 2010). In addition, observer ratings were moderately
correlated with self-reports of failures. This suggests that the behavioural consequences
of cognitive failures are relatively observable to other people, or at least those who
spend a substantial amount of time in close proximity. However, whilst an association
between self-reported and observed cognitive failures is clear, it is by no means strong.
Additionally, overall, the magnitude of discrepancy between self-observer CFQ scores
was higher than that seen for neuroticism. Although this difference was small, it might
suggest that cognitive failures are less easy to objectively observe than behaviour
associated with neuroticism. The nature of many cognitive failures is such that they are
subtle, and not readily noticed by others. As such, one would not expect a perfect
correlation between proneness to failures as perceived by the subject and those noted by
another person, even a significant or close other. Neurotic behaviours may hold more
valence than cognitive failures due to their potential for a negative emotional impact on
both the self and other, therefore making them slightly more memorable. Whilst the two
previous studies utilising informants (Broadbent et al., 1982; Mahoney et al., 1998)
tried to address this problem by using the adjusted CFQ-For-Others, including only a
few items deemed observable, it is interesting to note that the current use of the entire
CFQ yielded similar results. Although failures may vary widely in their form and
visibility to others, it seems that an individual’s general proneness to slips can be
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perceived and reported on by other people. Thus, this finding lends some support to the
idea that self-reported failures reflect actual problems with cognition in everyday life,
rather than an indication of self-perceptions.
Further combatting the complaint hypothesis of self-reported cognitive failures,
being high or low on neuroticism did not differentially impact the relationship between
self or observer rated cognitive failures. People higher on neuroticism do not seem to be
more likely to inflate reports of problems than those lower in neuroticism, which would
have been reflected by a larger disparity with observer ratings. In addition, there was no
clear change in the relationship between observed and self-reported cognitive failures
according to level of self-awareness of behavioural patterns associated with
neuroticism. Individuals who rated their own neuroticism at the same level as that
observed by their informant did not demonstrate significantly higher self-observer CFQ
correlations than those who tended to either exaggerate or minimise their neuroticism
compared with observer ratings.
In summary, whilst it would be illogical to argue that any self-report measure is
in no way impacted by self-awareness, in the case of cognitive failures, reporting does
not seem to be significantly “contaminated” by this, as per Wilhelm et al.’s concerns
(2010). Rather, self-reported cognitive failures seem to reflect vulnerability to
committing actual (rather than imagined) cognitive slips, with the resultant behavioural
outcomes and errors being relatively observable to those around us. As such, it appears
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that people higher on neuroticism genuinely experience more problems with cognition
in their day-to-day lives.

6.4.1. Limitations
Although psychological research informants are widely treated as providing a
more objective means of measuring aspects of real world personality and functioning
than self-reports, there are certainly limitations to this approach that must be considered.
For example, the term “complaint” implies that neurotic individuals may vocalise
concerns about their cognition, not only in the context of direct questioning via the
CFQ, but perhaps also more generally to those close to them. Hence, rather than
providing observations of the outcomes of failures, informants may be unduly
influenced by their significant others’ perceptions of themselves. This has implications
for the use of self-observer disparity scores as a measure of self-awareness. Setting
observer information as the bar against which self-observations are deemed as either
reflective of reality or not has the potential to be very flawed. However, it is not yet
clear what other methods may yield a more objective (and practicable) measure of
cognitive functioning as it occurs in the course of daily life.
In addition, it is possible that the personalities of informants might influence the
way in which they perceive others. Sticking with the theme at hand, a neurotic
informant may be more likely to view their target in an unrealistically favourable light
due to comparisons based on their own negative self-view (Buunk, Van der Zee, &
VanYperen, 2001). Indeed, there was potential evidence of this within the current study,
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with female informants – known to be higher on neuroticism than males - tending to
rate their targets as less neurotic than targets viewed themselves. However, males
comprised only a quarter of the sample of targets; hence whilst findings regarding sex
differences were in the expected direction given past research into cognitive failures and
neuroticism, they must be taken with caution. Another limitation of the current research
is that it did not collect self-reports of informant personalities alongside their
observations of targets, and therefore cannot rule these potential biases in or out. We
can only assume that observer reports represent somewhat “pure” observations of their
targets’ behaviour; an assumption that is widely held by the large portion of
psychological research that relies on informant ratings of behaviour (Simms, Zelazny,
Yam, & Gros, 2010). Future studies that capture both target and informant
characteristics are required to critically evaluate these assumptions.
It has been suggested that in dyadic research, married couples tend to have more
similar observer and self-ratings than other types of dyads (Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese,
2000). The current mixed sample could have resulted in a lowering of self-observer
correlations for cognitive failures. Nevertheless, the level of association identified here
was very similar to that identified in Broadbent et al.’s (1982) original study of married
couples, which produced correlations of r = .32 for male and r = .36 for female spouses.
The similarity between the current findings and those of Broadbent et al. suggest type of
relationship is unlikely to pose a large problem for this approach to researching
cognitive failures. Indeed, the only other self-observer study of cognitive failures in a
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healthy population also used a mixed sample, and in that case a slightly higher
correlation of r = .50 was observed (Mahoney et al., 1998). Further supporting this, no
differences were evident in the relationship between self and observer-reported
cognitive failures when controlling for whether informants were romantic partners of
targets or non-targets. Future studies would ideally capture more information about the
types and nature of relationships between targets and informants (e.g., whether living
together, length of relationship), to determine the extent to which this may impact
apparent observability.
Finally, the sample used in the current study was essentially one of convenience.
Subjects were all undergraduate psychology students, and informants were all
significant people close to students; as such both groups of participants may have
differed significantly to other groups in the general population. For example,
surprisingly given the known cognitive decline with age, older adults tend to report
equivalent or even fewer cognitive slips compared with younger people (Kramer et al.,
1994; Mecacci & Righi, 2006). It has been suggested that this may reflect a reduced
ability to self-monitor (Harty et al., 2013), and indeed a greater disparity between self
and observer-rated cognitive failures has been reported for older vs. younger adults
(Harty et al., 2013). As such, generalisation of the current findings to the broader
population requires caution, and future studies comparing different groups based on age
and other factors is required. Nevertheless, the current use of students as subjects was a
pragmatic choice to secure sufficient numbers in a study in which interest and consent
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was required from pairs of people, and which therefore meant that recruitment was to
some extent reliant on participants.

6.4.2. Implications and directions for future research
The current findings suggest that self-reported cognitive failures provide a useful
indication of vulnerability to cognitive errors in everyday life. Although measures like
the CFQ may not correlate highly with neuropsychological assessments of cognitive
ability (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a), the behavioural outcomes of cognitive failures are
evident to other people. This lends support to our previous conceptualisation of selfreported cognitive failures as measuring something other than the maximal ability
usually assessed in the lab; rather, they provide an indication of how this translates into
capacity for thinking in day-to-day contexts (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a).
Alongside refining the current conceptualisation of cognitive failures, these
findings highlight the everyday experience of people high on neuroticism as one that
involves frequent disruptions to and lapses in cognition. At the upper end of the
neuroticism spectrum, this may be to the extent that failures reduce quality of life, as
failures have the ability to contribute to serious failings including car accidents (Larson
& Merritt, 1991). Following on from this, the link between neuroticism and
psychopathology such as anxiety and depression raises the question: does the
experience of cognitive failures play any role in facilitating movement along the
spectrum of risk from health to disorder? One proposal made by Carriere, Cheyne, and
Smilek (2008b) is that mind-wandering – a specific type of cognitive lapse that can lead
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to slips and failures in thinking – plays a causal role in the development of depression
by reducing the ability to connect with the external world.
It is beyond the scope of the current study to elucidate the mechanism through
which neuroticism and failures may be related. However, it is possible that heightened
emotional reactivity means that the multitude of emotions and stressors faced in
everyday life lead to frequent disruptions to cognition. Several existing findings support
this. People high on neuroticism experience more stressors in daily life and react with
more extreme emotions (Suls & Martin, 2005), and an experience sampling study found
that they also experience more memory failures on days in which they face stressors
(Neupert et al., 2008). The next step in research into cognitive failures will therefore be
to further explore whether negative affect and emotional reactivity contribute to the
mechanism through which individuals with neuroticism and related personality traits are
more prone to slips.

6.4.3. Conclusions
The current study supports a view of self-reported cognitive failures as a useful
measure of tendency to experience disruptions to cognition in everyday life. Whilst
increased neuroticism is consistently associated with increased reports of failures, it
does not weaken the relationship between self-reported and observed cognitive failure
scores. As such, people high on neuroticism appear to genuinely be more prone to
problems with cognition in their daily lives, and are not just providing exaggerated
complaints about their own cognition due to negative distortions in self-perception.
155

Further study is required to determine which factors contribute to the mechanism by
which some people tend to experience more slips and failures, with aspects of
neuroticism which may disrupt everyday cognition, such as negative affect and
emotional reactivity, being of particular interest.
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7. Schizotypy and cognitive failures: Mediating role for affect.

This chapter is based on a paper published in Psychopathology.

Carrigan, N. & Barkus, E. (2017). Schizotypy and cognitive failures: Mediating role for
affect. Psychopathology, 50(3). 195-202 doi: 10.1159/000464106
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7.1. Introduction
7.1.1. Cognitive failures in schizotypy
Schizotypy is a cluster of personality features found along the psychosis
continuum, which proposes a theoretical, psychological, and biological link between
psychotic phenomena in the general population and diagnosed psychotic disorders. The
psychosis continuum refers to a theoretical spectrum of risk for schizophrenia and
related psychotic disorders, along which individuals, both healthy or with a clinical
diagnosis, are distributed. Individuals at the upper end of the spectrum are highest in
psychosis-proneness, and, therefore, are at greatest theoretical risk of developing mental
health disorders such as schizotypal personality disorder and schizophrenia (Johns &
van Os, 2001). Schizotypy is one construct useful for examining this continuum. Meehl
(Meehl, 1962, 1990) conceptualised schizotypy as a personality structure characterised
by social dysfunction, unusual perceptual experiences, and cognitive disorganisation.
This is thought to reflect an anomalous neurological makeup which may or may not
result in a psychotic disorder. Later conceptualisations have been more clinical in
nature, focusing on attenuated psychotic symptoms (Claridge, 1997) which are statebased. An updated understanding of the schizotypy construct incorporates both stable
personality features and propensity for psychosis-like symptoms that may fluctuate
according to changes in environment. Supporting its utility in examining the psychosis
continuum, schizotypy appears to be fully-dimensional, being normally distributed
throughout the entire population (Johns & van Os, 2001; Nelson, Seal, Pantelis, &
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Phillips, 2013). In addition, a shared genetic component for schizotypy and psychosis
has also been identified (Moreno Samaniego et al., 2011; Vollema et al., 2002). These
data collectively point to an overlap between schizotypy and vulnerability for
schizophrenia, therefore consideration of symptom expression in schizotypy will
contribute towards our understanding of the factors underpinning vulnerability for
psychotic disorders.
Schizotypy is broader in scope than other psychosis continuum constructs such
as at-risk mental states (ARMS) groups (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015), which
captures only those at imminent clinical risk of transitioning into psychosis (Simon et
al., 2007) as opposed to the psychosis vulnerability present in the entire population. As
such, only a relatively small subsection of people high on schizotypy will functionally
decompensate and go on to seek help for their experiences (Debbané et al., 2015;
Kwapil et al., 2013). It is proposed that a combination of psychological, biological and
environmental factors act against the backdrop of endogenous vulnerability (i.e., high
schizotypy) to push people along the psychosis continuum, so some individuals at the
upper end of the continuum may go on to develop schizophrenia-spectrum disorders if
sufficient stressors are encountered. In this way, schizotypy research may help to
identify adverse factors which may act as triggers for illness onset, as well as exploring
developmental trajectories in very early phases of risk and illness, even prior to a
prodrome (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015).
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Another key benefit of schizotypy research is the identification of possible
markers of risk such as biological anomalies and issues with emotion regulation, with
difficulties with cognition being one of the most widely studied (Debbané et al., 2015;
Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). Rather than focusing only on laboratory assessed
cognitive performance, increasingly clinicians are interested in measures of cognitive
capacity with relevance to an everyday setting. Cognitive failures or cognitive slips are
interruptions to normal cognitive functioning that occur in the flow of everyday life.
They include errors in thought or action, such as missing an appointment or forgetting
what item you went to the supermarket to purchase. Importantly, cognitive failures are a
normal experience that happen to everyone from time to time; they occur during tasks
that are usually completed without incident and so do not reflect any underlying deficit
of ability. Cognitive failures are often subtle, and at times may be detectable only to the
person experiencing them. As such, failures are typically measured via self-report.
Similar to schizophrenia patients (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b), healthy individuals high
in schizotypy, or “high schizotypes,” consistently report experiencing more cognitive
failures than those low in schizotypy (Corcoran et al., 2013; Giesbrecht et al., 2007;
Pfeifer et al., 2009). Along the psychosis continuum, such subjective complaints are
made even in the absence of detectable objective neuropsychological deficits (Chan et
al., 2011; Laws et al., 2008), which suggests that cognitive failures may be a marker of
psychosis risk present prior to the onset of more marked, objectively-detectable
impairment (Pfeifer et al., 2009). However, as yet the factors underpinning, driving or
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exacerbating a vulnerability to cognitive failures in schizotypy remain largely
unexamined. It is possible that negative affect may be one such factor.

7.1.2. Negative affect in schizotypy
A general pattern of high negative and low positive affect is evident in
schizophrenia, familial, and psychometric schizotypy (Horan et al., 2008; David
Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988), contributing to a heightened subjective level of distress
for these groups. As such, high schizotypes are thought to possess increased negative
affectivity, a temperament-based predisposition (Horan et al., 2008) towards
experiencing negative mood states such as fear, anxiety, disgust, sadness, and loneliness
(Watson et al., 1988). Negative affectivity predicts anxiety and mood disorders,
although in and of itself does not constitute a mental illness (Watson et al., 1988). On
this background of generally high negative affect (or perhaps contributing to it), high
schizotypes are also known to exhibit greater reactivity in response to emotional events
and stimuli (Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, et al., 2003). High schizotypes with greater
affective reactivity may be considered to have a low stress threshold, therefore negative
affect may be more intensely and readily experienced. This may contribute to their
movement along the psychosis continuum, possibly even from healthy into pre-morbid,
or pre-morbid into illness states (Horan et al., 2008).
Cognitive failures are also linked to affective reactivity (van den Bosch et al.,
1993). They are associated with a range of negative affects including anxiety at the level
of both generally heightened arousal (Mahoney et al., 1998) and at the extreme of fear
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(Payne & Schnapp, 2014), stress (Boals & Banks, 2012), sub-clinical depression (Farrin
et al., 2003), and guilt (Payne & Schnapp, 2014). Given the shared link between
negative affect and both schizotypy and cognitive failures, it may be that negative affect
is a key contributor to high schizotypes’ experience of cognitive failures in their
everyday lives. Cognitive failures and negative affect within schizotypy could be related
to one another in two different ways. First, heightened failures reported by high
schizotypes could result from their affective reactivity; a cognitive consequence of poor
management of their responses to emotional stimuli. Conversely, it could also be argued
that affective reactivity is itself caused by cognitive failures due to disruptions to
processes involved in the effective regulation of emotion. It is difficult to ascertain
which phenomenon precedes the other; indeed low mood, reduced stress tolerance, and
mild cognitive complaints are all considered to be basic symptoms of psychosisproneness evident in pre-clinical individuals (Schultze-Lutter, 2009). However, periods
of exposure to stressful environments have been found to lead to increased reporting of
cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982), suggesting that negative affective
experiences may precede increases in everyday failures. Therefore, the approach taken
in this paper is that negative affectivity in schizotypy more likely determines cognitive
performance in daily life.

7.1.3. Current study
Despite the well-established relationship of both schizotypy and negative affect to
cognitive failures, research has yet to explore how these two factors might interact. The
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stresses and demands experienced during the course of daily life have the potential to
trigger both negative emotions and failures in cognition. High schizotypes’ greater
negative affectivity and affective reactivity may increase the likelihood that emotional
experiences will disrupt cognition in daily life, relative to other groups. As cognitive
failures are thought to represent a marker of risk for psychosis, an understanding of if
and how negative affect might exacerbate such problems could provide new direction
for approaches in early intervention, such as cognitive remediation.
Within this study, an exploratory approach was taken to determine whether
affect has a mediating or moderating effect on the relationship between schizotypy and
cognitive failures. We focused on a young adult population, as this group is at
heightened risk for the onset of mental illnesses (Kessler et al., 2007), and also tend to
report higher levels of schizotypy than older adults (Bora & Baysan Arabaci, 2009).
As per past findings, we expected that self-report schizotypy and cognitive
failures would be moderately positively correlated at similar levels to those seen in
other studies comparing the two constructs (e.g., r = .53, Giesbrecht, et al., 2007). We
also expected that negative affect would positively correlate with both schizotypy and
cognitive failures. As noted earlier, being high on schizotypy is associated with the
experience of a greater level of negative affectivity. Similarly, negative affect also
forms part of the symptomatology of schizophrenia (Horan et al., 2008). Given that both
state and trait negative affect are also associated with cognitive failures, our primary
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hypothesis was that negative affect would mediate the relationship between schizotypy
and cognitive failures.
An alternative, but we believed less likely hypothesis, was that negative affect
would moderate the relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures. Given that
emotional reactivity is also a feature of schizotypy, perhaps the presence of negative
affect is a requirement for heightened failures to be experienced by individuals high in
schizotypy. That is, only people high in schizotypy and also experiencing high negative
affect report increased cognitive failures.

7.2. Methods
7.2.1. Participants
An online survey comprising several questionnaires was administered to test
these hypotheses. 863 young adults (251 male) aged between 18 and 25 years (M =
19.5, SD = 1.87) completed the survey. Participants were primarily recruited from an
undergraduate course in psychology, with some drawn from the broader community in
New South Wales, Australia. Around one third of Australians in this age group attend a
higher education institution (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008), and many of the
papers within schizotypy research have utilised student populations (Corcoran et al.,
2013; Giesbrecht et al., 2007). As such, this sample is appropriate for this study that
aims to expand our understanding of relationships between variables as identified in
these previous studies using similar samples. Inclusion criteria were open, and
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participants were to be excluded only on the basis of a psychotic or neurological
disorder as indicated by self-report questionnaire (as per other personality research, e.g.,
Ettinger et al., 2005). As no participants indicated any such disorder, none were
removed from the analyses.

7.2.2. Instruments
7.2.2.1. Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991) is a 74-item selfreport scale designed to screen non-psychiatric populations for schizotypy with strong
internal (.90 - .91) and test-retest (.82) reliability. The SPQ has three dimensions
measuring cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal, and disorganised aspects of schizotypy.
Participants are asked to provide a yes/no response to questions such as, “Do you often
feel nervous when you are in a group of unfamiliar people?” Responses are summed to
determine subscale scores, and an overall score is determined by summing endorsed
items, for a maximum score of 74. Although the multiple dimensions of schizotypy
mean it is a heterogeneous construct, all dimensions are closely associated with each
other (Raine et al., 1994) such that possession of one feature (e.g., unusual cognitiveperceptual experiences) increases the likelihood of possessing the other features. As
such, total SPQ score provides a reflection of the extent to which one exhibits a
schizotypal personality structure.
Whilst there are several schizotypy measures in existence, the SPQ has been
selected for the current study as it is one of the broadest in scope. It captures both
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attenuated psychotic symptoms such as ideas of reference, and personality-based
features of schizotypy such as social anxiety and odd behaviour, and as such is useful
for both clinical and non-clinical populations (Raine, 1991). As a measure of
schizotypy, it is thought to be representative of the psychosis continuum, and its normal
distribution (Johns & van Os, 2001) means that individuals with higher SPQ scores can
usefully be considered to be higher along the psychosis continuum. It has been widely
used as such in a variety of previous studies (e.g., Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015; Koychev
et al., 2012; Noguchi, Hori, & Kunugi, 2008).

7.2.2.2. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) is a 25-item
self-report inventory of errors in cognition experienced in the course of everyday life.
The CFQ asks participants to indicate the perceived frequency with which they have
experienced a list of common failures of memory, perception, and action over the past
six months; for example, “Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are
doing something else?” The response format is a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = Never,
and 4 = Very Often). Possible scores range from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicative
of a greater propensity towards experiencing failures during daily life. Cronbach's alpha
for the CFQ in the initial study was found to be .89 (Broadbent et al., 1982).
It is important to note that the factor structure of the CFQ has been a source of
ongoing debate within the literature, with authors arguing alternatively for a
unidimensional (e.g., Wallace, 2004; Larson et al., 1997) or multidimensional (e.g.,
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Wilhelm et al., 2010) approach. The primary focus of this study was total CFQ score,
however the subscales associated with Wallace et al.’s (2002) widely used four-factor
model were also analysed. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; S. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)
comprise three subscales that measure negative affectivity. The measure allows for
differentiation between symptoms of depression and anxiety, as well as capturing more
general tension and coping via the stress subscale. Participants are asked to what extent
each statement applied to them over the week using a 4 point Likert-type scale (0 = Did
not apply to me at all, and 3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time). The
DASS has good internal consistency as indexed by Cronbach’s alpha in both clinical
samples, α = .88 - .96 (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997) and non-clinical
samples, α = .81- .91 (P. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). As depression, anxiety, and
stress all tend to predict increased cognitive failures, we chose to utilize the DASS-21
total score (maximum = 63) instead of the subscales. This total score has previously
been used as a reliable measure of negative affect/general psychological distress (Henry
& Crawford, 2005).

7.2.3. Procedure
The study was approved by the institution’s human research ethics committee.
Participants were invited to complete the study via the undergraduate research
participation scheme website, flyers, emails, and word of mouth. A website address was
provided to interested individuals, where participants provided informed consent before
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completion of the questionnaires. Student participants were offered a small amount of
course credit for their participation (i.e., 0.5 of 3 credits required for the semester,
representing half an hour of survey completion).

7.2.4. Data analysis
Key variables in the analyses were the three SPQ dimensions as well as total
SPQ score as a measure of overall schizotypy, negative affect as indicated by total
DASS score, and cognitive failures as per total CFQ score. Correlations were examined
first. To test the prediction that negative affect mediates the relationship between
schizotypy and cognitive failures, hierarchical regression analyses of total effect (c),
direct effect (c’), and bootstrapped bias corrected 95% confidence intervals of the
indirect effect (ab) were computed using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012) in SPSS
with 5000 bootstrapped samples as per Hayes (Hayes, 2013). Continuous variables were
not mean-centred as this provides no additional benefit in terms of reducing
multicollinearity (Hayes, 2013), and in this preliminary research we were simply
interested in the presence or absence of a mediation/moderation relationship.

7.3. Results
Sample descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations are presented in Table 7.1.
Schizotypy, negative affect, and cognitive failures were all moderately positively
correlated with each other. As would be expected, the SPQ dimensions were all strongly
correlated with SPQ total score. Pearson’s correlations for the four dimensions of the
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CFQ and the remaining SPQ and affective variables were also calculated (see Appendix
C). As these were all highly correlated with each other and were associated with other
variables in a similar fashion to total CFQ, these were not examined in further
moderation and mediation analyses.
Sex differences were apparent for negative affect (t(861) = -.269, p = .007) and
cognitive failures (t(861) = - 6.41, p <.001), with females reporting both greater
negative affect (M = 16.22, SD = 11.77; versus M = 13.90, SD = 10.66 for males) and
more frequent cognitive failures (M = 49.06, SD = 15.59; versus M = 41.69, SD = 14.67
for males). There were no sex differences for overall schizotypy, (t(436.50) = -1.42, p =
.16), however of the SPQ dimensions females reported more cognitive-perceptual
disturbances (females M = 9.96, SD = 7.04; males M = 8.59, SD = 7.06; t(1012) = -3.07,
p = .002). Based on these findings, an analysis was carried out to determine whether sex
moderates the association between negative affect and cognitive failures. No
moderation effect was evident, and as such, sex was excluded from the main analyses.
It is possible that there is some overlap between the CFQ and dimensions of the
SPQ such as disorganised thinking. Specifically, the subscale of odd speech contains
items reflecting cognitive failures, such as “I sometimes forget what I am trying to say.”
We conducted a correlation analysis to examine whether other SPQ subscales also
related to the CFQ, including total SPQ score minus the odd speech subscale. This
supported that the SPQ is associated with increased cognitive failures separate to
overlapping items. See Appendix D, Table D.1 for the correlations.
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Table 7.1
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables
Variable

Mean S.D.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

1. Schizotypy total

23.43 14.51

-

2. Cog-perceptual

9.56

7.07

.88**

-

3. Interpersonal

8.43

6.06

.83**

.52**

-

4. Disorganisation

5.44

4.10

.81**

.61**

.55**

-

5. Negative affect

15.54 11.50

.51**

.45**

.44**

.36**

-

6. Cog failures

46.92 15.68

.50**

.42**

.39**

.47**

.45**

6.

-

Note: ** p < .01

Negative affect did not moderate the relationship between schizotypy and
cognitive failures (using PROCESS model 1, basic moderation) for total schizotypy (p =
.82), nor any of the subscales of the SPQ.
However, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, negative affect did partially mediate the
relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures (using PROCESS model 4, basic
mediation). A partial mediation is used to refer to a situation where the path between the
independent and dependent variables is reduced in size by the introduction of a mediator
variable, but does still not equal zero (Hayes, 2013). This means that negative affect did
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not fully account for the mechanism through which schizotypy leads to increased
failures, but that it does contribute to this mechanism. The pattern of results held with
coefficients differing only slightly between SPQ dimensions and effect sizes equivalent,
hence only the analysis of total schizotypy scores is presented here. As can be seen in
Figure 7.1, a bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab =
.15) did not cross zero (.110 to .195), supporting a significant partial mediating effect.
There was therefore an indirect effect of schizotypy on cognitive failures through
negative affect (κ2 = .14, 95% CI [.10, .17]), and although there is ongoing debate in the
literature as to how to interpret the size of this effect, it can be considered as being of
medium size (Preacher & Kelley, 2011). The direct effect between schizotypy and
cognitive failures remained significant even after the inclusion of negative affect in the
model.
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Note: ** p<.001
Figure 7.1. Mediation of schizotypy and cognitive failures by negative affect.

7.4. Discussion
In this study, a large sample of healthy young people was utilised to examine the
role of negative affect in high schizotypes’ experience of cognitive failures in everyday
life. Moderation and mediation analyses were performed to determine whether negative
affect needs to be present in addition to high schizotypy to result in cognitive failures
(moderation), or alternatively, whether the negative affectivity characteristic of
schizotypy actually accounts for this relationship (mediation).
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7.4.1. Key findings
Total mean schizotypy within this sample (23.43 out of 74) was comparable to
the levels seen in other young adult cohorts (e.g., 26.6, Raine, 1991: 19.6, Langdon &
Coltheart, 2004). In line with the past literature, cognitive failures, negative affect, and
schizotypy were all positively related to each other. As expected, negative affect
partially mediated the relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures,
supporting that negative affect contributes to the mechanism through which individuals
who express schizotypal traits experience increased cognitive failures during everyday
life. However, it is important to note that this was only a partial mediation, therefore
negative affect does not solely account for cognitive failures in schizotypy – variance in
the path between schizotypy and cognitive failures therefore reflects other factors, as
well. This suggests that other aspects of schizotypy also shape increased cognitive
failures in high schizotypes, and there are a range of features of schizotypy which may
be relevant. For example, high schizotypes’ unusual perceptual experiences might result
in errors of misinterpretation or division of attentional capacity (which may be already
compromised), whilst suspiciousness could cause cognitive failures via increased
cognitive load. The current finding that all three subscales of the SPQ demonstrate the
same pattern of negative affect partially mediating between schizotypy and cognitive
failures does not enable any speculation of which of these may be most relevant.
Nevertheless, whatever the key factors might be, cognitive failures cannot be said to be
purely a consequence of emotion. This suggests that schizotypy and cognitive failures
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have a distinct relationship with each other which is not purely reflective of the impact
of negative affect.
The lack of support for a moderating effect of negative affect suggests
schizotypy and negative affect do not interact to predict cognitive failures. This is at
odds with the moderation hypothesis that affective reactivity in high schizotypes leads
to exaggerated cognitive failures only when faced with negative affect. These findings
run counter to research concerning neuropsychological performance, where it is
proposed high schizotypes exhibit deficits only when faced with the additional load of
stress (Smith & Lenzenweger, 2010). This discrepancy with existing
neuropsychological findings perhaps supports the idea that there are differing
mechanisms of challenge behind objective versus subjective cognition. Overall, the lack
of a moderating effect is consistent with the finding that affect acts (instead) as a partial
mediator in this relationship. Negative affectivity is an inherent characteristic of
schizotypal personality structures which, alongside other characteristics, shapes
cognitive failures but does not necessarily need to be active (i.e., as evidenced by
current negative affective states) in order for failures to occur in those scoring highly on
schizotypy.

7.4.2. Limitations
There are some limitations to be considered in the current study, most of which
relate to the CFQ. First, there is ongoing debate in the literature concerning whether
cognition can be validly measured via self-report. Given the lack of correlation with
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neuropsychological outcomes, some researchers argue that measures such as the CFQ
may be distorted by respondents’ poor self-awareness (Chan et al., 2011; Wilhelm et al.,
2010). As the CFQ does, however, relate to reports made by significant others
(Broadbent et al., 1982; Carrigan & Barkus, submitted; Mahoney et al., 1998) and
outcomes such as being the at-fault driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991),
we argue that it does show validity as a measure of real life cognitive capacity;
providing separate and useful information to that captured by neuropsychological
assessments of ability.
Another possible limitation of this study was its use of the DASS to tap negative
affect. Factor analyses support the total score as a measure of general psychological
distress (Henry & Crawford, 2005), which is also a feature of schizotypy (Horan, et al.,
2008). However, the negative affect and distress captured by the DASS is specific to
stress, anxiety, and depression. Further, it may be more transient than trait-like, given
the wording of the questionnaire (e.g., “Over the past week: I found it hard to wind
down”). Future studies utilising different measurement tools will uncover whether
differential patterns emerge. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) is one tool which can be used to tap trait affect, and
may serve to tap a broader range of negative affect states. Extending further, a measure
directly focused on emotional reactivity, such as the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation
Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) may be used to look more specifically at the
impact of reactivity on cognition in schizotypy.
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An additional limitation of this paper was its use of a predominantly student
participant pool. Whilst the current paper was interested in young adults, a large
proportion of which are studying at university, future research would ideally incorporate
samples from the broader student population (i.e., beyond primarily psychology), and
more importantly to the rest of the community. As such, despite the large sample size,
caution must be taken when attempting to generalise the current findings to a broader
population.

7.4.3. Implications and directions for future research
The finding that schizotypy and negative affect overlap, although not
completely, in their associations with increased problems with cognition in everyday
life in young adults has implications for how we conceptualise cognitive failures. A
mixture of trait (i.e., schizotypy) and state (i.e., affect) factors both seem be important in
shaping individuals’ experiences of cognition (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b), and thus
both need to be considered in research concerning cognitive failures. This is perhaps the
defining feature characterising the study of everyday failures as distinct from more
traditional research focusing on cognitive ability (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Research
seeking to make further sense of the gap between self-reported and objective cognition
in schizotypy, for example by examining whether the introduction of emotional stimuli
reduces performance in the lab as in the “real world,” is required.
As the significance of state factors in everyday cognitive failures is becoming
apparent, future studies would also ideally aim to improve the ecological validity of
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measures of cognitive failures. One way to achieve this would be by incorporating
further measures of environmental factors which may influence the relationship, such as
daily life stressors. However, a more effective means of improving cognitive failures
research may be to capture them in vivo, via experience sampling approaches. This
would facilitate more accurate reporting, as well as allowing for the capture of
additional relevant state factors which may interact with trait vulnerability, such as
recent stressors or substance use. One of very few existing experience sampling study
of cognitive failures captured stressor reactions on a daily basis over the course of two
weeks, and found that stressor occurrence coincided with cognitive failures in more
reactive individuals (Palder, Ode, Liu, & Robinson, 2013). However, this study still
allowed only for examination of daily correlations. Ideally, future research would assess
multiple epochs each day to explore how affect at one time point predicts cognition in
the next. Such research may also tell us more about a possible cyclical relationship
between stress and cognitive failures, and whether this plays a role in potentiating
upward movement along the psychosis continuum.
The close link between schizotypy and failures also lends support to previous
assertions that cognitive failures may represent an indicator of psychosis risk (Laws et
al., 2008), at least in this young adult age group. Whilst this study examined cognitive
failures in healthy subclinical schizotypes, further research examining whether the
mediating effect of negative affect holds for ARMS and patient groups are necessary to
support cognitive failures as an early-emerging marker, and one which is partially
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shaped by affectivity. In addition, such studies could build on the basic model explored
here to help identify other key contributors to cognitive failures in schizotypy (e.g.,
social deficits, paranoia, perceptual aberrations), which may then serve as targets for
early intervention for young adults at-risk of developing first episode psychosis.
Looking even further ahead, the experience sampling methodology described above
may assist in identifying environmental factors that increase the likelihood of cognitive
failures, and subsequently transition to psychosis, for ARMS groups.
Importantly, the finding that problematic slips and errors in the flow of daily life in
schizotypy are not entirely dependent on affect highlights that, whilst likely playing an
important role, simply reducing psychological distress will not be a sufficient treatment
for reducing cognitive failures for at-risk individuals. Rather, strategies aiming to
ameliorate cognitive concerns will need to simultaneously target other as yet unknown
contributing features. For example, a suite of cognitive therapy techniques might
address multiple issues: distress management skills to cope with negative affect;
mindfulness techniques to disengage from suspicious cognitions and re-direct attention
to the task at hand; social skills training to reduce anxiety in situations of perceived
social pressure. The current findings support that improving mood is vital, but will need
to be combined with cognitive remediation and other psychological strategies aimed at
reducing the occurrence of cognitive failures.
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7.4.4. Conclusions
In summary, both schizotypy and negative affect are important in shaping the
likelihood of experiencing everyday cognitive failures, however negative affect does not
need to be present in those scoring highly on schizotypy for cognitive failures to occur.
Whilst affect does play a role in the mechanism by which high schizotypy and increased
cognitive failures are related, it cannot fully account for this relationship. Other
pertinent facets of schizotypy or coinciding with this personality constellation need to
be identified. This research highlights the need to focus on improving our understanding
of the role of emotion in real world vs. lab-based cognition, as well as increasing the
ecological validity in the study of cognition in order to better understand the role of both
inter- and intra-individual factors in real life functioning. This has the potential to
improve identification of, and targeted interventions for, young people prone to
psychosis.
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8. Do complaints of everyday cognitive failures in high schizotypy relate to
emotional working memory deficits in the lab?

This chapter is based on a paper published in Comprehensive Psychiatry.

Carrigan, N., Barkus, E., Ong, A. & Wei, M. (2017). Do complaints of everyday
cognitive failures in high schizotypy relate to emotional working memory deficits in the
lab? Comprehensive Psychiatry, 78. 115-129. doi: 10.1016/j.comppsych.2017.06.016
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8.1. Introduction
8.1.1. Schizotypy and cognition
Schizotypy refers to a set of personality traits and attenuated symptoms of
psychosis thought to reflect increased risk for developing a psychotic disorder
(Claridge, 1997; Meehl, 1990). Features include perceptual aberrations (e.g., unusual
spiritual experiences), interpersonal problems (e.g., lack of close friends), and
disorganised thinking (e.g., odd beliefs). All healthy individuals possess trait schizotypy
to some degree; it is normally distributed throughout the general population and is
thought to represent a continuum of risk for psychosis (Johns & van Os, 2001). At the
extreme end of this continuum are people with schizophrenia and related psychotic
disorders, whilst in the subclinical range are healthy individuals high on schizotypy.
The majority of subclinical “high schizotypes” will never seek help in their lifetimes
(Kaymaz et al., 2012), and in fact many report relishing some of their unusual
experiences and characteristics (Brod, 1997; McCreery & Claridge, 2002). This group is
important for the potential for revealing early risk, as well as protective factors for
psychosis.
One potential risk factor for psychosis is reduced cognitive functioning (Cornblatt,
2002; Cornblatt et al., 2003). A profile of cognitive deficits in those with schizophrenia
is documented across multiple domains including attention, working memory, and
executive function (Fioravanti, Carlone, Vitale, Cinti, & Clare, 2005). A cognitive
model of schizophrenia posits such deficits are at the core of perceptual aberrations and
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other psychotic symptomatology (Rapoport, Giedd, & Gogtay, 2012), and are central to
risk for psychosis. There have also been a range of studies identifying attenuated or
mild impairments in the same domains in healthy high schizotypes (e.g., Gooding,
Kwapil, & Tallent, 1999; Lenzenweger, Cornblatt, & Putnick, 1991). High schizotypes
are therefore an intermediary group between individuals with schizophrenia and those in
the general population with average schizotypy scores who have efficient cognitive
functioning. However, several studies have failed to identify cognitive impairments in
high schizotypes relative to controls (e.g., Daly, Afroz, & Walder, 2012; Noguchi, Hori,
& Kunugi, 2008). As such, a characteristic neuropsychological profile has not yet been
clarified for schizotypy, although working memory characteristics will be explored in
further detail below. There is some evidence that sufficient load needs to be present
before high schizotypes exhibit cognitive deficits compared to average schizotypes
(e.g., Braunstein-Bercovitz, Hen, & Lubow, 2004; Koychev et al., 2016). This increased
load could be referring to the cognitive demands of the task or the nature of the stimuli
being presented, such as emotional valence.
Despite the inconsistency in reports of laboratory-based, objectively measured
cognition, individuals high in schizotypy do consistently self-report increased levels of
cognitive failures (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017; Corcoran et al., 2013; Giesbrecht et al.,
2007; Pfeifer et al., 2009). Cognitive failures are subtle and relatively common slips in
memory, attention, and action that occur during the course of daily activities (Broadbent
et al., 1982). Examples include forgetting an appointment or inexplicably using a
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familiar word incorrectly. Importantly, cognitive failures are errors that arise whilst
carrying out tasks in which one is usually competent: they do not reflect any underlying
deficit of ability, but rather a break in routine action and are therefore about the capacity
to think sequentially within a given context. Nevertheless, there has been much research
exploring how self-reported cognitive failures relate to underlying neurocognitive
ability. The majority of research has focused on the link between failures and
objectively-assessed attentional control, with some (e.g., Berggren et al., 2011; Tipper
& Baylis, 1987), but not all (e.g., Broadbent et al., 1982; Forster & Lavie, 2007)
researchers finding a significant relationship. Working memory has also been an area of
interest (Ishigami & Klein, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009; Unsworth, 2015), with
findings of an association with cognitive failures mixed. It is therefore possible that
cognitive failures account for some of the differences in cognitive performance between
controls and those high on schizotypy. Indeed, controlling for these subjective
inefficiencies may begin to account for some of the inconsistent findings in this area.
There are two possible explanations for the “gap” between objective cognitive
performance and subjective cognitive failures in schizotypy. The first is that high
schizotypes potentially have poor self-awareness, inferred from schizophrenia patients’
poor cognitive insight (David, Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012). There is ongoing
debate concerning whether cognitive failures in the absence of objective impairment in
schizotypy reflects an awareness of subtle cognitive deficits not yet detectable via
objective tasks; or, whether they simply reflect poor self-awareness (Chan et al., 2011;
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Laws, Patel, & Tyson, 2008). This mirrors a broader debate in the cognitive failures
literature where an association between neuroticism and failures is thought to suggest
failures measure complaints about cognition, rather than actual problems with
functioning (Wilhelm et al., 2010). However, several findings refute this “complaint
hypothesis.” Observer ratings correlate moderately with self-reported cognitive failures
(Broadbent et al., 1982; Carrigan & Barkus, submitted; Mahoney, Dalby, & King,
1998), and importantly, high neuroticism and poor self-awareness do not reduce the
extent to which self and observer ratings of failures correlate (Carrigan & Barkus,
2017). In addition, self-reported cognitive failures are associated with real world
outcomes such as likelihood of being the at-fault driver in an accident (Larson &
Merritt, 1991), suggesting they tap into aspects of cognition relevant to everyday
performance.
Collectively, these findings seem to support a second explanation of the objectivesubjective “gap” in cognition: self-reported failures have utility as a measure of realworld functioning, reflecting vulnerability for problems with cognitive functioning that
are different to those usually assessed in the lab. So, this leads to another question: what
is this difference between lab assessed and real world cognitive functioning? Affect
appears to be a key factor in cognitive failures (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Subclinical
and clinical depression, anxiety, and stress are all closely associated with cognitive
failures (e.g., Mahoney et al., 1998; Merckelbach et al., 1996; Sullivan & Payne, 2007).
It may be that alongside cognitive capacity, cognitive failures additionally capture the
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effects of emotion regulation on cognition. In relation to schizotypy, there is evidence
concerning how emotion could interact with cognition to produce normal lab assessed
cognition but higher rates of cognitive failures. High schizotypy and schizophrenia are
both closely associated with negative affect (Horan et al., 2008). In addition, high
schizotypy is linked to heightened physiological, emotional, and behavioural reactions
in response to emotional experiences (Collip et al., 2013). Given the increased
likelihood of encountering salient or stressful situations in everyday life relative to the
lab research environment, perhaps high schizotypes experience problems with cognition
only in real world settings. Cognitive failures in daily life may reflect schizotypes’
emotional reactions interfering with cognition; hence the failure of traditional objective
cognitive tasks to identify difficulties. Providing preliminary support for this
hypothesis, negative affect partially mediates the relationship between schizotypy and
cognitive failures (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017). It seems plausible that cognitive failures
reflect issues with emotion regulation alongside other cognitive processes, and that the
affective characteristics of schizotypy contribute to slips during everyday cognition.

8.1.2. Emotional working memory in schizotypy
As previously mentioned, impairment in working memory appears to have some
relationship with both increased cognitive failures (Ishigami & Klein, 2009; McVay &
Kane, 2009; Unsworth, 2015) and elevated schizotypy (Tallent & Gooding, 1999).
Effect sizes for working memory deficits in schizophrenia are large (Forbes, Carrick,
McIntosh, & Lawrie, 2009; Lee & Park, 2005), and are associated with disturbances in
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the activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex already evident in first-episode,
medication-naïve patients (Barch et al., 2001; van Veelen, Vink, Ramsey, & Kahn,
2010). Given that working memory deficits are detectable in relatives of patients (Snitz,
Macdonald, & Carter, 2006), high schizotypes (Kerns & Becker, 2008a; Koychev et al.,
2012; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009a) and first episode patients, this suggests
working memory problems are part of the pathogenesis of the disorder. However, high
schizotypes do not share the same profile as patients with schizophrenia in their reduced
cognitive performance since in other areas of cognition findings have been mixed, with
some authors finding no differences between the performance of high schizotypes and
controls (e.g., Lenzenweger & Gold, 2000). A recent meta-analysis supported that
healthy high schizotypes generally exhibit working memory impairment at a level
attenuated to that seen in schizophrenia (Siddi, Petretto, & Preti, 2017).
Emotion processing is another area of apparent cognitive dysfunction in
schizotypy which mirrors schizophrenia. Problems are evident with perception of
emotion and heightened emotional reactivity, mentioned earlier (Phillips & Seidman,
2008). High schizotypes exhibit alexithymia, poor perception and expression of speech
prosody, and reduced facial emotion recognition (Giakoumaki, 2012). If the emotion
processing and regulation difficulties experienced by schizotypes are reflected in their
cognitive failures as we have suggested, there is a need to understand how emotional
processing difficulties may also be reflected in their objective working memory
performance. Indeed this could begin to help to explain why high schizotypes
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consistently report cognitive failures, given that affect is interlinked with cognitive
performance in an everyday setting much of the time.
As yet, very few studies of working memory in schizotypy have incorporated
emotion, however the existing literature will be briefly reviewed. In the general
population, the inclusion of emotional content has mixed effects on objective working
memory performance. Some studies have noted an enhancing effect of emotional
stimuli (Lindström & Bohlin, 2011), whilst in others emotional stimuli reduced
performance relative to neutral stimuli (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Mather et al.,
2006). Although studies are limited, schizotypy appears to be related to consistently
poorer performance in response to the presence of emotional stimuli. The positive and
disorganised dimensions of schizotypy are associated with poorer performance on tasks
such as the Stroop and n-back working memory tasks when faced with emotional versus
neutral stimuli (Kerns & Becker, 2008a; Mohanty et al., 2008). Most studies have
focused on the impact of stimuli of negative valence, and in some tasks only the most
threatening stimuli (i.e., angry voices) have induced poor performance (Papousek et al.,
2014). However, when using emotional film clips as a distractor alongside neutral
stimuli in a backward digit span task, films of both negative and positive valence
resulted in lowered performance in high schizotypy (Karcher & Shean, 2012). This
suggests emotional arousal per se rather than the valence itself is confounding to high
schizotypes’ cognitive capacities. Overall, the literature suggests that working memory
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deficits for emotional stimuli in schizotypy may reflect an underlying deficit in
emotional processing, leading to heightened reactivity to emotional events and stimuli.

8.1.3. Current study
There is a need to explore the relationship between emotion and cognition in
schizotypy, and to consider whether emotion disrupts cognition in the lab as it appears
to in the real world. High versus low schizotypes’ self-reported cognitive failures will
therefore be compared within the current study, and the impact of emotional stimuli on
performance in an objective affective working memory task. It is anticipated that this
research will make several contributions. Firstly, this will further our understanding of
how cognitive ability (measured in the lab) translates into cognitive capacity (as it is
enacted in real life). Traditional approaches to studying cognition have focused almost
solely on maximum ability as demonstrated in idealised settings, to the detriment of our
understanding of cognition as it occurs in the milieu of everyday life. By introducing
more emotive elements into the lab, it may be possible to identify ways in which the
ecological validity of lab-based tasks in general may be enhanced. The second
important reason for this research is to continue the ongoing work of pinpointing
cognitive indicators or markers of risk for psychosis. Identifying specific profiles of
cognition in schizotypy – for example, a relative deficit of emotional working memory
– would help to identify those at highest risk, and would also provide further direction
for early intervention.
The key questions to be answered in the current study will be:
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1) Do high schizotypes exhibit i.e., poorer working memory performance in
response to emotional versus neutral stimuli?
2) If so, which type of emotional stimuli has the biggest impact, and how does
emotion interact with different levels of task difficulty?
A secondary aim of this study will be to explore the relationship between self-reported
cognitive failures and objective working memory performance outcomes.
It is difficult to formulate clear hypotheses regarding these aims due to the
dearth of existing studies. However, it is hypothesized that high schizotypy will be
associated with increased vulnerability for cognitive failures. It is thought that
presentation of emotional stimuli will have a greater detrimental effect on high
schizotypes’ affective working memory performance than neutral stimuli, and that low
schizotypes will have a less exaggerated response to emotional stimuli. Stimuli of both
negative and positive valence will be utilised, but it is not yet clear whether positive
stimuli will impact working memory in the same way as negative stimuli. Cognitive
failures will be included in the analyses as a covariate for the group differences in
affective working memory performance for high vs. low schizotypes. This will
determine whether vulnerability to failures accounts for any patterns evident in
objective cognition.
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8.2. Methods
8.2.1. Participants
There were 129 participants recruited from an undergraduate student course and
the general community. There were 34 males, with mean age 21.87 (min = 18, max =
50, SD = 5.25). Inclusion criteria were open, with participants excluded only on the
basis of having a psychotic or neurological disorder by self-report questionnaire (as per
other personality research, e.g., Ettinger et al., 2005). No participants were excluded on
this basis, however two were not included as they were unable to understand the n-back
working memory task. This left the final participant sample as 127.

8.2.2. Instruments
8.2.2.1. Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991) is a 74-item selfreport scale designed to screen community populations for schizotypy with strong
internal (.90 - .91) and test-retest (.82) reliability (Raine, 1991). Participants are asked to
provide a yes/no response to questions such as, “Do you often feel nervous when you
are in a group of unfamiliar people?” The current study utilised total SPQ score as an
indication of overall level of schizotypy within individuals in a healthy sample, so that
comparisons could be made between those higher vs. lower in trait schizotypy.
Although schizotypy is not a homogeneous construct, all dimensions are closely
associated with each other (Raine et al., 1994) such that possession of one increases the
likelihood of possessing the other features. As such, total SPQ score provides a
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reflection of the extent to which one exhibits a schizotypal personality structure. This
overall score is determined by summing endorsed items, for a maximum score of 74.
In the existing schizotypy literature, there are two key approaches to analysis:
group (e.g., Henry et al., 2009; Koychev et al., 2011) and continuous (Mohanty et al.,
2008). Although schizotypy is conceptualised as a continuum, it is still useful to
conduct group analyses comparing “high” with “low” subclinical schizotypes. This
approach enables exploration of whether variables behave in the same way for
individuals at both the upper and lower ends of the spectrum. Although a continuous
approach was also possible, the purpose of the current study was to examine whether
level of schizotypy determines differential affective working memory functioning;
hence we decided to take a group approach. Clinical cut-offs for the SPQ are not
available, therefore individuals were allocated to the high or low schizotypy on the basis
of being 0.5 SD above or below the mean.

8.2.2.2. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) is a selfreport inventory of slips in cognition experienced in everyday life. The CFQ asks
participants to indicate the perceived frequency with which they have experienced a list
of 25 common failures of memory, perception, and action over the past six months; for
example, “Do you find you confuse right and left when giving directions?” The
response format is a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = Never, and 4 = Very Often). Possible
scores range from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicative of a greater propensity
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towards experiencing failures during daily life. Cronbach's alpha for the CFQ in the
initial study was .89 (Broadbent et al., 1982).
There is ongoing debate regarding the factor structure of the CFQ. Some authors
argue strongly for a multidimensional approach to the CFQ, with large samples
producing evidence of up to seven factors (Wilhelm et al., 2010). Nevertheless, several
other authors have argued that the small number of items and consistent evidence of a
large general factor support the use of the total CFQ score to examine the frequency of
failures overall (Larson et al., 1997; Wallace, 2004). It was decided that the CFQ total
score alone would be analysed to enable a study of emotion, schizotypy, and general
problems with day-to-day cognition.

8.2.2.3. National Adult Reading Test
The National Adult Reading Test (NART; Neslon & O’Connell, 1991) was used
to assess verbal intelligence. Participants are required to read aloud a standardized list of
50 irregularly spelt words (e.g., “chord”), and are scored on the number of correctly
pronounced words. In keeping with the original use of this test, the discontinuation rule
was not used.

8.2.2.4. Verbal fluency task
A verbal fluency (VF) task assessed verbal ability, executive control, and speed
of information processing. Participants are asked to verbally produce as many words as
possible during a series of one minute periods, and an examiner records these responses.
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The current study included a letter/phonological VF task requiring participants to list
words beginning with a letter (F, A, and S), and a category/semantic VF task requiring
production of words beginning to a certain category (vegetables and animals). In a third
category switching task, participants were instructed to alternate between two categories
(fruit and furniture). Participants are scored on the number of appropriate words
produced for each of the letter, category, and category switching tasks, and the number
of correct alternations between categories in the category switching task.
NART and the VF outcomes were used to examine basic cognitive performance
separate to the key domain of interest, working memory.

8.2.2.5. Emotional n-back working memory task
Participants completed a computerised visual affective n-back working memory
task developed and presented using Paradigm Stimulus Presentation software
(Perception Research Systems, 2007). Participants were asked to monitor a series of
images and to respond when the current stimulus is the same as the one presented n
trials ago. Trials included images with neutral, happy, fearful, or sad. These images
were drawn from International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 2008).
Twelve images were selected for each emotion; the IAPS numbers of these are
listed in Appendix E. We categorised images into the neutral, happy, fearful, or sad
groups based on a combination of valence and arousal ratings as per the norms currently
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recorded in IAPS, both of which are on scales from 1 (negative valence/low arousal) to
10 (positive valence/high arousal). Neutral stimuli selected from IAPS had average
valence and arousal ratings (M = 5.32, SD = 1.29; M = 3.56, SD = 2.05); happy stimuli
higher valence rating and only slightly higher arousal than neutral (M = 7.52, SD =
1.56; M = 5.37, SD = 2.27). Sad and fearful were both of a lower valence (M = 2.53, SD
= 1.58 and M = 2.43, SD = 1.61, respectively), however fearful had a higher arousal
rating (M = 6.21, SD = 2.20) than sad stimuli (M = 4.91, SD = 2.18). ANOVAs revealed
that there were significant differences between the emotions for valence, F(3, 44) =
1276.15, p < .001. Post hoc Tukey analyses revealed that all emotions differed on
valence (p < .001) apart from fearful and sad stimuli. Arousal also differed significantly
by emotion, F(3, 44) = 34.42, p < .001. Neutral had a significantly lower arousal rating
than all other emotions (p < .001) and happy was also significantly lower than fearful (p
< .02), however sad and happy did not differ on valence, (p = .32).
There were four levels of difficulty presented within this task: 0-back, 1-back, 2back, and 3-back. Examples of image sequences are depicted in Figure 8.1. Instructions
were displayed at the start of each block to alert the participant to the rule they needed
to adhere to (i.e., which level of n-back). They were not informed of the emotional
valence of stimuli. In the 0-back blocks, participants were shown one image on the
instruction slide which identified the target, and they were required to key press
whenever the target image was displayed. For each of the 1, 2, and 3-back blocks,
participants were instructed to respond with a key press if an image being displayed on
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the screen was the same as the image displayed either 1, 2, or 3 images ago. Thus, the nback task assesses working memory by requiring participants to continually update
information held in mind. Stimuli were presented for 1000 millisecond (during which
participants could respond at any time) with a 300 millisecond gap between each
stimulus. The same 48 images were used throughout the task to ensure responses were
not based purely on image familiarity. Blocks were randomised across the whole
presentation.
Each block contained images from only one emotional valence group. There
were three versions of each emotion at each level of difficulty. For example, there were
three each of neutral, positive, fearful, and sad 1-back blocks. In this way, we sought to
explore how response accuracy and reaction times differed for emotional stimuli and
difficulty, and how these interacted.
Lures were not included in blocks of trials – for example, there were no 1-back
“lure” trials presented within a 3-black block. This is in keeping with a number of
studies which have used the task of image updating to assess working memory in
schizotypy (e.g., Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009; Koychev et al., 2016). Concerns
have been raised as to the validity of the n-back task without lures as a measure of
working memory. False alarms are increased when lures are introduced, suggesting that
the original n-back task assesses recognition rather than memory (Kane, Conway, Miura
& Colflesh, 2007). However, two aspects of the current study were thought to warrant
the use of a lure-free n-back task. The first was the use of a small pool of images as
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stimuli, which were presented repeatedly. Presentation was counterbalanced across
participants, with the order of blocks randomised. This approach was thought to
minimise familiarity effects overall. Secondly, the addition of emotional valence to this
visual n-back task was conceptualised as adding cognitive load to the existing working
memory task of updating stored stimuli. Hence, the addition of lures was deemed
unnecessary to tap working memory processes.
The task took about 25 minutes to complete. Prior to commencing the task,
participants were shown a demonstration and practiced each difficulty level. Pilot
testing indicated that task instructions were clear and understandable for participants,
and that the different levels of task difficulty were impacting performance outcomes as
intended.
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Figure 8.1. Example of image sequence for 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back responses.
Letters are used as examples in place of IAPS images, which are not available for
publication.

8.2.3. Procedure
Participants were recruited from psychology undergraduate students as well as
the general community via posters, emails, and word-of-mouth – the “snowball”
technique (Solowij, Hall & Lee, 1992). Student participants were offered course credit
for participation. Approval was obtained from the institution’s Human Research Ethics
Committee prior to commencement of the study. The sample utilised in this study was a
subset of a larger one described in a previous article (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017a). All
participants who completed online self-report questionnaires utilised in this first study
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were then invited to attend additional assessment; those who did so are included in the
current research. Informed consent was obtained from participants verbally and in
writing for each stage of the study.
In the initial stage of the study, participants completed an online survey which
collected demographic data as well as the questionnaires of interest (CFQ and SPQ).
This survey took approximately 30 minutes to complete. The second stage required
participants to attend a laboratory testing session. In this stage, participants first
completed cognitive screening tests, the NART and verbal fluency task, to ensure that
no participants demonstrating signs of neurological impairment were included in the
study. Participants then completed the computerised affective n-back working memory
task. In total, each testing session took about 40 minutes. The testing session took place
in a quiet environment where there was an absence of emotionally laden materials on
the walls.

8.2.4. Statistical analyses
Independent variables of interest were schizotypy, and task emotion and load (i.e.,
difficulty). Dependent variables explored in the analyses included n-back outcomes of
accuracy (hits and correct rejections). Hits were averaged across trials according to
emotion and difficulty of trial, to give a score out of a maximum possible three (i.e.,
three target stimuli presented per 14 trial block), whilst correct rejections could have a
maximum of 11 (i.e., 11 non-target stimuli presented per 14 trial block), although much
fewer were expected given the use of a non-clinical sample.
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Signal detection measures were also examined to determine whether accuracy
outcomes reflected ability to detect signals. Sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) were
calculated according to formulae presented by Macmillan and Creelman (2004).
Adjustments were made for perfect scores. d' was calculated as z(hits – false alarms),
whilst c was calculated as –-z(hits – false alarms)/2. A higher d’ score indicates a better
ability to discriminate between target and non-targets. A higher c score indicates a more
conservative response bias, such that participants are less willing to respond positively
that a target is present. Lower c scores indicate a more liberal approach to responding.
Trials across all non-neutral emotion groups were collapsed to allow analysis of
the impact of emotional vs. neutral stimuli overall. The aim of this was to address the
overarching hypothesis that schizotypes demonstrate more impairment when faced with
emotive stimuli. 2 x 2 ANOVAs included schizotypy as the between subjects factor,
with emotion (neutral vs. emotional) as the within subjects factor. These examined the
outcomes of hits, correct rejections, sensitivity, and bias.
2 x 3 x 4 ANOVAs were also conducted to look at effects of each type of
emotional stimuli. These were also applied to each of the n-back performance data (hits,
correct rejections, sensitivity, bias). This included one between subjects factor
(schizotypy x 2 levels), and two within subjects factors (cognitive load x 3 levels;
valence x 4 levels). 0-back was not included in the analyses since there were no
differences in performance at this level which was included to capture attentional
difficulties. CFQ scores were included as a covariate to examine the extent to which
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interindividual differences in cognitive failures accounted for differences in objective
performance. This was deemed necessary given that the high and low schizotypy groups
differed in mean CFQ scores (see section 8.3.1, below). Comparison of F, p-value, and
partial eta squared (ηp2 ). Pairwise comparisons were examined for significant main
effects, whilst simple main effects were planned for any significant interactions.
Bonferroni adjustments made for multiple comparisons, and 2-tailed p-values were
considered.
Please note that an alternative analysis of the data collected within this study is
contained in Appendix F. This includes findings pertaining to hits and false alarms (i.e.,
incorrect identifications of non-target stimuli as targets).

8.3. Results
8.3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Participants who contributed to this second phase of the study (i.e., completing
the laboratory tasks in addition to online questionnaires) did not differ on age (t(1084)
= -1.81, p = .71), or SPQ score (t(1084) = 0.28, p = .78). Both groups contained around
27% males. However, they did report slightly higher CFQ scores (t(1084) = 2.06, p =
.04).
The mean SPQ score for the sample was 22.63 (SD = 12.99). Participants were
split into high and low schizotypy groups, with participants within 0.5 standard
deviations either side of the mean (n = 40) excluded from analyses. Mean SPQ for the
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high group was 38.21 (n = 39, SD = 6.49), and for the low group was 9.58 (n = 48, SD =
5.21); the two groups did not differ significantly in age or sex.
The mean CFQ score for the entire sample was 43.46 (SD = 14.66). The two
schizotypy groups differed significantly on mean CFQ (t(85) = 4.92, p < .001), with the
high group reporting correspondingly more cognitive failures (M = 51.10, SD = 14.56)
than the low group (M = 36.25, SD = 13.49). Similar to previous research, for the entire
sample, SPQ and CFQ scores were moderately correlated (r = .48, p < .01). CFQ was
not correlated with either hits or false alarms for the n-back task, at any level of task
difficulty or for any type of emotion.
It is possible that there is some overlap between the CFQ and dimensions of the
SPQ such as disorganised thinking. Specifically, the subscale of odd speech contains
items reflecting cognitive failures, such as “I sometimes forget what I am trying to say.”
We conducted a correlation analysis to examine whether other SPQ subscales also
related to the CFQ, including total SPQ score minus the odd speech subscale. This
supported that the SPQ is associated with increased cognitive failures separate to
overlapping items. See Appendix D, Table D.2 for the correlations.
Performance on the NART and VF tasks were examined for group differences.
Due to researcher error, data on these tasks were not collected for a number of
participants, leaving some data missing at random. Thus, the high schizotypy group was
reduced to n = 34 and the low group n = 39 for these analyses. On the NART, the high
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schizotypy group had a mean score of 21.76 (SD = 6.89) correctly pronounced words
and the low group 23.72 (SD = 5.89); these scores did not differ (t(71) = -1.31, p = .10).
For the VF tasks, group differences were similarly apparent only at the trend level on
the letter task (t(71) = -1.56, p = .06) with the high group producing a mean of 34.62
words (SD = 8.54) and the low group 37.92 words (SD = 9.47). The category task did
produce differences, with the high group producing fewer words (M = 30.71, SD = 5.90)
than the low group (M = 35.05, SD = 7.24; t(70) = -2.77, p < .001). However, for the
category switching task, the number of words produced by high schizotypes (M = 13.44,
SD = 2.67) did not differ to low schizotypes (M = 13.82, SD = 3.11; t(71) = -.56, p =
.29). Additionally, the number of correct category switches in this task did not differ
between high (M = 12.59, SD = 2.68) and low schizotypes (M = 13.05, SD = 3.18; t(71)
= -.67, p = .25). CFQ was not correlated with any of the NART or VF outcomes.
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8.3.2. Emotional vs. neutral stimuli and n-back working memory performance
8.3.2.1. Accuracy
8.3.2.1.1. Hits
There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 85) = 6.89, p = .01, ηp2=
.08) but no main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.62, p = .43, ηp2= .01). There
were also no significant interactions between emotion and schizotypy (F(1, 85) = 3.28,
p = .07, ηp2= .04). Main effects analyses revealed that emotional stimuli were associated
with a lower hit rate (M = 2.60, SE = .03) than neutral stimuli (M = 2.65, SE = .03).

8.3.2.1.2. Correct rejections
Again, there was a significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 85) = 34.88, p <
.001, ηp2= .29) but no main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.53, p = .47, ηp2=
.01). There were also no significant interactions between emotion and schizotypy (F(1,
85) = .02, p = .90, ηp2= < .001). Main effects analyses revealed that emotional stimuli
was associated with a lower correct rejection rate (M = 10.77, SE = .02) than neutral
stimuli (M = 10.84, SE = .02).

8.3.2.2. Sensitivity
8.3.2.2.1. d'- sensitivity
There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 85) = 23.11, p = < .001,
ηp2= .21), and again, no main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.47, p = .50, ηp2=
.01). There were also no significant interactions between emotion and schizotypy (F(1,
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85) = 0.36 p = .55, ηp2= .004). Main effects analyses revealed that neutral stimuli
elicited higher sensitivity (M = 3.50, SE = .07) than emotional stimuli (M = 3.50, SE =
.07).
8.3.2.2.2. c – bias
There was no significant main effect of emotion for bias (F(1, 85) = 3.08, p =
.08, ηp2= .04), nor a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.41, p = .84, ηp2<
.001). There were also no significant interactions between emotion and schizotypy (F(1,
85) = 2.57 p = .11, ηp2= .03). Main effects analyses revealed that neutral stimuli were
associated with a more conservative response bias (M = .49, SE = .03) than emotional
stimuli (M = .46, SE = .02).
In summary, overall emotional stimuli reduce accuracy, with hit rates and
correct rejections decreased relative to neutral stimuli. Similarly, sensitivity was
reduced when faced with emotional vs. neutral stimuli. Interestingly, neutral stimuli
were associated with a more conservative responding style, with participants appearing
to employ a more liberal approach for emotional stimuli. Overall, high schizotypes did
not tend to demonstrate more errors.
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8.3.3. Types of emotion and emotional working memory n-back task performance
8.3.3.1. Accuracy
8.3.3.1.1. Hits
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the
main effect of load (χ2(2) = 14.99, p < .01); this was also evident for the intercept of
load and emotion (χ2(20) = 45.95, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore
applied to relevant data. The CFQ was included as a covariate and was significant (F(1,
84) = 5.33, p = .02, ηp2= .06).
The analysis showed a significant main effect of load (F(1.79, 144.18) = 19.14,
p < .001, ηp2= .19). There was no linear main effect of emotion (F(3, 252) = 2.24, p =
.08, ηp2= .03). However, the within-subjects contrasts suggested a quadratic relationship
was present (F(1, 84) = 6.82, p = .01, ηp2= .08). A quadratic rather than linear
relationship makes sense given emotion groups were not ordered in a sequential
manner, as was possible with load. Contrasts were therefore considered in assessing the
significance of interactions involving emotions; see below. There was also a main effect
of schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 5.02, p = .03, ηp2= .06).
There were no interactions between load and emotion (F(1, 84) = 0.43, p =.51,
ηp2= .01), load and schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.71, p =.46, ηp2= .01), or emotion and
schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.93, p = .17, ηp2= .02). Additionally, no three way interaction
was evident between emotion, load and schizotypy, (F(1, 84) = 0.34, p = .91, ηp2= .004).
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Simple effects analyses indicated that as expected, hits declined as task
difficulty increased – see Figure 8.2 a) below. All loads differed significantly from each
other, p < .001 for all comparisons. For emotion, neutral and sad stimuli did not differ
(p = .66), nor did neutral and fearful (p = .10), nor fearful and happy (p = .09). All other
combinations differed at p < .05, with happy stimuli eliciting the lowest hit rate; see
Figure 8.2 b) High schizotypes had lower estimated mean hit rates (M = 2.48, SE =
0.04) than low schizotypes (M = 2.61, SE = .04; p = .03, 95% CI [.012, .25]).

a)

b)

Figure 8.2. a) Mean hit estimates for different stimuli emotion types and b) levels of nback load.

8.3.3.1.2. Correct rejections
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the
main effect of load (χ2(2) = 15.67, p < .01); this was also evident for the intercept of
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load and emotion (χ2(20) = 85.04, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore
applied to relevant data. Again, the CFQ was included as a covariate but was not
significant for correct rejections (F(1, 84) = 2.13, p = .15, ηp2= .03).
Similar to hits, there was a significant main effect of load (F(1.78, 14.51) =
10.64, p < .001, ηp2= .11), however there was no significant quadratic main effect of
emotion (F(1, 84) = 1.18, p= .28, ηp2= .01) nor a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1,
84) = 2.13, p = .15, ηp2= .03).
With regards to interactions, there was none present between emotion and load
(F(1, 84) = 2.14, p = .15, ηp2= .03), load and schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.73, p = .49, ηp2=
.02), or emotion and schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.31, p = .26, ηp2= .02). There was also no
evidence of a three-way interaction between the three factors (F(1, 84) = 3.36, p = .07,
ηp2= .04).
Simple effects analyses indicated that n-back load impacted performance in the
expected directory, with correct rejections decreasing as load increased, p < .001 for all
comparisons. This data is depicted in Figure 8.3 below.
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Figure 8.3. Mean estimates for correct rejections by level of n-back load.

8.3.3.2. Sensitivity
8.3.3.2.1. d’ – sensitivity
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated for
any of the factors. Again, the CFQ was included as a covariate for sensitivity and was
significant (F(1, 84) = 6.67, p = .01, ηp2= .06).
There was a significant main effect of load (F(2, 168) = 27.05, p < .001, ηp2=
.24), a significant quadratic main effect of emotion (F(1, 84) = 5.67, p= .02, ηp2= .06)
and a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 5.75, p = .02, ηp2= .06).
There were no interactions between emotion and load (F(1, 84) = 1.04, p = .31,
ηp2= .01), load and schizotypy (F(2, 168) = 0.95, p = .39, ηp2= .01), or emotion and
schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 2.17, p = .14, ηp2= .03). There was also no evidence of a threeway interaction between the three factors (F(1, 84) = 1.48, p = .23, ηp2= .02).
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In line with accuracy outcomes, simple effects analyses showed that sensitivity
decreased with load, p < .001 for all comparisons, see Figure 8.4 a). Sensitivity for each
emotion is also depicted in Figure 8.4 b). Fearful stimuli were associated with lower
sensitivity than neutral (p < 01) and sad stimuli (p < .001), but not happy stimuli (p =
1.00). Neutral stimuli were associated with higher sensitivity than happy (p = .01) but
did not differ from sad stimuli (p = 1.00). Participants were more sensitive to sad than
happy stimuli (p < .001). High schizotypes had a lower mean estimated d’ score (M =
2.97, SE = .06) than low schizotypes (M = 3.16, SE = .05; p = .02, 95% CI [.03, .34]),
indicating that high schizotypes had more difficulty discriminating targets from nontargets.

a)

b)

Figure 8.4. a) Mean sensitivity estimates for different stimuli emotion types and b)
levels of n-back load.
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8.3.3.2.2. c – bias
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the
main effect of load (χ2(2) = 14.18, p = .001); this was also evident for the intercept of
load and emotion (χ2(20) = 61.89, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore
applied to relevant data. The CFQ was included as a covariate but was not significant
(F(1, 84) = 2.36, p = .13, ηp2= .03)
There was a significant main effect of load (F(2, 168) = 6.57, p = .003, ηp2= .7),
a significant linear main effect of emotion (F(3, 252) = 2.74, p= .04, ηp2= .03) but no
quadratic effect (F(1, 84) = 3.90, p= .05, ηp2= .04). There was also no main effect of
schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 2.36, p = .13, ηp2= .03).
There were no significant interactions between emotion and load (F(5.46,
418.20) = 1.36, p = .24, ηp2= .02), load and schizotypy (F(2, 84) = 0.78, p = .44, ηp2=
.01), or emotion and schizotypy (F(3, 84) = 0.78, p = .51, ηp2= .01). There was also no
evidence of a three-way interaction between the three factors (F(5.46, 458.30) = 0.28, p
= .94, ηp2= .01).
Simple effects analyses showed that the criterion increased with load as per
Figure 8.5 a), p < .001 for all comparisons, meaning that responding became more
conservative with higher loads. Happy stimuli had the highest criterion which was
significantly larger than all other types of emotion at p = < .001; see Figure 8.5 b). No
other type of emotional stimuli differed significantly.
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Overall, accuracy outcomes suggest high schizotypes are impaired in detecting
signal/target stimuli from noise/non-target stimuli, as evidenced by their decreased hits
rates but no difference in correct rejections. Findings around sensitivity and bias
demonstrate that high schizotypes have poorer sensitivity than low schizotypes
regardless of load/emotion, and overall increasing load impairs sensitivity. In addition,
both happy and fearful stimuli appear to impair sensitivity. Interestingly, participants
were more liberal when faced with higher cognitive loads, and with happy as opposed to
other types of emotion. Also of note is the finding that the CFQ was a significant
covariate for hits and d’ , but not correct rejections or c.

a)

b)

Figure 8.5. a) Mean bias estimates for different stimuli emotion types and b) levels of nback load.

211

8.3.4. Role of cognitive failures in accounting working memory performance
CFQ score did not correlate with overall hit rates (r = .14), correct rejections (r =
.06), sensitivity (r = .16), or bias (r = .10), suggesting that everyday cognitive failures
have little relationship to emotional working memory performance. In order to ascertain
this, changes in F-values for main effects and interactions for the above ANOVAs are
presented in Tables 8.1 (hits and correct rejections) and 8.2 (sensitivity and bias) below.
For both hits and sensitivity, the inclusion of the CFQ as a covariate led to the main
effect of schizotypy group becoming significant. Additionally, inclusion of the CFQ as
covariate led to the emotion x load interaction becoming significant for bias.
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Table 8.1
Changes in F Value for Hits and Correct Rejections According to Addition of Cognitive
Failures as a Covariate
F
p-value ηp2
Hits

CR

Load

117.57

<.001

.58

Load [CFQ]

19.14

<.001

.19

Emotion

17.60

<.001

.17

Emotion [CFQ]

6.82

.01

.08

Schizotypy group

1.63

.11

.02

Schizotypy group [CFQ]

5.02

.01

.06

Load x emotion

2.42

.12

.16

Load x emotion [CFQ]

0.43

.51

.01

Load x schizotypy

0.14

.85

.002

Load x schizotypy [CFQ]

0.74

.47

.01

Emotion x schizotypy

1.97

.16

.02

Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

1.93

.17

.02

Load x emotion x schizotypy

.86

.52

.01

Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

.34

.91

.004

Load

75.49

<.001

.47

Load [CFQ]

10.64

<.001

.11

Emotion

0.40

.53

.01

Emotion [CFQ]

1.17

.28

.01

Schizotypy group

0.75

.40

.01

Schizotypy group [CFQ]

2.13

.15

.03

Load x emotion

0.73

.40

.01

Load x emotion [CFQ]

2.14

.15

.03

Load x schizotypy

1.39

.25

.02

Load x schizotypy [CFQ]

1.09

.33

.01
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ηp2

F

p-value

Emotion x schizotypy

0.63

.43

.01

Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

1.31

.26

.02

Load x emotion x schizotypy

1.20

.28

.01

Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

3.36

.07

.04

Note. [CFQ] denotes CFQ added to the model as a covariate.
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Table 8.2
Changes in F Value for Sensitivity and Bias According to Addition of Cognitive
Failures as a Covariate
F
d'

c

p-value

ηp2

Load

175.58

<.001

.67

Load [CFQ]

27.05

<.001

.24

Emotion

35.57

<.001

.30

Emotion [CFQ]

5.70

.02

.06

Schizotypy group

1.68

.20

.02

Schizotypy group [CFQ]

5.75

.02

.06

Load x emotion

0.76

.39

.01

Load x emotion [CFQ]

1.04

.31

.01

Load x schizotypy

0.11

.90

.001

Load x schizotypy [CFQ]

0.95

.39

.01

Emotion x schizotypy

1.81

.18

.02

Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

2.17

.14

.03

Load x emotion x schizotypy

0.76

.39

.01

Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

1.48

.23

.02

Load

43.79

<.001

.34

Load [CFQ]

6.57

.003

.08

Emotion

26.52

<.001

.24

Emotion [CFQ]

2.74

.04

.03

Schizotypy group

0.75

.39

.01

Schizotypy group [CFQ]

2.36

.13

.03

Load x emotion

12.48

<.001

.13

Load x emotion [CFQ]

1.36

.24

.02

Load x schizotypy

0.91

.34

.01
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ηp2

F

p-value

Load x schizotypy [CFQ]

0.80

.44

.01

Emotion x schizotypy

0.66

.57

.01

Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

0.78

.50

.01

Load x emotion x schizotypy

0.75

.59

.01

Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

0.28

.94

.01

Note. [CFQ] denotes CFQ added to the model as a covariate

8.4. Discussion
This study sought to explore further the role of emotion in cognitive
performance in schizotypes. High and low schizotype participants were compared for
differences in self-reported cognitive failures, as well as differences in processing of
emotional vs. neutral stimuli in an objective working memory task. In addition, we
considered whether the inclusion of cognitive failures as a covariate could account for
working memory performance differences on emotionally valanced stimuli.

8.4.1. Key findings
The current findings are similar to previous studies which have identified a strong
link between schizotypy and cognitive failures (Corcoran et al., 2013; Giesbrecht et al.,
2007; Pfeifer et al., 2009), with individuals high on schizotypy reporting more failures
than those low on schizotypy. High schizotypes demonstrated significantly reduced
semantic but not phonological verbal fluency. This reflects patterns of performance
within schizophrenia patients (Juhasz, Chambers, Shesler, Haber, & Kurtz, 2012),
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although it is interesting that the current study found no evidence of deficits on the more
complex category switching task in schizotypy.
With regards to the core tasks of interest, high schizotypes did not exhibit any
impairment on the lab-based emotional 0-back task, a simple visual attention-based task
with a low cognitive load. However, high schizotypes exhibited impaired working
memory across increased loads of 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back. Contrary to our
hypotheses, emotional stimuli elicited a relative deficit compared with neutral stimuli
for all participants, regardless of level of schizotypy. Further analyses accounting for
differing levels of load and type of emotion also failed to identify a specific emotional
working memory deficit in schizotypy. Although heightened sensitivity and therefore
reactivity of response to emotion is well documented in schizotypy (Collip et al., 2013),
it seems that, in a laboratory environment at least, this does not translate to a reduction
in working memory when faced with stimuli of either positive or negative valence.
This research also revealed that, across all levels of load and emotion, high
schizotypes achieve lower hit rates and have more difficulty discriminating target from
non-target stimuli, but did not differ on their bias in responding or response criterion.
These findings are suggestive that high schizotypes have difficulties in accuracy of
perception of information to be stored, rather than systematically applying a flawed
style of responding. That is, working memory issues in schizotypy appear to be due to a
problem of ability rather than approach. A deficit of ability is in line with a number of
studies that have demonstrated reduced working memory accuracy in high schizotypy
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(Kerns & Becker, 2008a; Koychev et al., 2012; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009a).
However, only a handful of papers have examined measures of sensitivity in addition to
accuracy in n-back performance in schizotypy, and these findings add to incoherence in
the literature. Schmidt-Hansen & Honey’s (2009) found that low levels of negative
schizotypy were associated with a conservative response bias, but that unusual
experiences in schizotypy had no impact on bias. Another study identified a more
liberal style of responding in people who have experienced psychotic-like experiences
(Rossi, et al., 2016), and suggested this may relate to problems in reality testing in
schizophrenia (Brebion et al., 2007). As these previous studies considering sensitivity
have not included emotionally salient stimuli, comparison may not be particularly
meaningful.
An unexpected finding was that happy stimuli elicited the lowest hit rate of all
emotions, eliciting poorer sensitivity and a more conservative response bias across all
participants. Fearful stimuli also elicited poorer sensitivity, although to a lower degree
than happy. Given our fearful stimuli were of negative valence and high arousal, and the
happy were of positive valence and mid arousal, it is difficult to interpret these findings.
Kensinger and Corkin (2003) found increased reaction times for fearful vs. neutral
stimuli in conditions of higher n-back load, and suggested that activation of emotional
networks acts as an additional drain on resources alongside n load. From an
evolutionary perspective, the emotional activation associated with the fight/flight
physiological response could certainly disrupt working memory function. However, the
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more robust findings regarding happy stimuli in the current study are more difficult to
interpret. Previous research has found that, within a delayed recognition memory
paradigm, positive emotional valence was generally associated with more liberal
responding, however in this study discriminability was actually enhanced by positive
valence (Bowen, et al., 2016). Perhaps from an evolutionary perspective, happy or
positive stimuli in our environment carry no threat potential and therefore afford the
perceiver more time for careful consideration. Less obviously “safe” and potentially
threat-laden stimuli, such as of fearful, or even sad or neutral valence, require a more
immediate response, and therefore encourage a more “trigger-happy” or liberal
approach to responding. Clearly, further research is required into the role of both
valence and arousal in disrupting or facilitating working memory function in
schizotypes.
A secondary aim of this study was to explore the relationship between selfreported cognition in daily life and objective neuropsychological performance. First,
cognitive failures appeared to be significant as a covariate for hits and sensitivity, but
not correct rejections or response bias. This finding aligns with previous studies, which
found an association between accuracy of working memory and self-reported failures
(e.g., Ishigami & Klein, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009). Further to these issues, no
correlation between any of the measures of objective working memory performance and
self-reported cognitive failures was identified. It remains the case that the addition of
emotional content is not sufficient to render objective cognitive performance valid in
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capturing the same cognitive difficulties experienced by schizotypes in their everyday
lives. Why is this? As suggested above, the source of high schizotypes’ poor accuracy
on the n-back task appeared to be ability rather than a style of approach. Cognitive
failures, meanwhile, are thought of as reflecting an inadequate cognitive management
style (Larson & Merritt, 1991). The dissociation between n-back and CFQ outcomes
makes sense in that they may be accessing very different features of functioning. High
schizotypes therefore experience impairment in both pure ability and capacity for
cognition in real world contexts.
Also pertinent to the dissociation between working memory and cognitive failures
may be the task design. Although our goal was to maximise ecological validity by
introducing an emotional component to the working memory task, use of evocative
stimuli is perhaps not enough. The stimuli, whilst selected to activate emotional
processing networks, lacked the personal relevance which is tied in with most of the
emotional stimuli we encounter in daily life. Imaging studies have identified cortical
midline structures as areas of brain activation specific to self-referential content
(Northoff, et al., 2006). Therefore, enriching the current n-back paradigm with
participant-generated emotionally salient stimuli has potential for improved mimicking
of real world emotional cognition. At this point, our previous assertion that cognitive
failures access facets of cognition separate to those that are the focus of traditional,
objective measurements of cognition, is supported (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Given
that emotional working memory and cognitive failures are not related, more
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ecologically valid experimental paradigms or constructs are needed to improve our
ability to assess cognitive capacity.

8.4.2. Limitations
There are several limitations to be considered for the current study. A number of
these relate to the sample. A larger sample size is needed to improve power and clarify
findings. In addition, many of the demographic features of the sample were not
measured (e.g., previous education, smoking status), and those that were suggest the
sample was relatively restricted. Participants were primarily female undergraduate
students; therefore, the current results are limited in their generalisability and future
studies would ideally capture more demographic information and cast a wider net to
capture a better balance of sexes. Of particular interest would be individuals in their late
adulthood, as the research into schizotypy in older populations is as yet very limited.
There is emerging evidence that whilst the factor structure is stable over the lifespan,
overall schizotypy tends to decrease with age (Badcock & Dragović, 2006; Bora &
Baysan Arabaci, 2009). Of interest is whether deficits in emotional processing and
cognition as well as problems with everyday failures may become less pronounced with
the development of compensatory strategies through life experience.
There was also some evidence of a self-selection bias, with participants who chose
to take part in this second study reporting more frequent cognitive failures than the rest
of the sample that completed online surveys only. It would make sense that some
individuals who perceive that they make more errors are more likely to be interested in
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completing tests of objective ability, perhaps due to concern or anxiety. Nevertheless,
this difference was small (difference of three points out of a possible score of 100 on the
CFQ), and larger studies may be able to avoid such a problem.
In terms of the group analysis of schizotypy, it is possible that the low group could
be anomalous in their performance and response to emotions as the high group; research
around these individuals is as yet very limited. Idealistically, in future people would be
pre-selected from a large sample to be +/- 1 standard deviation from the mean for high
and low respectively as well as a control group scoring +/- 0.5 standard deviations from
the mean. In this way we would have three groups who did not overlap in their
schizotypy score. Unfortunately, there was not a sufficiently large sample for this
approach in the current study. Whilst utilisation of the low schizotypy group still
achieves the aims of this study, future studies would ideally include a larger sample size
to enable comparison between low and average schizotypes.
Another issue not considered in the current study may be the mediating role of
depression and anxiety symptoms in subjective cognition. Heightened subjective
cognitive complaints associated with physical illness in the absence of objective
cognitive deficits appear to be associated with low mood or distress, for example in
individuals with epilepsy (Marino et al., 2009) and cancer (Hutchinson et al., 2012).
Depression and anxiety symptoms are also prevalent within schizotypy (Lewandowski
et al., 2006), and negative affect acts as a partial mediator in the relationship between
schizotypy and cognitive failures (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017). There is ongoing debate
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as to whether this reflects negative cognitive biases in self-reporting, or whether
objective assessment tasks may fail to capture subtle cognitive failures as experienced in
daily life (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b). Future studies would therefore benefit from
inclusion of measures of depression and anxiety, to assess the extent to which these
factors specifically impact the relationship between objective and subjective cognition
in schizotypy.
This study used dimensional ratings of IAPS images to produce categories of
emotional images. Whilst both valence and arousal were taken into account in formation
of these categories, of interest may be how arousal uniquely shapes performance. An
fMRI study found that, in healthy people, images of only medium to high arousal levels
had an impact on working memory, potentially through drawing more attention and
disrupting the memory process (Mather et al., 2006). Hence, future studies should
incorporate emotional stimuli with differing arousal levels to determine whether there is
a threshold at which it interferes with working memory performance, and whether this
threshold is lower for those scoring highly on schizotypy.
Previous studies of the impact of emotion on cognition in schizotypy have tended
to focus on social cues, such as facial expressions (e.g., Leitman et al., 2007; Phillips et
al., 2011). Interestingly, people with schizophrenia demonstrate heightened memory for
faces, despite difficulty interpreting expressions (Mano & Brown, 2013). The IAPS
images selected for the current study did include a majority depicting people or social
situations, however, it also included of a variety of objects and landscapes. Of course, it
223

is likely quite difficult to identify images of strong arousal and valence that do not
include interpersonal cues. Nonetheless, if future studies could consider social vs. nonsocial stimuli, further clarification could be sought as to whether social information has
a specific impact on cognition.

8.4.3. Clinical implications and directions for future research
This research provided further evidence that working memory deficits and
everyday cognitive failures are evident even in healthy high schizotypes, and may
constitute early markers of risk for psychosis. Given these two aspects of cognition
seem to be distinct, further consideration is required in how clinicians approach
treatment of cognitive dysfunction in daily life.
Although a relative deficit for emotional vs. neutral stimuli was evident across all
participants, the current findings nevertheless suggest that emotionally salient
experiences have the capacity to further interfere with cognition across the psychosis
continuum, particularly as task difficulty increases from simple attention to demands on
working memory. Early intervention programs incorporating general cognitive
components are already in development (Piskulic, Barbato, Liu, & Addington, 2015),
with the aim being to help manage cognitive difficulties which can be a source of stress
and possibly contribute to potentiation of illness in prodromal individuals. However, the
current findings suggest that cognitive remediation programs may benefit from targeting
emotion processing. Additionally, other aspects of schizotypy that may contribute to
difficulties with cognition and emotion processing in daily life – such as reduced social
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cognition – may also need to be addressed in early intervention training programs. A
study with healthy individuals has found that “brain training” using working memory
tasks incorporating emotive elements demonstrates transferability to other types of
training tasks that also include emotion (Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dalgleish, 2011). Of
course, the ultimate transferability of these popular interventions – from computerbased tasks to the real world – is yet to be established.
Cognitive behavioural therapy could also be used to develop distress tolerance
skills, which would help further reduce the impact of negative emotions on cognition.
In addition, there is a need for therapists to be sensitive to the cognitive features of
schizotypes, should they seek help. For example, most psychotherapies focus on
discussion of emotive topics, and many even aim to engender intense emotional states
within the session (e.g., emotion-focused therapy; Greenberg, 2004). It is possible that
emotional content could disrupt schizotypes’ ability to retain information during
session; hence, therapists may need to consider how information is “chunked” across
the period of a session to maximise treatment effectiveness.

8.4.4. Conclusions
This study supported previous findings of a working memory deficit in schizotypy,
as well as our previous findings that self-reported cognitive failures are also heightened
in schizotypy (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017a). Objective working memory deficits and
failures in daily life may therefore hold utility as early markers of risk for
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Contrary to expectations, reductions in performance
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when faced with emotional stimuli were evident across all participants rather than being
exaggerated in high schizotypes. Whilst problems are evident in both cognitive ability
and capacity in schizotypy, the two aspects of cognition were not associated. It may be
that the ecological validity of the n-back emotional working memory paradigm could be
further improved by addition of content that is self-referential for individual
participants, given the personalised nature of emotionally salient events in everyday life.
Clinically, cognitive remediation programs that target both working memory and
capacity for real world functioning may be vital in the design of early interventions.
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9. General Discussion

9.1. Summary of findings
Collectively, the series of studies within this thesis provide for a clearer
understanding of the determinants of vulnerability to cognitive failures. They also
highlight the role of emotion in shaping cognition within schizotypy as a trait reflecting
psychosis proneness. In addressing the broad hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 and the
more specific hypotheses presented in Chapter 5, the current research has revealed that:
1. Self-reported cognitive failures measure capacity for cognitive functioning in the
real world, and reflect both trait vulnerability and the impact of state factors that
may shape cognition on a momentary basis (Chapter 2).
2. Individuals with a range of psychological disorders report increased cognitive
failures relative to healthy populations, and substance use may also increase
susceptibility to failures (Chapter 3).
3. Self-reported cognitive failures are not distorted by problems of self-awareness
associated with neuroticism, and thus are useful as a measure of real world
cognition rather than purely reflecting poor or excessive self-monitoring
(Chapter 6).
4. Subclinical high schizotypes do consistently report increased cognitive failures
relative to those lower in schizotypy (Chapters 2, 7, 8).
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5. High schizotypes’ negative affectivity does appear to contribute to their
experience of increased cognitive failures in daily life. Specifically:
a. Negative affect partially mediates the relationship between schizotypy
and cognitive failures, which suggests it contributes to but does not fully
explain the mechanism through which high schizotypes experience
heightened failures (Chapter 7).
(Chapter 8).
6. High schizotypes exhibit a deficit in objectively-assessed working memory, but
this deficit of ability is dissociated from problems with capacity for functioning
in daily life as indicated by heightened cognitive failures.
The reviews included in this thesis supported a view of cognitive failures as
reflecting capacity for successful cognition within day-to-day contexts, distinct to
objective cognitive performance which is assessed at its optimal level in the lab or
clinic. In healthy populations, vulnerability to slips appears to be determined by
personality traits including neuroticism and schizotypy, whilst fluctuations in aspects of
state including time of day, mood, activity, and boredom also increase the likelihood of
a failure occurring (Chapter 2). In addition, the review of failures in populations with a
psychological disorder highlighted that slips tend to occur at an increased frequency in
mental illness, with individuals with depression, PTSD, schizophrenia, and a range of
other disorders noting marked deterioration in their everyday cognitive functioning
(Chapter 3).
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Whilst these systematic reviews drew together existing research to develop a
more holistic conceptualisation of cognitive failures, they also served to highlight
questions about the impact of self-awareness. In particular, key concerns regarding the
relationship between failures and neuroticism, and the potential for self-awareness to
distort self-reports of cognition became clear. Hence, this thesis initially explored the
extent to which self-ratings of cognitive failures are corroborated by observers; a
relatively novel approach in this area. The findings presented in Chapter 6 did not
support the complaint hypothesis of cognitive failures, where concerns with cognition
are thought to reflect negativistic biases associated with neuroticism (Wilhelm et al.,
2010). Rather, self and observer ratings of cognitive failures were moderately
correlated, and neuroticism did not alter this relationship. Additionally, poor selfawareness – as assessed via disparity between self and observer ratings of neuroticism –
also did not reduce correlation between self and observer ratings of cognitive failures.
Thus, self-reported cognitive failures are observable to both self and others. The
remaining program of research was therefore designed to attempt to determine which
features of everyday life result in cognitive failures in schizotypy, given the gap
between subjectively-perceived and objectively-observed cognition in this group.
In Chapters 7 and 8, the role of emotion in schizotypes’ cognitive problems was
explored. The results of Chapter 7 identified a mediating role for negative affect in the
relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures. This supports the theory that
emotion contributes to the mechanism through which everyday cognition is disrupted in
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this group. However, as this was only a partial mediation, it is likely that other aspects
of schizotypy also contribute to everyday cognitive failures.
Given the apparent role of affect in everyday failures in schizotypy, it was
hypothesized that introducing an emotional element into an objective working memory
task might elicit a clearer deficit in performance in high schizotypes, thereby enabling
closer comparison of self-reported and objective cognition (Chapter 8). Although low
schizotypes demonstrated poorer working memory overall, emotional stimuli did not
exacerbate performance issues relative to neutral stimuli. Self-reported cognitive
failures were also more frequent in schizotypy, but still did not correlate with objective
performance outcomes, even with emotion accounted for. The relationship between
cognitive performance and self-reported cognitive failures remains far from clear cut.

9.2. Conceptual and research implications
The conceptual and clinical implications of this thesis are each considered with
regards to two key components of the research findings: 1) the cognitive failures
construct, and 2) cognitive failures and cognition in schizotypy.

9.2.1. Cognitive failures construct
A key outcome of this thesis was the clarification of a definition of the cognitive
failures construct. Self-reports of cognitive failures appear to give an indication of an
individual’s tendency to demonstrate either high or low cognitive capacity in the
context of their day-to-day activities. Cognitive capacity, as reflected in cognitive
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failures, differs from ability in that it does not capture maximum cognitive potential
given ideal circumstances. Rather, it reflects cognitive functioning as it must occur in
everyday life; as one copes with encountering different emotions, stressors, levels of
task interest and challenge, environments, substances, and times of day. Although
capacity for modulating the effects of such factors on cognition may be linked to stable
personality traits and biology, the fluctuating nature of these factors means that capacity
shifts over time in a fluid manner. Hence, cognitive failures are a distinct construct
within cognition in that they capture factors relevant to cognitive functioning in
everyday contexts, beyond pure ability in certain domains.
This thesis echoed previous studies in failing to identify a correlation between
failures and objective neurocognitive outcomes (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2007; Kane et al.,
2007a; Roche et al., 2005). With the definition of cognitive failures as measuring
dynamic cognitive capacity vs. neurocognition as measuring stable optimal ability,
these findings become expected rather than confusing. Further, they emphasise the
significance of subjective experiences of cognition as a separate area for research.
Although self-reports of any psychological phenomenon do need to be looked upon
with caution for potential bias, ignoring them altogether in favour of “gold-standard”
approaches that involve strict control mechanisms is problematic. The trade-off for the
control afforded by gold-standard measures is knowledge around daily life processes
(Reis, 2012). By valuing self-reports of real world experience, cognitive researchers
have more options for study design and can examine the complex interactions between
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the personality, illness, mood, and environmental determinants of momentary cognition.
This thesis focused on just one such interaction – that between schizotypy and affect and there are many others of potential interest that warrant further study. Thus, the
findings contained in this thesis suggest that measuring self-reported cognitive failures
alongside existing neurocognitive assessment could improve the ecological validity of
cognitive research.
But what exactly can self-report failures tell us about real world cognitive
functioning? Previous findings reviewed in Chapter 2 of this thesis identified a link
between vulnerability to cognitive failures and outcomes in daily life including
likelihood of being the at-fault driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991) and
performance on the SAT exams in the U.S. (Unsworth et al., 2012). The study presented
in Chapter 6, which compared self and informant ratings of cognitive failures, revealed
that failures result in behavioural slips and errors that are significant enough to be
reliably observable to others. Together, these results further indicate that self-reported
failures provide insight into the extent to which one is generally able to successfully
utilise cognition in the flow of their day-to-day lives, and thus carry out the tasks and
challenges faced in any given moment.

9.2.2. Cognitive failures and cognition in schizotypy
Both cognitive capacity and cognitive ability were also studied in schizotypy, and
findings point to a need for a separation of the two in future study of psychosis prone
populations. With regards to cognitive capacity in daily life, identification of
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consistently heightened cognitive failures in individuals high on schizotypy was in line
with previous research (e.g., Corcoran et al., 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2009). However, a
novel finding was that negative affect mediates this relationship. Two areas of the
current findings provide clues as to how schizotypy and affect may interact to shape
failures. Firstly, Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that previous literature has found a
strong link between negative affect and cognitive failures in both healthy (e.g.,
Mahoney et al., 1998; Payne & Schnapp, 2014) and clinical populations (e.g.,
MacQueen et al., 2002; Sullivan & Payne, 2007), separate to schizotypy.
Secondly, Chapter 7 found that negative affect mediates rather than moderates
the relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures, suggesting this is a feature
of schizotypy that is part of the mechanism through which failures occur in everyday
life. But with affect acting only as a partial mediator, other schizotypal features and
symptoms also appear to act as determinants of cognitive failures. Together, these
findings suggest that affect can increase cognitive failures, and despite an overlap with
affect so too does schizotypy itself. Given the presence of negative affectivity within
individuals at both subclinical and clinical points of the psychosis continuum (Horan et
al., 2008), it is, however, likely that the influence of affect on cognitive failures is
compounded in high schizotypy. That is, schizotypy and affect also interact with each
other to determine cognitive failures, as depicted in Figure 9.1. Whilst a range of other
psychological disorders are also associated with cognitive failures, negative affect may
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play a particularly large role in shaping failures in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.
The clinical implications of this will be explored in detail in section 9.3.1.

Figure 9.1. Proposed relationship between schizotypy, affect, and cognitive failures.

The second area of interest in schizotypy within this thesis was the impact of
emotion on objective cognition. Although previous findings of a working memory
deficit were supported, there was no additional detrimental effect of emotional stimuli,
and overall observed deficits were distinct from self-reported cognitive failures. An
important finding was that high schizotypes’ pure ability is reduced, but so too is their
separate capacity for transforming this in carrying out day-to-day responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the question about what causes the “gap” between objective and
subjective cognition could not be answered. As per the definition proposed previously,
cognitive failures likely still do not directly align with objective cognition because they
ask about cognition in complex situations, which capture a range of dynamic factors
that are broader still than emotion. For example, within schizotypy, the stress associated
with ambiguous social situations (Quirk, Subramanian, & Hoerger, 2007) may also
interfere with daily life cognition. Introducing emotional components to objective
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paradigms as this thesis has done is still necessarily artificial and controlled, and, we
suspect, failed to ascertain personal salience. Other potentially relevant factors are
virtually impossible to introduce in some way reminiscent of real life situations. Given
that subclinical high schizotypes appear to retain the ability to observe and report on
their own subtle deficits, subjective perceptions of cognition would seem to provide a
valuable means for researchers to gain insight into their unique pattern of cognitive
functioning in everyday life, in a way that simply cannot be achieved in the laboratory.

9.3. Clinical implications
9.3.1. Cognitive failures construct
The review in Chapter 3 demonstrated that mild issues with daily cognitive
function are closely linked to a variety of psychological disorders, including and
perhaps especially those that tend to be thought of as less “severe” such as depression or
anxiety, even when neuropsychological deficits are mild or absent (Farrin et al., 2003;
MacQueen et al., 2002; Preiss et al., 2010). These complaints are present even in
individuals prone to subclinical levels of distress, including those high on neuroticism
and trait anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998; Matthews, Coyle, & Craig, 1990b), suggesting
that self-perceived cognitive failures may serve as a non-specific marker of declining
mental health and risk for psychopathology. But a key question is, as a marker, what do
cognitive failures actually reflect? Potentially increased susceptibility to failures might
indicate a global inefficiency in cognition, which contributes to the development of
psychopathology. Of course, the weak relationship with objective cognitive
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performance does not provide any support for this theory. Alternatively, the links
between cognitive failures and affect evidenced in both past literature and the current
thesis might suggest that failures provide a behavioural window into underlying
difficulties processing emotion and regulating emotional responses. Such deficits could
be associated with increased distress, leading to illness onset.
Cognitive failures may be better conceptualised as a symptom of psychological
disorder as opposed to a marker of risk. If so, what is the causal relationship between
cognitive failures and other symptoms? The relationship implied in this thesis is that
failures occur, at least partially, as a kind of cognitive consequence of negative affect in
individuals whom struggle to regulate emotions, such as those with high neuroticism
(Ormel et al., 2013). However, a second possible explanation is that cognitive failures
lead to negative affect. Carriere et al. (2008b) examined self-reports of attention-related
errors, a subset of cognitive failures, and found a link with depressive symptoms. They
suggested that individuals prone to errors are less consciously engaged with their
environment, which may reflect a tendency towards ruminative thinking. This in turn
leads to boredom and dysphoric affective states. The current thesis provided some
support for the former viewpoint, with the finding that affect serves as a partial
mediating factor determining cognitive failures, at least within subclinical schizotypy.
However, further research is required to understand this relationship, and indeed it is
certainly possible that both conceptualisations are true, that is cognitive failures and
affective symptoms may feed into each other in a cyclical manner.
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Despite these remaining questions about the role of cognitive failures in
psychopathology, the current findings have some implications for clinical practice. At
the first point of contact, clinicians could incorporate items from the CFQ or similar
measures as part of a general mental health screening process. This may be particularly
helpful for groups that are less likely to self-report more overt, affectively-based
symptoms, such as men (Cochran & Rabinowitz, 2003) or older adults (Fiske,
Wetherell, & Gatz, 2009). Whatever the role of cognitive failures in indicating or
maintaining psychopathology, intervention may be possible to reduce their impact on
daily activities. Mindfulness-based therapies, which aim to increase attentional control,
show success in decreasing both ruminative behaviours and distress in depression (Jain
et al., 2007). They may also be helpful in reducing cognitive failures in individuals with
mild to moderate low mood and anxiety. Another treatment option may be “brain
training” which is generally administered via computerised tasks. Whilst these
approaches do not consistently improve all domains of cognitive functioning, they do
appear to reduce the severity of other symptoms and improve daily life functioning
(Motter et al., 2016). These interventions can now be used with relative ease and low
cost, with both mindfulness and brain training mobile apps readily accessible. As such,
these would seem to be feasible self-help options for groups at the lower end of clinical
severity. Further research is required examining whether such approaches assist in
amelioration of cognitive failures specifically.
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9.3.2. Cognitive failures and cognition in schizotypy
The intention of this thesis was to explore cognitive failures as they relate to
schizotypy, a personality trait useful for capturing risk for psychosis. Although the
preceding evidence would suggest that cognitive failures act as a general marker of
psychopathology rather than a specific indicator of schizotypy, their heightened
presence in individuals along the psychosis continuum warrants further consideration.
Depression and anxiety are highly prevalent in schizotypy (Lewandowski et al., 2006),
and are experienced alongside multiple other issues likely to maintain dysphoric mood
states, such as social isolation. It is therefore possible that cognitive failures in
schizotypy simply reflect the same influence of negative affect and emotion
dysregulation evident in other types of psychopathology. However, there are a number
of reasons to consider cognitive failures as they relate distinctly to schizotypy. First,
schizotypy and its affective features are by definition a stable state of being (Horan et
al., 2008), rather than the distinct affective episodes usually experienced in disorders
like depression. Hence, cognitive failures are of separate interest in this group as a likely
more enduring experience. In addition, unlike clinical groups, the majority of healthy
high schizotypes will not go onto receive a psychosis diagnosis (Kaymaz et al., 2012).
The role of cognitive failures in schizotypy as a proxy for psychosis risk is thus of
investigative significance due to the fact they may interact with protective factors to
prevent illness onset.
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If cognitive failures do represent a specific marker of risk along the psychosis
continuum, there are two ways they may function. First, as suggested elsewhere in this
thesis, they may be a cognitive basic symptom – a subtle reduction in functioning selfperceived by the individual just before onset or relapse of illness, and prior to
objectively-detectable decline (Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, Picker, & Klosterkotter,
2006). If cognitive failures are a basic symptom, it would be expected that people high
on schizotypy would only complain of them when decompensating in their
psychological functioning. Alternatively, cognitive failures may be conceptualised as a
trait-based vulnerability present alongside high schizotypy, regardless of clinical status.
In this case, cognitive failures may still fluctuate according to co-occurrence of other
relevant state and trait factors. This allows for potential increases in the frequency of
failure in illness stages, occurring due to factors like high stress or medication use, but
also accounts for high failures in healthy high schizotypes who never seek help. This
second view of how cognitive failures function as a risk marker has greater support
from the current findings, in that our healthy sample reported high failures and a
mediating effect of affect was present. Longitudinal research to confirm the extent to
which cognitive failures are reported by individuals at different points along the
psychosis continuum, and at different stages of illness, is necessary to determine its
utility as a risk marker.
In terms of objective emotional working memory, the clinical implications of the
apparent deficit are that subclinical high schizotypes may evidence an intermediary
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stage of cognitive impairment between healthy individuals with average schizotypy and
those with a diagnosed schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Objectively, difficulties only
become apparent once a certain level of cognitive load is surpassed, for example when
demands are placed on working memory rather than a more simple attentional task. A
cognitive model of schizophrenia posits that underlying cognitive deficits contribute to
pathology (Rapoport et al., 2012), hence factors that place excessive stress on cognition
may increase the likelihood of illness onset for high schizotypes. Cognitive load may
therefore relate to schizotypy and psychosis risk in a stress-vulnerability manner: high
cognitive load may itself act as a stressor that reduces functioning and increases risk in
schizotypy.
Whilst not all high schizotypes will go on to develop a psychotic disorder, all
individuals who develop ARMS are high on schizotypy (Debbané et al., 2015). Hence,
this research can be used to inform approaches to assessment and treatment of
individuals at-risk of transitioning from non-clinical to clinical status along the
psychosis continuum. With the many questions that remain about the nature of cognitive
failures and cognition in schizotypy, it seems that the focus on detecting deficits in
objective cognition has been to the detriment of answering questions about real world
cognitive functioning (Chun, Minor, & Cohen, 2013). This also applies to those with
schizophrenia: although objective deficits are evident in this group, focusing purely on
neurocognition limits our ability to understand how cognitive patterns in schizophrenia
translate into everyday cognition (Green, Kern, Braff, & Mintz, 2000). Green et al.
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(2000) highlight the need to identify mediators between neurocognition and functional
outcomes in order to design cognitive interventions that can have a transformative effect
on cognition in everyday life. For example, within schizophrenia patients, mediators
such as learning potential (Green et al., 2000) and social cognition (Kee, Kern, &
Green, 1998) have been found to determine the extent to which neurocognitive deficits
impact real world cognitive functioning. Thus, these need to be addressed when
attempting to improve daily life outcomes. Although less is known about similar
patterns in schizotypy, the current findings reiterate the dissociation between ability and
capacity in the real world, and the need to explore factors other than emotion that act as
mediators between the two.
In the translation of these ideas into clinical practice, there are a number of
existing cognitive early interventions for psychosis that could be quite simply altered
for potentially significant improvements in outcomes. Cognitive remediation techniques
use graded training in tasks in specific domains of cognition (e.g., attention, working
memory) to improve function through practice (Gomar et al., 2015). These are now
often presented via computer, similar to brain training programs used with healthy
populations, and show some efficacy in improving cognitive functioning in individuals
at clinical high risk of psychosis (e.g., Piskulic et al., 2015). One study found ARMS
patients were able to improve their cognitive performance through training, and that
they obtained more benefit than those who had already progressed to schizophrenia
(Rauchensteiner et al., 2011). As mentioned previously with regards to brain training,
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one problem with this approach is that little is known about how cognitive remediation
translates to everyday life. There is currently a large trial underway examining the
efficacy of cognitive remediation for ARMS individuals (the “FOCUS” trial; Glenthøj
et al., 2015), with general daily functioning as outcome. Whilst the results of this trial
will be of interest, the current findings point to the importance of interventions for
which real world cognitive outcomes specifically, such as cognitive failures, are
measured.
There are some flaws, however, with using existing cognitive remediation
approaches to address cognitive failures. The definition of failures is that they occur
unexpectedly in the flow of daily life, and do not reflect any enduring deficit of ability.
Training in specific areas of cognition is perhaps the intervention version of traditional
assessments which target ability only, rather than capacity for cognition in daily life
contexts. An alternative approach might be interventions that teach individuals to
understand factors that shape their own cognitive patterns, and develop “life
management” skills to minimise these. For example, metacognitive training seeks to
provide psychoeducation about the fallibility of human cognition and metacognition –
“thinking about thinking” – thereby helping individuals to avoid automatic thought traps
(Moritz & Woodward, 2007). This approach has had preliminary success with psychosis
patients; rated as more fun and more useful to daily life than cognitive remediation
(Moritz & Woodward, 2007). This could perhaps be adapted to help psychosis-prone
groups experiencing heightened cognitive failures. For example, individuals could be
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educated on the factors that contribute to everyday failures, such as high cognitive load
or negative affect. At-risk individuals could also learn about other features of psychosisproneness, such as dysfunction in social cognition, which may increase stress and
secondarily contribute to failures. They could then be provided with strategies to
minimise the likelihood of failures, such as use of memory aides, social skills training,
or emotion regulation skills. Very little is currently known about how clinicians might
intervene in high cognitive failures, and as such future research that 1) examines
cognitive failures as an outcome for interventions that target contributing factors such a
mood, and 2) compares different approaches to managing failures, is of foremost
importance.
Finally, the current findings also draw attention to the fact that whilst not all
high schizotypes go on to seek help or receive a clinical diagnosis, they still experience
some negative consequences of their high schizotypy. Despite appearing minor,
cognitive failures can have serious, even harmful consequences in occupational and
daily life settings (Simpson et al., 2005; Weigmann & Shappell, 1997), and may reduce
quality of life. Non-help-seeking schizotypal college students report subjectively
reduced quality of life equivalent to that observed in patients with a severe mental
illness (Chun et al., 2013; A. S. Cohen et al., 2014). There are mixed findings as to
whether objective markers of quality of life are similarly reduced (A. S. Cohen et al.,
2014) or demonstrate no difference relative to people low on schizotypy (Chun et al.,
2013). Plausibly problems with cognition may contribute to a general sense of
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dissatisfaction with life, even in those schizotypes who never go on to decompensate.
The fact that the vast majority of schizotypal individuals will never seek help is
inherently limiting, however, perhaps mental health literacy programs could be
improved to encourage help-seeking. This could achieve improved awareness that
minor issues in cognition might a) relate to a more serious issue, but more importantly
b) be amenable to treatment.

9.4. Limitations and further directions for research
While limitations specific to each study are discussed within the relevant
chapters, there are a few issues that affect the thesis as a whole. One concern is the
limited generalisability of the samples utilised, with the majority of participants
undergraduate students aged in their early twenties. However, schizotypy research in
groups beyond early to mid-adulthood is very limited. It appears that the SPQ threefactor structure holds up similarly in older adults, although schizotypal experiences are
less frequent than in younger groups (Badcock & Dragović, 2006). This make sense
given the median age for an initial psychotic episode is between 19-25 years (Ronald C
Kessler et al., 2007), therefore high schizotypes who do go on to develop psychosis are
removed from the sample pool after this age. Additionally, high schizotypes who do not
decompensate may develop adaptive strategies that reduce the expression of schizotypal
traits through life experience. As it stands, the majority of schizotypy studies utilise
student populations, and it has been argued that meaningful variance exists in this group
in the same way as any community sample (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). Hence,
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in the context of this thesis it was decided that it would be most beneficial to focus on a
younger population in an attempt to answer some preliminary questions about cognitive
failures and their relationship to schizotypy. Future research examining whether the key
determinants of cognitive failures identified in the current thesis hold across older age
groups will be of great interest.
In Chapter 2 it was proposed that the state and trait factors known to influence
cognitive failures likely interact to determine outcomes. Whilst the empirical studies
within this thesis began to explore this relationship, more ecologically valid approaches
to examining relevant state factors will be required to provide clearer answers.
Experience sampling (ES) is a methodology of interest for psychological phenomena in
everyday life mentioned previously in this thesis. This approach can capture self-reports
of different experiences as they occur within daily life contexts via diary measurements
at multiple time points each day. ES approaches have benefits such as reducing recall
bias, and are of significance for understanding the way in which trait and state factors
co-occur to shape outcomes such as cognition (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). Whilst the
cognitive failures research thus far has focused on the role of static factors at individual
points in time, ES research enables examination of the dynamic interplay of trait
vulnerability and exacerbating or protective factors in shaping cognitive failures over
time. Per the findings of this thesis, the temporal relationship between fluctuations in
mood and the occurrence of cognitive failures is significant for understanding the causal
relationship between the two, and could be investigated via ES. For example, does
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mood at one time point co-occur with cognitive failures in the same time point, or does
it predict failures in the next time point? Very few studies thus far have utilised such an
approach to examine cognition in daily life. Two studies have found a link between
stressors and memory and attention slips at the day level (Neupert et al., 2008; Palder et
al., 2013), however further studies are needed examining multiple time points
throughout the day for more detailed temporal analysis. Ongoing advances in mobile
technology and associated reductions in cost will likely enable researchers to look at the
whole range of state factors already known to shape failures on a momentary basis, such
as challenge vs. ease of activity being engaged in (Kane et al., 2007a) or tiredness
(Wilkerson et al., 2011). The current thesis has established the utility of self-reports of
cognition, and has pinpointed key areas of personality (schizotypy and neuroticism) and
daily life (affect) for this next step in the research to explore.
Chapter 3 identified substance use and substance use disorders as potential
confounds for cognitive failures research in both healthy and clinical populations. It was
beyond the scope of the current thesis to address this, however it is possible that
substance use patterns may have impacted the results. Future research would benefit
from a closer consideration of how intoxication, withdrawal, and use shape cognitive
failures. In particular, ES studies might explore whether substance use at one time point
relates to increased failures at the next, or even later points (e.g., the morning after).
Researchers examining cognitive failures in schizotypy will need to focus on cannabis
use in particular, given that schizotypes tend to report patterns of increased psychosis246

like and unpleasant experiences following use (Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, & Lewis,
2006) which may exacerbate drug-related disruptions to everyday cognition.
A related issue identified in Chapter 3 was the lack of consideration for
comorbidity in psychiatric disorders. This mirrors (and co-occurs with) substance use as
a potential confound for findings around cognitive failures. Schizotypy itself is
associated with increased prevalence of psychiatric disorders beyond the schizophreniaspectrum; schizotypal personality disorder is associated with increased risk of PTSD,
bipolar, and anxiety disorders (Pulay et al., 2009). However, again, this issue was not
accounted for in this thesis’ focus on analogue samples. Both substance use and
psychiatric comorbidity warrant that methodological approaches within the field are
improved.
Looking beyond the focus of this thesis, future research could also examine the
possible application of the current findings to understanding cognition in other clinical
populations. Particular cognitive deficits, and difficulty processing and regulating affect
are noted in a number of other psychological disorders, but the direct impact of emotion
on cognition is rarely studied. For example, one area of interest would be substance use
disorders, in which cognitive impairment is evident even after detoxification is
completed (e.g., Fein, Torres, Price, & Di Sclafani, 2006; McCann et al., 2008).
Negative emotions are seen as one of the key drivers behind problematic substance use
patterns (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995; Verdejo-García, Bechara, Recknor, &
Pérez-García, 2007), and yet there is very little research considering how the experience
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of emotion may negatively impact decision-making processes, leading to maladaptive
behaviour including further substance use. Research examining whether the cognition of
individuals with substance abuse (and other) disorders is reduced when dealing with
emotional vs. neutral stimuli in the same way as in schizotypy will help to expand the
reach of the current findings into other important areas of clinical and non-clinical
psychology.

9.5. Conclusions
This thesis has addressed major conceptual limitations in an area of human
cognition that has rarely been examined in depth. The results provide a clearer
definition of self-reported cognitive failures as a valid measure of capacity for cognitive
functioning in real world contexts, shaped by a range of trait and state-based factors.
Importantly, self-perceived cognitive failures capture aspects of cognition separate to
those measured by traditional approaches such as objective neurocognitive assessment.
The findings also highlight the significance of heightened cognitive failures as a feature
common to psychological disorders, which may represent a marker of impaired emotion
processing and regulation. Further, this thesis has underscored the role of negative affect
in subjective cognitive complaints in schizotypy, alongside other as yet unknown facets
of this trait reflecting risk for psychosis. Collectively, these findings support the use of
self-reported cognitive failures as a meaningful measure of everyday cognition in
healthy, clinical, and at-risk groups. Clinically, the findings indicate a need to assess
subjective experiences of cognition separate to objective outcomes, and to treat
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emotional regulation and emotion processing difficulties as a key barrier to successful
day-to-day cognitive functioning in psychosis-prone populations. There is likely a
detrimental effect on quality of life for the broad range of individuals who experience
persistently high levels of everyday cognitive failures, emphasising the ongoing
significance of investigation into this aspect of human cognition.
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Appendix B
Table B.1. Pearson correlations among study variables - males
Variable

1.

2.

3.

1. CFQ-self

-

2. N-self

.369**

-

3. CFQ-observer

.426**

.083

-

4. N-observer

.143

.516**

.274**

4.

-

Table B.2. Pearson correlations among study variables - females
Variable

1.

2.

3.

1. CFQ-self

-

2. N-self

.361**

-

3. CFQ-observer

.264**

.053

-

4. N-observer

.117*

.470**

.167**

4.

-
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Appendix C
With regards to dimension of failures, females reported more distractions (M = 20.61,
SD = 6.11; versus M = 16.92, SD = 5.68 for males; t(861) = -8.21, p <.001), memory
problems (M =11.25, SD = 5.30; versus M = 9.48, SD = 4.79 for males; t(861) = -4.60, p
<.001), and blunders (M =12.79, SD = 4.56; versus M = 11.10, SD = 4.52 for males;
t(861) = -4.97, p <.001), but did not differ on names.
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Table C.1
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables Including Subscales of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
Variable
Mean
S.D.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

1. Schizotypy total

23.43

14.51

-

2. Cog-perceptual

9.56

7.07

.88**

-

3. Interpersonal

8.43

6.06

.83**

.52**

-

4. Disorganisation

5.44

4.10

.81**

.61**

.55**

-

5. Negative affect

15.54

11.50

.51**

.45**

.44**

.36**

-

6. Cog failures

46.92

15.68

.50**

.42**

.39**

.47**

.45**

-

7. Distractions

19.54

6.21

.48**

.39**

.40**

.44**

.41**

.92**

-

8. Memory

10.74

5.21

.40**

.36**

.28**

.37**

.39**

.89**

.74**

-

9. Blunders

12.30

4.61

.50**

.43**

.37**

.46**

.44**

.89**

.75**

.74**

-

10. Names
Note: **p < .01.

4.34

2.03

.24**

.16**

.22**

.25**

.23**

.58**

.49**

.39**

.44**

10.

-
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Appendix D
Table D.1
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables Including Subscales of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire and SPQ Total Score With and
Without Odd Speech Subscale Included – Study 2
Variable

1.

2.

1. CFQ total

-

2. SPQ total

.50** -

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

3. SPQ total less odd speech .47** .99** 4. SPQ odd speech

.49** .77** .69** -

5. SPQ ideas of ref

.38** .75** .76** .50** -

6. SPQ social anx

.41** .72** .73** .46** .43** -

7. SPQ odd beliefs

.21** .50** .51** .34** .45** .17** 332

Variable

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

8. SPQ unusual perceptions

.37** .72** .72** .53** .59** .36** .57** -

9. SPQ odd behavior

.32** .64** .63** .56** .38** .32** .25** .44** -

10. SPQ no friends

.26** .70** .72** .41** .32** .64** .15** .32** .35** -

11. SPQ constricted affect

.34** .75** .74** .57** .38** .58** .21** .37** .44** .71** -

12. SPQ suspicious

.36** .79** .80** .53** .67** .49** .31** .51** .38** .52** .52** -

Note: **p < .01.
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Table D.2
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables Including Subscales of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire and SPQ Total Score With and
Without Odd Speech Subscale Included – Study 3
Variable

1.

2.

1. CFQ total

-

2. SPQ total

.48** -

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

3. SPQ total less odd speech .44** .99** 4. SPQ odd speech

.50** .75** .64** -

5. SPQ ideas of ref

.28** .66** .67** .44** -

6. SPQ social anx

.33** .71** .74** .38** .34** -

7. SPQ odd beliefs

.08

8. SPQ unusual perceptions

.34** .60** .60** .39** .49** .33** .32** -

.26** .27** .12

.36** -.04

-
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Variable

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

9. SPQ odd behavior

.31** .60** .58** .52** .23** .30** -.01

.39** -

10. SPQ no friends

.19*

.17** .34** -

11. SPQ constricted affect

.38** .72** .71** .55** .27** .55** -.12

.19*

12. SPQ suspicious

.38** .82** .82** .55** .59** .55** .15

.38** .42** .52** .53** -

.69** .72** .37** .16

6.

7.

.60** .01

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

.38** .75** -

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Appendix E

Table E.1
International Affective Picture System Picture Numbers by Emotion Group for
Emotional N-Back Task.
“Neutral”
1675
2032
2445
2745.1
5390
7014
7052
7080
7170
7547
7632
8312
“Happy”
1463
2224
2314
4622
7270
7405
7580
8080
8370
8496
8502
8540

“Fearful”
2683
2688
2811
2981
3103
3500
3550
6821
9050
9630
9800
9911
“Sad”
2053
2141
2276
2345.1
2710
2900.1
3230
9041
9220
9331
9432
9530
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Appendix F
Performance for emotional versus neutral stimuli
To first examine general differences in performance between emotional and
neutral stimuli, performance outcomes for fearful, happy, and sad stimuli were averaged
together to create outcome variables looking at overall emotional working memory.
Collapsing across all working memory loads, paired samples t-tests revealed that high
schizotypes’ hit rates were significantly lower for emotional stimuli (M = 2.57, SD =
.30) than neutral stimuli (M = 2.65, SD = .26; t(38) = 2.78, p < .001). Low schizotypes’
hit rates did not differ according to stimuli type, with emotional stimuli (M = 2.64, SD =
.22) and neutral stimuli (M = 2.65, SD = .24) eliciting similar hit rates (t(47) = .64, p =
.26).
To explore the individual impact of specific type of emotion load on hit rates, zscores were calculated for overall hit rates for fearful, happy, and sad stimuli using the
mean and standard deviation for neutral stimuli hits for each group. This enabled a
comparison of the magnitude of difference in hit rates with the addition of each type of
emotional load versus performance for neutral stimuli as a baseline. Independent
samples t-tests were then carried out to compare whether the magnitude of difference in
hit performance for each type of emotional load relative to neutral stimuli differed
between high and low schizotypes. Mean scores, z-scores, and results are depicted in
337

Table 8.1. Whilst there were no significant group differences in the magnitude of
deviation in performance for any type of emotion versus neutral, at a trend level, fearful
stimuli elicited a more exaggerated reduction in hit rates and an increase in false alarms
for high schizotypes than low schizotypes.
For overall false alarm rates, high schizotypes produced more false alarms for
combined emotional (M = .24, SD = .18) than neutral stimuli (M = .17, SD = .18; p <
.001). Low schizotypes also demonstrated this pattern, with neutral stimuli (M = .15, SD
= .14) eliciting fewer false alarms than emotional stimuli (M = .22, SD = .11; p < .001).
Fearful stimuli appeared to result in the largest increase in false alarms relative to
neutral stimuli in both groups; again there were no significant group differences. Given
that emotional stimuli appeared to have some differential effects on working memory
performance, further analyses explored the combined effects of emotion type and load
by schizotypy group.
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Table F.1
Mean Performance and Deviations in Performance for Emotional Stimuli vs. Baseline
of Neutral Stimuli by Schizotypy Group
Overall mean (SD) hits

Mean z-score (SD)

p-values

and false alarms

deviations in performance

for group

with neutral as baseline

differences
in z-scores

High

Low

High

Low

Neutral

2.65 (.28)

2.65 (.24)

0

0

Fearful

2.55 (.29)

2.64 (.27)

-.40 (1.14)

-.03 (1.14)

0.06

Happy

2.49 (.38)

2.57 (.26)

-.63 (1.47)

-.33 (1.02)

0.14

Sad

2.66 (.31)

2.71 (.21)

.06 (1.20)

.24 (.83)

0.21

Neutral

.17 (.18)

.15 (.14)

0

0

Fearful

.33 (.20)

.28 (.17)

1.18 (1.35)

.83 (.79)

0.07

Happy

.21 (.23)

.20 (.13)

.34 (1.58)

.27 (.89)

0.40

Sad

.16 (.18)

.17 (.18)

-.03 (1.21)

.05 (1.25)

0.48

Hits

False alarms
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Hits
A mixed design ANOVA examined whether schizotypy interacted with load and
emotion to shape hit rates. CFQ was included as a covariate and was significant (F(1,
84) = 5.33, p = .02, ηp2= .06). Performance on 0-back blocks were tested for group
differences, however none were evident and this was not included as a covariate (t(85) =
-.28, p = .78).
Hits – task effects
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the
main effect of load (χ2(2) = 14.99, p < .01); this was also evident for the intercept of
load and emotion (χ2(20) = 45.95, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore
applied to relevant data.
Hits – effects of load
The analysis showed a significant main effect of load (F(1.79, 144.18) = 19.14,
p < .001, ηp2= .19). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that as expected, hits
declined as task difficulty increased. The 1-back load elicited the highest hit rate (M =
2.80, SD = .34), followed by 2-back (M = 2.56, SD = .33), and finally 3-back (M = 2.29,
M = .41). All loads differed significantly from each other, p < .001 for all comparisons.
Hits - effects of emotion
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The main effect of emotion was also significant (F(3, 252)=2.24, p = .04, ηp2=
.03). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that happy stimuli (M = 2.53, SD = .32)
resulted in a significantly lower hit rate than all other stimuli; neutral ((M = 2.65, SD =
.26; p <.001), sad (M = 2.67, SD = .27; p < .001), and fearful stimuli (M = 2.63, SD =
.27; p = .02). Fearful resulted in a lower hit rate than both neutral (p = .02) and sad
stimuli (p = .02). Neutral and sad stimuli did not differ in terms of hit rates (p = .11).
Hits – interactions for task effects
There was a trend interaction between load and emotion (F(5.64, 473.73) = 1.54,
p =.08, ηp2= .02). Inspection of plotted data suggested that hit rates for fearful stimuli
were slightly more stable across load level than other types of emotional stimuli.
Hits - schizotypy group effects
There was a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 5.02, p = .01, ηp2= .06),
with high schizotypes having a significantly lower hit rate (M = 2.48, SE = 0.40) than
low schizotypes (M = 2.61, SE = .04).
There was no significant interaction of load and schizotypy (F(1.72, 150.40) =
.74, p = .48, ηp2= .01), or emotion and schizotypy (F(3, 252) = 1.01, p = .39, ηp2= .01);
nor was there evidence of a three way interaction between emotion, load and schizotypy
(F(5.64, 473.73) = .34, p = .91, ηp2= .004). However given that a schizotypy by emotion
interaction was a specific hypothesis of this study, further analyses were conducted in
which high and low schizotypy groups were examined separately. Estimated marginal
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mean hit rates for high versus low schizotypes for each combination of load and
emotion are depicted in Table 8.2. There was no main effect of emotion for the low
group (F(3, 138) = 1.08, p = .12, ηp2= .02), but an effect was present for the high group
(F(3, 111) = 2.52, p =.03, η2= .06). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that high
schizotypes had significantly lower hit rates for fearful versus both neutral (p = .005)
and sad stimuli (p = .004), and hit rates were also lower for happy versus both neutral (p
= .001) and sad stimuli (p < .001). Fearful and happy stimuli did not differ significantly
from each other, nor did neutral and sad stimuli.
False alarms
The same three-way mixed design ANOVA was used to explore false alarms as a
second n-back performance indicator of interest. CFQ score was also included as a
covariate in this analysis, but its effect was present only at the trend level (F(1, 84)
=1.99, p = .08, ηp2= .02). Performance on 0-back blocks were tested for group
differences, and as with hits none were evident and this was not included as a covariate
(t(85) = -.25, p = .81).
False alarms – task effects
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was again violated for
load (χ2(2)=17.74, p < .001); this was also evident for interaction of load and emotion
(χ2(20) = 87.33, p < .001). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore applied to relevant
data.
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Table F.2
Estimated Marginal Means for Hit Rates Across Schizotypy Group, N-Back Load Level, and Emotion Type
1-back

2-back
M (SE)

3-back

M (SE)

95% CI

95% CI

M (SE)

95% CI

Neutral

2.90 (.04)

[2.82, 2.97] 2.44 (.08)

[2.28, 2.59] 2.33 (.09)

[2.15, 2.50]

Fearful

2.83 (.05)

[2.73, 2.94] 2.50 (.06)

[2.38, 2.61] 1.96 (.09)

[1.78, 2.13]

Happy

2.52 (.05)

[2.43, 2.61] 2.39 (.09)

[1.98, 2.38] 2.18 (.10)

[1.98, 2.38]

Sad

2.80 (.05)

[2.70, 2.90] 2.54 (.06)

[2.42, 2.66] 2.35 (.08)

[2.18, 2.51]

Neutral

2.93 (.03)

[2.86, 2.99] 2.55 ( .07)

[2.41, 2.69] 2.39 (.08)

[2.32, 2.54]

Fearful

2.92 (.05)

[2.83, 3.02] 2.67 (.05)

[2.57, 2.78] 2.22 (.08)

[2.07, 2.38]

Happy

2.62 (.04)

[2.54, 2.70] 2.61 (.08)

[2.46, 2.76] 2.29 (.09)

[2.11, 2.47]

Sad

2.91 (.04)

[2.82, 2.99] 2.73 (.05)

[2.62, 2.84] 2.48 (.07)

[2.34, 2.63]

High

Low
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False alarms – effects of load
A similar pattern of findings was observed for false alarms as in hits. There was a
significant main effect of load (F(1.78, 149.41) = 11.13, p < .001, ηp2= .12), with posthoc pairwise comparisons again indicating reduced performance with increased load,
with the 3-back condition eliciting the most false alarms (M = .34, SD = .25), followed
by 2-back (M = .22, SD = .19), and 1-back (M = .05, SD = .13). Again, each of the
levels of load differed to each other, with comparisons significant at p < .001.
False alarms – effects of emotion
A main effect of emotion was also apparent (F(3, 252) = 2.56, p = .03, ηp2= .03).
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that happy stimuli (M = .21, SD = .17) elicited
fewer false alarms than neutral (M = .16, SD = .15; p< .001), fearful (M = .31, SD =
.18; p < .001) and sad stimuli (M = .16, SD = .17; p = .003). Fearful stimuli, meanwhile,
elicited more false alarms than neutral (p< .001), happy (p< .001) and sad stimuli (p<
.001). Neutral and sad stimuli, meanwhile, did not differ significantly from each other
on false alarm rates.
False alarms – interactions of task effects
There were no significant interactions between load and emotion for false alarms
(F(4.67, 392.14) = 1.23, p =.30, ηp2= .01).
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False alarms – schizotypy group effects
The between-subjects effect of schizotypy group was significant at a trend level
(F(1, 84) = 2.07, p = .08, ηp2= .02), with the high schizotypes producing slightly more
false alarms (M = .23, SE = .03) than low schizotypes (M = .18, SE = .03).
There was a significant interaction between emotion and schizotypy group (F(3,
252) = 2.33, p = .04, ηp2 = .03), as well as a significant three-way interaction between
load, emotion, and schizotypy group for false alarms (F(4.67, 392.14) = 2.59, p = .02,
ηp2= .03). A variety of post-hoc analyses were conducted to explore these interactions
further. Separate repeated measures ANOVAs for the high and low schizotypy groups
failed to reveal clear differences in the effects of emotion or load between groups,
although the main effect of emotion was absent for the low group (F(3, 138) = .87, p =
.23, ηp2 = .02), while a trend was evident for the high group (F(3, 111) = 1.66, p = .09,
ηp2 = .04).
Graphs were plotted using mean false alarm rates for each combination of load
and emotion (with marginal means as depicted in Table F.3) in order to specifically
explore the meaning of the three-way interaction between load, emotion, and
schizotypy. These helped to identify the areas of greatest difference in performance for
different levels of emotion and load within each schizotypy group, which then informed
follow up analyses. For example, from examination of the plotted data, there appeared
to be no differences between types of emotional stimuli or groups at the 1-back level of
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load. However, at the 2-back level, there was greater separation between false alarm
rates for different types of emotion for both the high and low groups; at the 3-back
level, separation was evident for the high group only. A number of independent samples
t-tests were conducted according to observed differences. These revealed that high and
low schizotypes differed in their performance only for fearful stimuli at the 3-back
level, with the high group making more false alarm errors than the low group (p < .01).
Again, no other load/emotion false alarm outcomes were explored for between and
within group differences on the basis of no apparent separation between scores in the
plotted graphs.
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Table F.3
Estimated Marginal Means for False Alarms Across Schizotypy Group, N-Back Load Level, and Emotion Type
1-back

2-back

3-back

M (SE)

95% CI

M (SE)

95% CI

M (SE)

95% CI

Neutral

0.07 (0.03)

[.00, .13]

0.24 (0.05)

[.14, .34]

0.36 (.06)

[.25, .47]

Fearful

0.07 (.03)

[.02, .12]

0.42 (.05)

[.33, .52]

0.54 (.07)

[.41, .68]

Happy

0.07 (.04)

[-.01, .14]

0.10 (.04)

[.03, .17]

0.27 (.06)

[.16, .38]

Sad

0.07 (.03)

[.01, .13]

0.22 (.05)

[.12, .31]

0.36 (.06)

[.23, .49]

Neutral

0.04 (.03)

[-.02, .09]

0.19 (.05)

[.03, .21]

0.37 (.05)

[.27, .47]

Fearful

0.02 (.02)

[-.02, .07]

0.39 (.04)

[.31, .48]

0.25 (.06)

[.13, .37]

Happy

0.06 (.03)

[.00, .13]

0.09 (.03)

[.03, .15]

0.21 (.05)

[.11, .31]

Sad

0.05 (.03)

[-.01, .10]

0.21 (.04)

[.13, .30]

0.29 (.06)

[.18, .40]

High

Low
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Role of cognitive failures in accounting for hits and false alarms in schizotypy
As previously described, CFQ score acted as a covariate for hits, but not false
alarms. Table F.4 depicts changes in main effects and three-way interaction F values
according to the addition of CFQ as a covariate. Evidently, the inclusion of CFQ did not
alter the significance of either interaction. It can be seen that inclusion of CFQ as a
covariate did alter some of the main effects although not sufficiently to shift whether a
finding was significant or not, with the exception of schizotypy group for hits. This
suggests that interindividual differences in CFQ do not account for the observed
differences between high and low schizotypes’ performance across levels of load and
emotion.
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Table F.4
Changes in F Value According to Addition of Cognitive Failures as a Covariate
F
Hits

False alarms

p-value

Partial eta2

Load

117.57

<.001

.58

Load [CFQ]

19.14

<.001

.19

Emotion

17.60

<.001

.17

Emotion [CFQ]

2.24

.04

.03

Schizotypy group

1.63

.11

.02

Schizotypy group [CFQ]

5.02

.01

.06

Load x emotion x schizotypy

.86

.52

.01

Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

.34

.91

.004

Load

76.85

<.001

.48

Load [CFQ]

11.13

<.001

.12

Emotion

20.73

<.001

.20

Emotion [CFQ]

2.58

.03

.03

Schizotypy group

.68

.21

.01

Schizotypy group [CFQ]

1.99

.08

.02

Load x emotion x schizotypy

2.65

.03

.03

Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ]

2.59

.03

.03

Note. [CFQ] denotes CFQ added to the model as a covariate.
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